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Introduction
The private provision of public goods (PPPG) is still one of the most fascinating
puzzles in economics. Underpredicted by standard economic theory but outrightly ev-
ident in empirical evidence, its presence opened doors for new methods to enter the
economist’s toolkit and helped birthing the nowadays more vibrant than ever field of
behavioral economics.1 The essence of the puzzle of PPPG has been the question: Why
do people voluntarily give to provide public goods? Even with decades of research in
economics and other disciplines, this question is far from being answered fundamentally
such that a uniform theory of PPPG could be formulated. Thus, there are important
research gaps to fill along the incremental way to provide an answer.
Closely related to the question of causes is the question of determinants: What af-
fects voluntary giving to public goods? While the answers to the first question mostly lie
in the realm of unobservable physio-psychological drivers and motivations2, the second
question asks for observable conditions, traits, or contexts and their e↵ects on individuals’
contributions to public goods or their propensity to give, without much focus on underly-
ing mediators. Insights regarding the determinants of PPPG can benefit society—apart
from satisfying fundamental scientific interest—along two dimensions: First, they can
help advancing research about the fundamental causes of PPPG on its way to a unified
theory by inspiring new potential motivations or mediators or by having implications
for known ones. Second, they may in fact speak to regulators (or fundraisers) who want
to encourage PPPG where e cient and who wonder about how to create a nurturing
environment. While my personal interest in this research was sparked by the first of
these returns, the second one cannot be denied.
1The interested reader is referred to Olson (1965) or any introductory microeconomic text for the
neoclassical results of the theory, to, e.g., Schokkaert (2006) for a summary of empirical evidence, and
to Camerer et al. (2011) and Kagel and Roth (1995) to find reviews of the development of behavioral
and experimental economics.
2See, e.g., Kolm and Ythier (2006) for an overview.
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As the reader will find out, variants of the question of determinants make up, for
the most part, the research questions of the five articles that constitute this dissertation.
Thus, while each of the five papers largely stands for itself, the articles are far from being
independent from each other. One purpose of the introductory summary of the papers
following below is, besides providing an overview, elucidating their interrelation by the
common question of the determinants of voluntary provision.3
On a methodological note, the research of the five articles of this dissertation resides
on the overlap of public economics, environmental economics, and behavioral/experimental
economics. In particular, while public economics provides the basic theoretical frame-
work of PPPG, environmental economics is the realm of most applications or contexts,
and behavioral/experimental economics is from where I borrow the dominant method—
experiments. Experiments are a natural methodological choice for targeting the determi-
nants of giving to public goods: Among the available empirical strategies, experiments
provide a particular high amount of control to the researcher, who can design appropri-
ate experimental treatments to isolate or identify specific determinants. The five articles
contained in this dissertation report on three di↵erent experiments, two of which were
online experiments with subjects from the general population. In one experiment, the
subject sample was representative for the Internet-using part of the German population.
This experiment (Papers 1 to 3) was a “framed” field experiment (Harrison and List
2004) in which both the subject sample and the experimental stakes were “from the
field”. The second, “artefactual” field experiment (Paper 4) was a typical laboratory
design conducted with subjects from the general population via Internet. The third
experiment (Paper 5) was a standard laboratory experiment using student subjects.
Synopsis
The first article targets the probably most fundamental determinant of demand: the
price. The paper presents and analyzes an online “framed” field experiment on the
decision to contribute to a (real) public good which exogenously and directly varies the
3In providing this overview, I will largely refrain from providing references in this introduction. See
the particular papers for a detailed collection of the relevant literature.
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price of contributing one unit of the public good. The paper reports results for 2,440
subjects who were representative for the Internet-using population of Germany. Each
subject was assigned to one of 50 di↵erent amounts of money he or she had to give up in
order to provide the contribution. In contrast to earlier field-experimental results from
indirect price variations using match ratios and rebate rates, the theoretical prediction
of a clear negative relationship between price and the decision whether to contribute is
borne out by the experimental evidence: In the analysis, my coauthor Timo Goeschl and
I find a price e↵ect that is highly significant and negative, but also small and estimate
the mean elasticity of the probability to contribute as  0.31. As this finding aligns
with empirical evidence that public goods exhibit lower price elasticities than private
goods, the result provides one argument for research on “non-price” determinants of
public good contributions. In correlating sociodemographic characteristics of the highly
heterogeneous subject sample with their choices, we provide strong support for the level
of education being an important determinant of public good contributions.
In the second article, we analyze the same experimental choices in the context of
the particular real-world public good we used and with respect to additional, potentially
context-specific determinants. The public good in the experiment was greenhouse gas
emissions reductions, which do not only pose a natural opportunity to study price ef-
fects through direct price variation but is of interest in its own right as some voices in
the public debate on climate change have been emphasizing “voluntary climate action”
as a potential remedy or at least an important part of the solution strategy to climate
change. In order to arrive at a willingness to pay (WTP) estimate for a voluntarily
provided unit of the public good, the contribution decision subjects faced in the exper-
iment was framed in terms of the simple dichotomous choice between the guaranteed
reduction of 1 metric ton of CO2 emissions and the randomly assigned cash amount.4 In
the statistical analysis, in order to reduce a potential bias of WTP estimates from the
presence of “fat tails” in the empirical WTP distribution in our data, we jointly estimate
4Thus, the experimental design resembles a standard dichotomous choice valuation question in con-
tingent valuation studies but exhibits non-hypothetical properties. By constraining the contribution to
one unit, the design focuses on the “extensive margin” of giving. In contrast, many public good experi-
ments in the literature focus on variations at the “intensive margin” without price variation: By letting
subjects decide on how much of an endowment to contribute, the decision is on how many “units” of the
public good to provide at a (usually implicit) fixed price.
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the choice of the emissions reduction, the non-zero probability of complete indi↵erence
to the o↵ered choice, and the endogeneity of prior knowledge about the particular public
good in a three-equations mixture model. The results regarding the determinants of
the contribution choice are mainly threefold: First, the analysis confirms education as
the outstanding correlate among subjects’ sociodemographic characteristics. Second, the
joint model uncovers interesting subtleties within the submodels, suggesting that younger
and male subjects demonstrate better endogenous knowledge about climate change re-
lated figures but, at the same time, are less likely to participate in any voluntary climate
action at all. Third, additional controls, potentially specific to this public good, deliver
significant additional determinants. Some of these additional controls come from data
about the time and likely location of a subject’s experimental choice within Germany,
which allow us to match regional weather data as well as data on the media coverage of
the issue of climate change to each subject’s choice. The main result here is that higher
outdoor mean temperatures during the days prior to the choice significantly increase the
probability of choosing the emissions reduction. More controls come from answers to a
questionnaire administered after the experimental choice. These variables suggest that
higher expected benefits of emissions reductions, both personal and, more so, for future
generations, as well as an awareness of a negative impact of personal lifestyle on the
climate increases the propensity to choose the emissions reduction. Results regarding
WTP revealed by subjects are ambiguous: Despite the use of the joint mixture model
and a considerably higher bid range than previous studies on the WTP for voluntary
climate action, the issue of “fat tails” renders the estimates sensitive to model assump-
tions. The most conservative lower-bound estimate would be e 6.30 for mean and e 0.30
for median WTP for 1 ton of voluntary CO2 emissions reductions.
The third article exploits the statistical power of a dataset of 12,624 observations
to (1) investigate the presence and strength of certain causal motivations driving the
decision to contribute to a public good and (2) review some of our previous results re-
garding determinants. The dataset consists of the same observations of the online framed
field experiment analyzed in Papers 1 and 2 (referred to as the “baseline treatment” in
this paper) but also includes observations from additional subjects assigned to various
4
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treatment conditions targeted at isolating altruism, a “warm glow” of giving, image
motivation, and equity concerns. Furthermore, each of the 6,312 subjects in total was
observed in a second contribution choice, allowing for within-subject analysis of treat-
ment e↵ects besides between-subjects analysis. In the results, evidence on treatment
e↵ects is mixed and points to significant e↵ects of framing and the sequence of present-
ing options. Regarding the determinants of the contribution choice in the experiment,
the results confirm education as the most pronounced and robust sociodemographic de-
terminant. In addition, the positive e↵ect of age and being female on the propensity to
give becomes marginally significant, in contrast to the findings in Papers 1 and 2 and
presumably due to the statistical power of the full sample. Lastly, results largely confirm
the positive causal e↵ect of outdoor temperatures.
In the fourth article, Timo Goeschl, Israel Waichman and I follow up on the ob-
servation that many real-world public goods, such as climate change mitigation, are
privately provided among large groups. Other examples such as national and interna-
tional charitable organizations, open source software programs, or online encyclopedias
are likewise consumed by literally millions or billions of individuals who are, at the
same time, potential contributors. This observation renders group size a potentially im-
portant determinant of PPPG. Lab-experimental insights about an e↵ect of group size
is—for large groups, pure public goods, and in the standard linear environment—almost
entirely based upon one piece of work by Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994) while the-
ory provides ambiguous predictions and empirical evidence is mixed. We present major
methodological improvements to Isaac, Walker, and Williams’ design and run a “long-
term” online experiment with a diverse sample of the German population and group
sizes of ten, 40, and 100 subjects per group. Our procedure produces data of higher
quality than Isaac, Walker, and Williams’ dated procedure could deliver, and the results
confirm the positive relationship of group size and individual contributions, but with
higher statistical confidence. Thus, individuals provide more of a pure public good in
larger groups. In addition, our data provide evidence that this positive e↵ect is also
present in subjects’ first-order beliefs and that subjects consistently underestimate oth-
ers’ contributions across group sizes. As in Papers 1 to 3, the highly heterogeneous
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nature of the subject sample allows to also analyze the role of several sociodemographic
characteristics. In support of our previous findings, education is a significant determi-
nant of contributions which, in contrast to our first experiment, include variations at
the intensive margin. Also, age positively correlates with contributions but estimates
are mostly insignificant. In contrast to our previous results, females give less in this
“artefactual” field experiment. A sociodemographic attribute not elicited in Papers 1
to 3 is a rural residential environment, which positively correlates with contributions in
this experiment.
In the fifth article, I take up our previous finding that certain environmental con-
ditions (such as temperature) may determine di↵erences in public good provision. In
particular, I turn to the e↵ects which environmental stressors (such as noise, air pollu-
tion, extreme temperatures, or crowding) might have on economic behavior. Especially
in the controlled environment of economic experiments, this has not been subject to
systematic research so far as traditionally, economics has been abstracting economic be-
havior from the influence of environmental stressors, much as it used to do for moods
and emotions. Environmental stressors may pose relevant externalities in the economy,
however, if three conditions are fulfilled: (1) The e↵ect of environmental stressors on
economic behavior is significant, (2) the ambient levels of environmental stressors are
subject to (man-made) change, and (3) adaptation of humans to altered levels is imper-
fect or costly. In this paper, I address condition (1) and test for an e↵ect of acute noise
exposure on cooperative behavior in a standard linear public good experiment in the
laboratory. I find a negative e↵ect of noise exposure on contribution levels that is statis-
tically significant for certain subgroups of the sample. This direction of the e↵ect points
against a mediation of the e↵ect by physiological stress, given the available evidence on
this mediator in the literature.
References
Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G. and Rabin, M. (2011). Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Harrison, G. W. and List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments, Journal of Economic Literature 42(4): 1009–
6
Introduction
1055.
Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M. and Williams, A. W. (1994). Group size and the voluntary provision of
public goods: Experimental evidence utilizing large groups, Journal of Public Economics 54(1): 1–36.
Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E. (1995). The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Kolm, S.-C. and Ythier, J. M. (2006). Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity,
Elsevier.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Vol. 124,
Harvard University Press.
Schokkaert, E. (2006). The empirical analysis of transfer motives, in S.-C. Kolm and J. M. Ythier (eds),
Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, Vol. 1, Elsevier, pp. 127–181.
7
8
To Give or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and the
Provision of Public Goods⇤†
Johannes Diederich Timo Goeschl
Abstract
We examine the relationship between the price of giving and the decision to
contribute in a framed field experiment (n = 2, 440). In a departure from previous
research using match rates and rebates, we vary the price of contributing to the
public good directly. Treatment groups di↵er between subjects by the amount of
money subjects have to give up in order to provide one unit of the public good. In
contrast to earlier results, the theoretical prediction of a clear negative relationship
between price and the decision whether to contribute is borne out by the experi-
mental evidence. We estimate the mean elasticity of the probability to contribute
as  0.31. The direct price e↵ect is robust across specifications including sociodemo-
graphic controls for the highly heterogeneous, Internet-representative non-student
sample of subjects.
Keywords: voluntary contributions; public goods; price elasticity; field experi-
ment; online experiment
JEL Classifications: C93, D12, H41
1 Introduction
The private provision of public goods has been attracting sustained attention from
economists for several decades now. A natural and recurrent question within this field
has been how the price of giving to the public good a↵ects its supply (see e.g. Vesterlund
2006). Answering this question requires observing variations in the price of giving, and
relating those price variations to observed variations in giving decisions. The empirical
literature, starting with Feldstein and Taylor (1976) and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976),
has been exploiting observable variations in the marginal income tax rate between house-
holds to study the price e↵ect in settings in which contributions to public or charitable
⇤The authors are grateful to Andreas Lange, John List, and seminar participants at Cambridge,
Heidelberg, the London School of Economics, Manchester, and the NBER Summer Institute 2012 for
helpful comments. The usual waiver applies. We also thank Holger Geißler and Soreen Schroll at
YouGov for cooperation, Dr. Svenja Espenhorst and Dennis Mignon at First Climate for support in
acquiring EU ETS allowances, and Ruth Fieber, Christina Grimm, and Thomas Scheuerle for student
assistance. Financial support by the German Science Foundation (DFG) under grant GO1604/1 is
gratefully acknowledged.
†This paper is available as NBERWorking Paper No. 19332. An early version of this paper is available
under Diederich and Goeschl (2011).
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causes are tax deductible and, therefore, subsidized.1 More recently, the focus of empir-
ical research in this area has shifted to gathering evidence from field experiments carried
out in a fundraising context. These have provided new estimates of price elasticities of
giving (Karlan and List 2007, Eckel and Grossman 2008, Karlan et al. 2011, Huck and
Rasul 2011). A major benefit of field experiments is that the researcher is not restricted
by given variations in marginal income tax rates. Instead, exogenous variations in the
price of giving can be introduced in a controlled manner and independent of subjects’
household income. The typical vehicle for such exogenous variations have been changes
in the so-called “match ratio”, i.e. the amount of money that some third party will con-
tribute for every unit of money donated by the subject (Karlan and List 2007, Eckel and
Grossman 2008, Karlan et al. 2011, Huck and Rasul 2011).2 Converted into theoretically
equivalent price variations, the evidence from variations in match ratios forms the basis
of our current empirical understanding of the price e↵ect.
Using variations in match ratios as a measure of the price e↵ect in giving decisions of-
fers a number of advantages, as it allows randomized assignment to subjects, is a familiar
feature of fundraising, and is easy to implement.3 It is also theoretically straightforward:
The conversion of match ratios into theoretically equivalent price changes is simple. A
1:1 (1:2) match ratio should have the same e↵ect as a reduction in the price by 50%
(67%).
At the same time, getting at the price e↵ect indirectly via match ratios also has
drawbacks. One important drawback is the assumption implicit in the indirect ap-
proach that subjects’ response to variations in match ratios can safely be interpreted
as those of the theoretically equivalent price variation. The validity of this assumption
has been thrown into doubt by recent experimental evidence. For example in the case
of contributions to public goods, match ratios and their theoretically equivalent rebate
rates give rise to systematically di↵erent behavior among potential contributors, both in
the laboratory (Eckel and Grossman 2003) and in the field (Eckel and Grossman 2008).
1See, e.g., Peloza and Steel (2005) for a comprehensive review of empirical estimates of the price
elasticity of giving.
2For comparative purposes, Eckel and Grossman (2008) also uses rebate rates as a vehicle.
3Even though one drawback is that matches and rebates only allow the experimenter to reduce the
price of giving, not to increase it.
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The introduction of a match leads to a greater e↵ect on giving than the introduction
of its theoretically equivalent rebate rate. Similarly, in an experiment involving private
goods, Davis and Millner (2005) compare rebates, matches, and direct price variations
that should be equivalent on theoretical grounds. They find that there are systematic
di↵erences in the quantity responses to these vehicles. This implies that for private
goods, “match rate elasticities”, i.e. price elasticities derived on the basis of variations
in match ratios, are likely to be biased estimators of the price elasticity in a narrow
sense. While we are not aware of comparable evidence for public goods, these results
show at a minimum that the empirical equivalence of variations in match rates and in
prices cannot be taken for granted.
In this paper, we present the design and report on the results of a framed field
experiment that provides a direct measure of the price e↵ect in a decision whether
to contribute or not. The direct price e↵ect arises out of the treatment condition in
the experiment: Di↵erent subjects are randomly assigned a di↵erent amount of money
that they give up if they decide to supply one unit of the public good. The observed
e↵ect on the probability to contribute therefore closely relates to the notion of the price
e↵ect from the theory of the private provision of public goods (Bergstrom et al. 1986,
Andreoni 1990). The decision whether to contribute or not presents a useful first target
for a study of the direct price e↵ect: While an immediate prediction of theory is that,
all else equal, the share of contributors in a population is a decreasing function of the
price of contributing, a number of papers have found little field experimental support
for the conjecture. Neither variations in match rates (Karlan and List 2007, Eckel and
Grossman 2008, Huck and Rasul 2011) nor in rebate rates (Eckel and Grossman 2008)
appear to influence subjects’ decision whether to contribute.4 Similarly, in an empirical
paper exploiting variation in marginal tax rates, Smith et al. (1995) find that the rebate
rate does not impact on the decision whether to contribute to a rural health care facility.
The basic idea of simply using direct price variation as a treatment in an experiment
on giving is, of course, not new. For example, Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Andreoni
4However, there is evidence that the presence of a lead donor in itself has a significant positive impact
on the probability that some positive contribution will be given. See Huck and Rasul (2011) for a careful
discussion of the possible mechanisms at work.
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and Vesterlund (2001) introduce, in a laboratory-based within-subject dictator game
design, a direct variation in the price of giving by changing how many units of their
experimental endowment a dictator has to give up in order to transfer a unit to the
recipient. However, the idea has to our knowledge not been used in the context of public
goods provision and in a framed field experiment (Harrison and List 2004). This enables
us to control for a number of subject attributes such as age (e.g. List 2004), gender (e.g.
Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001), education (e.g. Karlan 2005) and culture (Ockenfels and
Weimann 1999, Brandts et al. 2004, Brosig-Koch et al. 2011) that conceivably interact
with the price e↵ect and also to check for the presence of field price censoring among
subjects.
The experiment was administered to a non-student population of 2,440 subjects,
employing a between-subjects design. The real public good used in the experiment was
verified CO2 emissions reductions, a natural choice since they represent a real physical
contribution to a public good, are perfectly uniform and individually traceable. Subjects
were randomly assigned to one of fifty treatments, with the experimental price of con-
tributing one metric ton of emissions reductions lying between e2 and e100, depending
on the treatment group.
Based on this design, we estimate a direct price e↵ect on the probability to contribute
to the public good that is negative and statistically significant: On average, increasing
the price for supplying a unit of the public good by e1 decreases the probability that the
individual will contribute by around 0.1%. Estimated across all price treatments, the
probability to contribute has a price elasticity of  0.31. There is some evidence of non-
linearity in the price e↵ect, but the net e↵ect is vanishingly small within the treatment
range. The direct price e↵ect therefore confirms the theoretical prediction that, all else
equal, the number of contributors is a decreasing function of the price of contributing.
Our data do not provide evidence for the presence of a gender, age, or a culture e↵ect in
terms of either levels or elasticities. We find, however, support for the hypothesis that
the level of education has a positive role in determining contributions to public goods.5
The paper proceeds as follows: We explain the experimental design considerations
5The same design can be used to draw conclusions about individuals’ willingness to pay for voluntary
climate action. See Diederich and Goeschl (2013) for an implementation.
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and procedures in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and discusses the
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design
The estimation of the direct price e↵ect on the individual probability of contributing
relies on an experimental design that manipulates the price of giving to a public good.
Basic economic intuition dictates that in a su ciently heterogeneous and large popula-
tion, a higher price of giving will be associated with fewer individuals deciding in favor of
contributing. The intuition can be confirmed by introducing a unit price for the public
good into a variant of Andreoni’s 1989, 1990 classical impurely altruistic model.6 The
experimental implementation of the intuition combines the idea of direct price variation
by the experimenter (e.g. Andreoni and Miller 2002, Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001) with
the idea of controlled contributions to a public good or a charity explored by Kingma
(1989), Eckel and Grossman (1996), Karlan and List (2007), Eckel and Grossman (2008),
Karlan et al. (2011), to name just a few. The core feature of the treatment condition
consists of di↵erent units of experimental pay-o↵ that subjects have to give up in or-
der to contribute one unit of the real public good. The real public good are verified
CO2 emissions reductions7 and the unit is one metric ton. The emissions reduction
is realized in the form of the documented and verifiable retirement (“deletion”) of an
emissions allowance (EUA) under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU
ETS). Retiring one EUA lowers the total ceiling of the Scheme, and hence emissions, by
one ton.8
6In this model and its variants in the literature, the price of the public good is conventionally normal-
ized to one along with the private good. We provide a formal proof of the proposition that the number
of contributors in a su ciently heterogenous population decreases in the price of contributing to the
public good in the appendix to this paper.
7Economists have long noted that voluntary emissions reductions to mitigate climate change consti-
tute a close empirical counterpart to a contribution in a large public goods game (e.g. Nordhaus 1993).
An obvious prerequisite is that subjects agree with the economists’ characterization. We come to this in
the next subsection.
8Among several possibilities, the regulatory framework of the EU ETS, regulating the bulk of indus-
trial CO2 emissions across EU member states, provides the most reliable and transparent technology
for real contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions reductions in an experiment. First, retiring
EUAs avoids the problem of additionality frequently encountered for project-based carbon o↵sets as the
total cap of the EU ETS is binding and enforced. Second, each EUA is uniquely identified by its issue
number and hence individually traceable. Third, EUAs are not paper currency and have therefore no
curiosity value as a tangible private commodity. Total EU emissions for the trading period 2008-2012,
13
Paper 1 · The Price of Contributing
Subjects are randomly assigned to one of the fifty di↵erent treatment groups, di↵er-
entiated by the price of contributing. The price of contributing ranges, in increments of
e2, from e2 to e100, the upper bound reflecting a current estimate of the maximum
marginal cost of emissions reductions per metric ton of CO2 (Tol 2010). Subjects only
decide whether to contribute or not at the given price. They do not learn about others’
choices before, during, or after the experiment.
Subjects’ choices are implemented under a random incentive system (RIS) (Grether
and Plott 1979, Starmer and Sugden 1991, Lee 2008) in order to limit total cost of the
experiment. The RIS is between-subjects (BS)(Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Baltussen
et al. 2010, Abdellaoui et al. 2011) with odds of one in fifty that the subject’s choice (of
either cash or contribution) was realized. On the experimental screens, the BS-RIS is
framed as a lottery in which the winners’ prize choices will be implemented.9
Like in most lab experiments, both financial incentives and public good benefits in the
present design are “on the house”. An alternative procedure that was considered would
have involved requiring subjects to give up own money when choosing to contribute to
the public good. Our choice in favor of the standard lab procedure was mainly due to
questions of practicality and the cost of time and e↵ort to the subject of transferring
funds in an Internet experiment from the subject to the experimenter.10 The latter
transaction costs are equivalent to an individual minimum price on the contribution that
would be unobservable and therefore out of control of the experimenter. In the literature,
there is an ongoing debate on potential e↵ects of “house money” on contributions in
public good experiments.11 Based on these results, however, there is little evidence
the relevant one for this experiment, were capped at 1.856 billion tons.
9Between-subjects (BS) and within-subject (WS) RIS have been subjected to examination for possible
biases. While BS introduces noise and decreases risk aversion, there is less evidence of a systematic bias
for simple tasks Cubitt et al. (1998), Baltussen et al. (2010). In one example, BS-RIS has been shown
to a↵ect behavior in dictator games Sefton (1992) while for ultimatum games, behavior was una↵ected
Bolle (1990).
10For example, the infrastructure of our cooperation partner is not designed to facilitate payments
from subjects to the company.
11The evidence on a “windfall” (Keeler et al. 1985) or “house money” (Thaler and Johnson 1990) e↵ect
in public goods experiments, and if so in which direction, is mixed. While the classic finding is that
with house money individuals behave less risk-averse Thaler and Johnson (1990), Clark (2002) finds no
significant di↵erence in contribution behavior in a standard voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM)
in the lab. Harrison (2007) reviews Clark’s analysis of the data and identifies a decrease of contributors
at the extensive margin by 8% when using house money. Engel and Mo↵at (2012) use a panel version
of the double hurdle model on the same data and find that house money increases the probability of
being a “potential contributor”. Carlsson et al. (2013) find in a dictator game that subjects behave more
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to inform whether price elasticities would be a↵ected by a di↵erence in contribution
probabilities, if any.
2.1 Subjects and procedures
The choice of subjects and the procedures under which the experimental design is imple-
mented constitute a “framed field” setting.12 The design is administered to a non-student
population of 2,440 subjects drawn from the approximately 65,000 Internet panel mem-
bers of the German section of YouGov and are representative for Germany’s Internet
using population of voting age.13 The choice of population has some significance for
an experiment that relies on economists’ view of emissions reductions as public goods
contributions: Irrespective of age, sex, education, or political orientation, previous sur-
veys have concluded that German citizens overwhelmingly accept the empirical veracity
of climate change and its anthropogenic cause in the form of greenhouse gas emissions
(European Commission 2008). An exit questionnaire was administered to all subjects
that confirmed the prior evidence.
The Internet experiment ran in two sessions in May and July 2010.14 Session 1
lasted from May 25th to June 2nd and generated 1,640 complete observations from
1,817 invitations to the ‘baseline’ treatment. Session 2 lasted from July 19th to 27th
and generated 800 complete observations out of 888 invitations. The recruitment of
subjects followed the standard routine in which panel members are invited via an email
message to proceed to the poll via a hypertext link. The introductory screen then
explained, as common with the pollster’s regular surveys, the thematic focus of the
poll (CO2 emissions and climate change), the expected duration (ten minutes), and the
payment (in form of a lottery).15
generously with house money than with own money both in the lab and in the field.
12Following the nomenclature of Harrison and List (2004), our design falls short of a “natural field
experiment” by virtue of the setting, which is familiar, but not natural, and by virtue of the awareness
of subjects that their choices are being observed.
13We test whether our sample di↵ers from one drawn from the general population of German voters.
Using two-sided t-tests, we reject the hypothesis that the means of the socio-demographic characteristics
coincide at the 1% level. Our subjects are slightly more likely to be male, younger, and educated than
the average German of voting age. Income is self-reported, and therefore the lower average income in
the sample is unsurprising.
14Prior to the experiment we ran a set of pre-tests and a pilot experiment with 200 economics students
at Heidelberg University to test the online implementation and refine the set of texts and questions.
15The polling company usually incentivizes panel members participating in a in polls through either a
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Following the introductory screen, there was a filter screen to focus on German
subjects.16 Participants then faced a sequence of 10 to 13 computer screens, depending
on their decisions.17
On average, 49 subjects were randomly assigned to each treatment group, di↵erenti-
ated by the experimental price.18 The centerpiece of the experiment were two screens,
the information screen that set up and the decision screen that collected the subject’s
choice. The information screen explained three features of the experiment, (1) the choice
between a cash prize in Euros and the CO2 emissions reduction, (2) a succinct expla-
nation of how choosing the emissions reduction results in a real, reliable, and verifiable
reduction in EU CO2 emissions through the deletion of an EUA, and (3) an explanation
of the RIS with odds of 100 in every 5,000.19 Furthermore, the text reminded subjects
of the purely public nature of the contribution. Like in other field experiments on public
and charitable goods, the instructions did not contain further information on what the
precise public goods e↵ects of a contribution are.20 Instructions were kept short and
simple in order to avoid well-known biases and potential misinterpretations that arise
when providing subjects with potentially choice-relevant information about the public
good around the time of the contribution decision (Arrow et al. 1993).
The decision screen of the experiment explained how the subject’s choice would
materialize if the subject was drawn as a winner.21 The screen then collected the sub-
ject’s choice of either the specific cash award or the real emissions reduction, which were
piece-rate reward of approximately e1 for 20 minutes expected survey time or random (lottery) prizes,
e.g. in the form of shopping vouchers.
16Subjects of other nationalities were redirected to other surveys running at the same time.
17The screens required an answer for each question by entering text or choosing at least one of the
options given (including “I don’t know” options) before being able to proceed to the subsequent screen.
This helps to prevent subjects from “rushing” through a survey.
18The smallest group contained 31, the largest 66 subjects (standard deviation 6.4 subjects).
19The number of participants implied here is due to additional treatments running at the same time.
20When subjects are invited to contribute to give to a liberal political organization (Karlan and List
2007, Karlan et al. 2011), a public radio station (Eckel and Grossman 2008), to a children project of
an opera house (Huck and Rasul 2011), or to CO2 emissions reductions, information about productivity
should matter. Despite this, giving decisions are typically poorly informed (Krasteva and Yildirim
2013). Other authors also find that when given the opportunity, subjects take only modest e↵ort to
access additional relevant information (Berrens et al. 2004) and no more than one third of subjects have
a positive willingness to pay for relevant information (Fong and Oberholzer-Gee 2011).
21As in other polls by the polling company, all winners would be informed via a personal email
message. Cash prizes were directly credited to the subject’s personal account with the polling company.
A member’s account balance can be converted into a variety of shopping vouchers or, having reached
a threshold of e 50, wired to the member’s bank account. The retirement of EUA issue numbers was
verifiable through a public-sector Internet site.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of subjects’ sociodemographics
Variable Description Mean SD Obs.
Female Indicator variable for gender, 1 if female 0.469 0.499 2,354
Age Subject’s age (years) 45.42 14.68 2,352
Years of education Based on subject’s stated highest educational degree 12.27 3.213 2,299
Net income Midpointa of subject’s monthly household net income
category (e)
2,556 1,706 1,950
Eastern Germany Indicator variable for residence in former GDR terri-
tory
0.1895 0.392 2354
Notes: a In our income approximation, for the ‘less than e 500’ category, we assume e 450. For the two
categories above e 5,000, we assume e 8,000 for compatibility with German census data. The remaining
categories have widths of e 500.
presented on the screen in a randomized ordering. Subjects that chose the cash prize
were automatically directed to a screen that provided them with an non-incentivized
opportunity to explain their choice, which we describe in more detail below.
The experiment concluded22 with a set of follow-up questions eliciting subjects per-
ceptions and beliefs about EUAs and emission reductions as well as sociodemographics
(age, gender, income, education, residence). Correlation of the latter variables with
subjects’ profiles on record with YouGov was checked. The nature of the Internet exper-
iment also allowed us to observe when exactly subjects completed the experiment and
how much time subjects spent at each screen. Table 1 presents summary statistics of
the sociodemographics.
2.2 Field price censoring
A well-understood challenge created by directly varying prices in order to determine the
price e↵ect is that it can give rise to field price censoring (Harrison and List 2004). Field
price censoring, henceforth FPC, arises because prices for goods within the experiment
are di cult to isolate from prices of those same goods or close substitutes in the real
world (Harrison et al. 2002, Cherry et al. 2004, Harrison et al. 2004). In other words,
there is a possibility that subjects perceive an arbitrage opportunity introduced by the
experiment, biasing the observable contribution decision. In the present experiment,
subjects who would otherwise have chosen the public good contribution might choose
the cash prize instead because they believe that they are able to provide an equivalent
22Between subjects’ choices and the questionnaire, the experiment administered a second choice con-
taining a treatment condition. This paper focuses on the independent first choice only.
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CO2 emissions reduction at a lower total cost (including time and transaction costs)
than the prize o↵ered as an alternative.23
Two aspects are relevant for detecting the possible presence of FPC in the experi-
ment. First, it is relatively costly for private individuals to purchase and delete EUAs
at the going spot price (e15 per metric ton at the time of the experiment)—a fact that
largely excludes the possibility of FPC from perfect substitutes.24 A subset of subjects
may be aware that a variety of imperfect substitutes exist at di↵erent prices and degrees
of substitutability. The alternatives range from close substitutes such as having a EUA
retired through a broker25 or purchasing an emissions o↵set based on a carbon reduction
project26 to more remote substitutes such as making costly changes in everyday life to
reduce one’s own carbon footprint.
The second issue is that the researcher should expect a high degree of heterogeneity
in subjects’ knowledge about these substitutes and thus, in the levels of perceived field
prices. In fact, subjects’ information status and FPC may be interrelated phenomena:
uninformed subjects may have an incentive to opt for the cash prize in order to make
an informed decision later.27 In the context of the experiment, therefore, there is no
single explicit field price that will censor all responses. Instead, FPC would be driven
by subjects’ possible perception that field opportunities are available at certain prices
(Harrison et al. 2004).
23For our purposes, FPC is present if a subject with a reservation price for the public goods contribution
ri accepts the experiment cash prize ei even though ri > ei simply because the field price of an equivalent
contribution in the field fˆi estimated by the subject (inclusive of transaction costs) obeys ei > fˆi. In cases
then where ri > ei > fˆi, the experimenter may mistakenly conclude that the unobservable reservation
price ri is smaller than ei on the basis of the subject choosing cash instead of the good and therefore
systematically understate the probability to contribute. Since there is no secondary market for retired
EUAs, we need not be concerned about the situation fˆi > ei > ri in which subjects opt for the EUA
despite ri < ei in order to pocket the arbitrage margin fˆi   ei.
24The EU ETS gives private individuals the opportunity to open an account for a fixed fee of e200.
The account does not include trading, though. Obtaining EUAs in small numbers is not straightforward
without an additional intermediary.
25At the time of the experiment, there existed only very few opportunities via the internet to com-
mission EUA retirements, none of them in German language. One example is the UK based Carbon
Retirement Ltd. (www.carbonretirement.com) with a price of around e23 per ton of CO2 at the time
of the experiment.
26For example, Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) under the United Nations Clean De-
velopment Mechanism (CDM). Being available at various grades (e.g. the “Gold Standard”,
www.cdmgoldstandard.org), prices exhibit significant heterogeneity. Typically, some grades of CERs
were available below and above the EUA spot price at the time of the experiment.
27Our design prevents this e↵ect to a certain extent since the online survey implementation allows
subjects to search the internet while doing the survey, or leave the survey and take it up again later. We
do not find much evidence on this behavior, though (cp. footnote 36).
18
Paper 1 · The Price of Contributing
To detect subjects potentially constrained by FPC without interfering with subjects’
information status, we follow the strategy of a debriefing questionnaire as in Coller and
Williams (1999) and Harrison et al. (2002). Our identification strategy is threefold and
consists of several follow-up questions after subjects chose their desired prize. First, we
gave subjects who chose the cash price the opportunity to agree to three statements
following the decision screen. As a result, this FPC “filter” contained all subjects that
did not check the first option (‘Given the two prizes, I did not want to forgo the chance of
winning x Euros’), but checked the second option (‘I believe that there is another way for
me to reduce CO2 emissions by one ton for less than x euros.’) or made a qualitatively
equivalent statement in the open-ended third option (‘I had other reasons for choosing
the cash prize, namely...’). Second, we asked all subjects to estimate current EUA spot
prices and the availability of EUAs to private individuals in the follow-up survey. Third,
an open-ended question in the survey asked all subjects to list existing e↵orts to mitigate
climate change. Thus, while the first and the third part of the strategy aimed at FPC
from both perfect and imperfect field substitutes, part two targeted perfect substitutes
only. Section 3.3 reports on several robustness checks for our results with respect to a
potential bias from FPC.
3 Results and Discussion
2,440 subjects completed the experiment with a median completion time of 5 minutes.28
A total of 382 subjects in the experiment contributed to the public good. Of the 2,058
subjects that decided not to contribute, 86 subjects expressed some form of disbelief
about the payment or the real provision of the public good in answers to open-ended
survey questions and were excluded from the subsequent analysis.29 We observe con-
tributions in each of the fifty price treatments between e2 and e100. In forty-eight
treatments, the share of contributors exceeds zero at the 5% level of significance, using
28Average completion time was 1 hour 17 minutes. The di↵erence between mean and median is largely
driven by a small fraction of outliers (approx. 3%) in which subjects availed themselves of the opportunity
to leave the survey and continue hours or days later.
29Results are not sensitive to their inclusion or exclusion.
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a one sided t-test.30
The parametric analysis of subjects’ discrete choice is based on a probit model. We
estimate five specifications of increasing richness. The most parsimonious estimation of
the direct price e↵ect has the form
Pr(Yi = 1) = ↵0 + ↵1Pi + "i
with Yi = 1 if subject i chose the contribution to the public good and Pi denoting
the cash prize o↵ered to subject i. In several steps, in which additional controls are
introduced, we arrive at the final specification of the form
Pr(Yi = 1) =  0 +  1Pi +  2P
2
i +  2Ni +  3PiNi + "i
that allows for the possibility of a non-linear price e↵ect and controls for non-price
e↵ects driven by a vector Ni of the subject’s attributes as well as for interaction e↵ects
between the price of contributing and the attributes Ni.
Tables 2 and 3 report the probit coe cient estimates and the marginal e↵ects, re-
spectively, of the five specifications. The first two columns in both tables report on
price-only specifications: Column 1 corresponds to model 1 while column 2 estimates a
linear and a non-linear price e↵ect. The second three columns augment the price-only
model by including socioeconomic attributes and additional controls for experimental
session, day, and daytime. Column 3 shows the coe cient estimates of the linear price
model with controls for the standard suite of subjects’ socioeconomic attributes. Col-
umn 4 and 5 report on the results of the final specification above, with column 4 (5)
excluding (including) a possible non-linearity of the price e↵ect.
3.1 The Direct Price E↵ect
Theory predicts that a higher price of contributing will be associated with a lower prob-
ability to contribute. Our data indeed confirms this prediction: The marginal e↵ects
reported in Table 3 imply that raising the price of the contribution by e1 at the sample
30The two prices at which contributions do not exceed zero in statistically significant way are the
treatments with a price of contributing of e50 and e56.
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Table 2: Probit coe cient estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price (e) -0.0038*** -0.0223*** -0.0040*** -0.0030 -0.0022
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Price squared – 0.0002*** – – 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Female – – 0.0952 0.0834 0.0808
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Age – – 0.0037 0.0038 0.0037
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of education – – 0.0641*** 0.0659*** 0.0654***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Net income (Te) – – -0.0258 -0.0299 -0.0279
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Eastern Germany – – -0.1092 -0.1239 -0.1192
(0.095) (0.096) (0.097)
Price * female – – – -0.0030 -0.0034
(0.003) (0.003)
Price * age – – – 0.0001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.000)
Price * years of education – – – 0.0010*** 0.0009**
(0.000) (0.000)
Price * income – – – -0.0014* -0.0012
(0.001) (0.001)
Price * Eastern Germany – – – -0.0006 -0.0012
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.7947*** -0.4904*** -1.7739*** -1.0869*** -1.2419***
(0.061) (0.090) (0.283) (0.196) (0.201)
Additional controls No No Yes Yes Yes
N 2354 2354 1872 1872 1872
Log-likelihood -1037.451 -1027.442 -786.483 -781.486 -773.769
 2 12.749 32.767 81.359 91.352 106.786
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.016 0.049 0.055 0.065
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if subject chose the contribution over the cash award. Standard
errors are in parentheses. *** Significant at or below 1% ** Significant at or below 5% *
Significant at or below 10%. Main e↵ects of continuous variables in (4) and (5) are evaluated
at the sample means. Additional controls include dummies for experimental session, day, and
daytime.
21
Paper 1 · The Price of Contributing
Table 3: Marginal e↵ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price (e) -0.0009*** -0.0054*** -0.0009*** -0.0007 -0.0005
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Price squared – 0.0000*** – – 0.0000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Female (d) – – 0.0223 0.0194 0.0186
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Age – – 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of education – – 0.0150*** 0.0153*** 0.0150***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Net income (Te) – – -0.0060 -0.0069 -0.0064
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Eastern Germany (d) – – -0.0246 -0.0275 -0.0263
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Price * female – – – -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.001) (0.001)
Price * age – – – 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
Price * years of education – – – 0.0002*** 0.0002**
(0.000) (0.000)
Price * income – – – -0.0003* -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000)
Price * Eastern Germany – – – -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Additional controls No No Yes Yes Yes
N 2354 2354 1872 1872 1872
Log-likelihood -1037.451 -1027.442 -786.483 -781.486 -773.769
 2 12.749 32.767 81.359 91.352 106.786
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.016 0.049 0.055 0.065
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if subject chose the contribution over the cash award. (d) denotes
an indicator variable. Additional controls include dummies for experimental session, day, and
daytime. Marginal e↵ects are evaluated at the sample means. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*** Significant at or below 1% ** Significant at or below 5% * Significant at or below 10%
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mean decreases the propensity to contribute to the public good by approximately 0.1%.
The e↵ect has the predicted negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. The e↵ect
is also robust: Comparing the magnitude of the linear price e↵ect across specifications
(columns 1, 4, and 5), the magnitude of the price e↵ect changes only slightly when
allowing for both price and non-price e↵ects. Converting the direct price e↵ect into a
measure of elasticity, we calculate the elasticity of the probability of contributing31 based
on column 1 as  0.31 (standard error 0.09).
While in line with theoretical predictions, the evidence generated by direct price
variation contrasts somewhat with the reported evidence based on indirect variation.
Not all papers on the topic report on how indirect price variation impacts on the decision
whether to contribute (e.g. Eckel and Grossman 2003). Those that do tend to find that
variations in match rates or rebates do not have a significant impact on the share of
contributors in the population. Karlan and List (2007), Karlan et al. (2011) and Eckel
and Grossman (2008) conduct field experiments for political campaign organizations and
public broadcasting services, respectively. Even though the experimenters o↵er match
or rebate rates that reduce the price of giving by as much as 66%, response rates in
the population do not vary systematically with the indirect price variation. Likewise,
Huck and Rasul (2011) examine contributions to an educational program maintained by
a large opera theater and do not find an e↵ect on the propensity to contribute when
introducing a match.32. Smith et al. (1995) examine contributions to rural health care
facilities in Montana and do not find a significant e↵ect of the rate of tax rebate on the
decision whether to make a charitable contribution.33
The di↵erence between the direct price e↵ect on the probability to contribute and the
previous evidence based on indirect price variation could be driven by several di↵erent
31The elasticity of probability is defined as ⌘Pr =
@ Pr(Y=1)
@p
p
Pr(Y=1) where p denotes the cash prize
(e.g. Miklius et al. 1976, LeClere 1992).
32Huck and Rasul (2011), however, find an e↵ect of introducing a lead donor, pointing to the important
confounding e↵ect that arises when matches and lead donors are introduced simultaneously.
33Some observers have related this evidence to similar findings on the irrelevance of stake size on
behavior in dictator games (e.g. Carpenter et al. 2005). For example, in an artefactual field experiment
with an all-or-nothing design similar to ours, Bekkers (2007) exploits variations in the size of the exper-
imental endowment, which range between e6 and e11. He finds that the probability that a subject will
donate this amount to a charity is independent of the size of the endowment. A key di↵erence to our
experiment is, however, that the recipient of the donation there also receives a larger transfer while in
our case, di↵erent stake sizes always results in the same physical contribution.
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factors. One possibility is a bias in reporting evidence: While previous research has
stressed that the drivers of whether and of how much to contribute may be di↵erent
(Smith et al. 1995), some studies do not report separately how the decision whether to
contribute is impacted by the variation in the indirect price of giving. Those that report
on the contribution decision may do so particularly because of the surprising result that
they do not find an e↵ect. A second possibility is that experiments using indirect price
variations would have found a price e↵ect in the contribution decision at larger sample
sizes. Finally, an explanation could be that indirect and direct price variation are not
behaviorally equivalent when subjects decide whether to contribute to a public good
(Eckel and Grossman 2003, Davis and Millner 2005, Eckel and Grossman 2008).
Before turning to possibility of FPC as a potential bias, one objection to the result
that could be raised regarding the size of the direct price e↵ect is the possibility of an
anchoring e↵ect. When subjects are poorly informed or unfamiliar with the good (Green
1992, List and Shogren 1999), higher prices o↵ered might conceivably lead uninformed
subjects to infer that the good is more valuable, prompting subjects to choose the pub-
lic goods contribution. Experimental prices would therefore confound the contribution
decision with the result that the true direct price e↵ect would be even greater. To test
for the possibility of such an anchoring e↵ect, we re-estimate the model with interaction
terms between price and variables that are likely to be associated with greater familiarity
with the good such as subjects’ confidence in their knowledge about the donation context
(confidence in own estimate of the carbon “footprint” caused by personal lifestyle, confi-
dence in own estimate of the going EUA spot price) and their education. An anchoring
e↵ect would mean that better informed subjects should be more price sensitive compared
to less informed subjects, who would be more likely to base their valuation of the contri-
bution on the cash prize o↵ered in the experiment. We find a non-negative relationship
between the propensity to provide the mitigation e↵ort and the “information-weighted”
price: Contrary to the hypothesis of the confounding price e↵ect, more familiarity does
not change the price elasticity of contributing (for the knowledge variables) or even
decreases it (for education, see columns 4 and 5 in Table 3). This resonates with ex-
perimental findings that price elasticity does not systematically vary with uncertainty
24
Paper 1 · The Price of Contributing
about good characteristics He↵etz and Shaya (2009).
3.2 Non-price controls
There are a number of non-price attributes of subjects that have been examined in
the literature as determinants of contributing and that conceivably interact with the
price of contributing. These attributes include mainly gender, age, education, income,
and ‘culture’. Column 3 in Tables 2 and 3 reports the estimated e↵ect of non-price
attributes on the probability to contribute while columns 4 and 5 report on the estimated
interaction e↵ects.
List (2004) succinctly sums up much of the experimental evidence on the socioeco-
nomic drivers of a failure to contribute in public goods games in his dictum of “young,
selfish, and male”. In the present experiment, females seem to be more inclined to opt
for the public good contribution across all tested specifications, but the e↵ect is not sig-
nificant. The result is in line with the currently equivocal evidence on gender e↵ects in
public goods settings where the evidence on gender di↵erences is less clear-cut than its
behavioral salience in areas such as risk taking or competition (see Croson and Gneezy
2009, and references therein). As Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) point out, however,
the lack of a level e↵ect in social dilemmas may mask interaction e↵ects: In a laboratory
setting, they find male subjects to be more altruistic than female subjects when the price
of giving is low, and vice versa. We therefore test for a possible price-gender interaction
term to allow for elasticities to di↵er between men and women. The estimates in columns
4 and 5, however, yield no evidence for a gender e↵ect in the present setting.
Like gender, age has attracted increasing attention as a determinant of behavior in
public goods settings (Harbaugh and Krause 2000, List 2004). List (2004) and Carpenter
et al. (2008), for example, find that social preferences increase with age in laboratory
public goods games and charitable donations experiments. Also, like gender, the age
e↵ect is consistently positive but insignificant in all model specifications. Again, we test
for a possible interaction e↵ect with the price of contributing, but do not uncover a
significant relationship.
In contrast to gender and age, education stands out as highly significant across all
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specifications. As the results in Table 3 show, subjects’ propensity to contribute increases
by as much as 1% for every year spent in education. Education also stands out for
an interaction e↵ect with the price of contributing: Additional years of education are
associated with a higher probability of contributing at higher prices. Education therefore
makes subjects decision to contribute less price elastic.
Both the presence and strength of the education e↵ect are interesting. Many papers
studying pro-social behavior do not report on the educational status of participants.
Notable exceptions are List (2004), Karlan (2005), and Bekkers (2007): In three field
experiments measuring social preferences reported by List (2004), education is either
insignificant or weakly associated with higher contributions. In an experimental study
in the context of a Peruvian microcredit program, Karlan (2005) finds that educational
attainment is a determinant of observed behavior in a number of archetypical strategic
situations such as the trust game, but is not associated with a greater willingness to
contribute in public goods games. Bekkers (2007) studies dictator behavior in a survey-
based, anonymous, all-or-nothing version of the game. There, educational status is
binary (with or without a university degree) and a high status is associated with a
significantly elevated probability of donating.
Pro-social behavior may be acquired through education, but the strong relationship
observed in the data may also arise from a di↵erent source. One plausible explanation
could be that education and the perception of benefits from public goods provision are
positively correlated, as is the case for climate policy benefits in the U.S. as survey data
indicates (Borick et al. 2011). However, there is less evidence of this type of correla-
tion in EU countries: 89% among those with a high-school degree or less and 92% of
those with tertiary education regard climate change as at least “a fairly serious prob-
lem” (European Commission 2008). The strong education e↵ect may also be explained
by the specific public good used in the experiment: Emission reductions have long-run
public good characteristics in a complex climate system. Patience and cognitive ability
are therefore likely to matter. A number of empirical studies link cognitive ability and
its proxy, education, with lower discount rates when assessing future costs and ben-
efits and with overall stronger forward-looking behavior by individuals (Bettinger and
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Slonim 2007, Kirby et al. 2005, Parker and Fischho↵ 2005). Other studies emphasize the
lower cognitive cost to abler individuals of making decisions in complex settings (Peters
et al. 2006). Against the background of self-reported income, another explanation is
that education is a possible alternative measure of income and wealth. Since both tend
to be positively correlated with cognitive ability (Banks and Oldfield 2007), this pro-
vides an additional causal channel through which education could enter as a significant
explanatory variable.
The e↵ect of income is insignificant in every model specification and the interaction
e↵ect borderline significant at the 10% level in one specification. While surprising in the
context of the tax rebate literature (Auten et al. 2002), income elasticities of contribution
close to zero have also been reported in a field experiment on charitable contributions by
Eckel and Grossman (2008). However, the authors warn against overinterpreting the re-
sult due to the aggregate nature of their income data. In the present experiment, income
data is indeed available on an individual level. At the same time, caution is advised as
income is self-reported and therefore subject to potential biases, and 482 subjects are
excluded that did not report their income. Data speaks against multicollinearity of in-
come and education as explanation for the persistent insignificance of the one and strong
significance of the other. The correlation coe cient with education is positive at 0.29,
but excluding education from the regression as a robustness check fails to give rise to a
significant income e↵ect.
Previous research has stressed the role of culture as a potential determinant (or not)
of contribution decisions in public goods. While some experiments fail to find evidence for
cultural di↵erence (e.g. Brandts et al. 2004), two experiments on contribution behavior
conducted in Germany (Ockenfels and Weimann 1999, Brosig-Koch et al. 2011) find
significant and highly persistent di↵erences between East-German and West-German
residents regarding their behavior in a so-called “solidarity game”. We test for the
presence of significant di↵erences in the contribution decision between subjects located
in East and West Germany both in terms of level and in terms of an interaction with
the price e↵ect. In both cases, there is no evidence for a significant e↵ect of the place of
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residence on the contribution decision when considering all subjects.34
3.3 Field price censoring
As pointed out earlier, one potential drawback of varying the price of contributing di-
rectly and in the field is the possibility of field price censoring (FPC) among subjects.
If present, FPC has the potential of biasing results. In the limit, e.g. in the context of
highly familiar goods, the presence and magnitude of the direct price e↵ect could con-
ceivably hinge entirely on the fact that subjects know or believe that they can provide
the public good more cheaply outside the experiment.
To identify subjects possibly a↵ected by FPC, we draw on the FPC “filter” state-
ments described in Section 2.2 as well as on answers to the follow-up questions on EUAs
and on e↵orts for climate change mitigation. A common problem in debriefing ques-
tionnaires that are not payo↵-relevant is that, while easily implemented, they are not
immune to contamination through strategic behavior or ex post rationalization (Corri-
gan and Rousu 2008). In the context of the FPC identification strategy pursued here,
both a subject’s “filter” statements and his or her estimate of the EUA spot price may
be endogenous to the preceding choice whether to contribute or not at the given price.
The conservative strategy we adopt here is to use these answers to identify the observa-
tions that are potentially subject to FPC and test in four di↵erent ways whether their
inclusion causes a bias in the overall price e↵ect. Previewing the results, the available
evidence points against a substantive bias in the price e↵ect on account of omitted FPC.
In three of four di↵erent approaches, the coe cient estimates for the price e↵ect are not
a↵ected, in one case they are a↵ected marginally.
Table 4 summarizes subjects’ FPC “filter” statements and identifies 511 (25.9%) of
1,973 cash choosing subjects who declare, by not checking statement 1 but checking
statement 2, that at the given experimental price, they would make a contribution, but
chose not to because they believe they can make the same contribution to the public
good at a lower price elsewhere.35 The question now is whether the inclusion of these
34However, excluding younger age groups who would have spent their formative years after German
reunification, we find a location e↵ect: Subjects resident in Eastern Germany have a 5% lower probability
of contributing, with the highest significance (p = 0.047) for those aged 33 years or more.
35Among the 1,973 cash choosing subjects, 276 gave an open-ended answer in own words without
28
Paper 1 · The Price of Contributing
Table 4: FPC “filter”: Joint distribution of subjects’ statements about their choice of
cash
“I assume that there is another
“Given the two prizes, possibility for me to reduce CO2 emissions
I did not want to forgo by 1 ton for less than x euros”
the chance of winning x euros” 0 1 Total
0 18 511 529
1 1,321 123 1,444
Total 1,339 634 1,973
Note: x denotes the cash prize the subject was assigned to
subjects bias the estimate of the price e↵ect in column 1 of Tables 2 and 3? If FPC played
a role, the estimated coe cient of price on the contribution decision in the full sample
would be plausibly biased towards zero since a rational agent making those statements
would always choose cash, irrespective of the price.
Column (1) in Table 5 reports that the price coe cient of the reduced sample that
excludes the 511 potentially a↵ected subjects does not di↵er significantly from the coef-
ficient of the full sample. The regression replicates the significantly negative price e↵ect
on the decision to contribute in the full sample (cp. column 1 in Table 2) and compares
it to that in the reduced sample. The coe cient of the interaction term is insignificant
(p = 0.69). Naturally, the overall probability of choosing the reduction is significantly
higher if one excludes cash choosing subjects, leading to a significantly positive coe -
cient on the dummy for the reduced sample. We obtain a price elasticity of probability
of  0.33 (standard error 0.089) if computed for the reduced sample only, compared to
 0.31 (standard error 0.09) derived for the full sample.
Another way of utilizing the “filter” statements is to assume that all subjects iden-
tified by the statements were indeed subject to FPC and then recode their choice from
choosing cash to choosing the reduction. Column (2) compares the original and the re-
coded sample the same way column 1 does for the reduced sample. Again, a significant
di↵erence in the coe cients on cash prize cannot be established. The evidence based on
the “filter” statements thus points against a significant bias from FPC.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 present the results of the second part of the strategy
checking one of the two statements. 258 answers provided paraphrases of the given statements and
could therefore be reassigned. 249 of them implied an actual comparison of benefits and costs of the
prizes (statement 1), 9 answers corresponded to a preferred opportunity outside the experiment given
the choice (statement 2).
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Table 5: Robustness of the price e↵ect to field price censoring
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cash prize -0.0038*** -0.0038*** -0.0038*** -0.0042***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Reduced sample 0.2024** – 0.1161 –
(0.090) (0.092)
Reduced sample * cash prize -0.0006 – -0.0004 –
(0.002) (0.002)
Recoded sample – 0.6557*** – –
(0.081)
Recoded sample * cash prize – 0.0005 – –
(0.001)
EUA estimate below – – – -0.5297***
(0.148)
EUA estimate below * cash prize – – – 0.0048**
(0.002)
Constant -0.7960*** -0.7960*** -0.7960*** -0.6799***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.069)
N 4199.000 4710.000 3714.000 2355.000
Log-likelihood -1970.881 -2594.222 -1698.694 -1027.371
 2 41.701 312.406 28.654 33.265
Pseudo R2 0.010 0.057 0.008 0.016
Notes: Probit coe cient estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable:
1 if subject chose the contribution over the cash award. Independent variables: ‘Reduced
sample’ is 0 if the observation belongs to the full sample and 1 if the observation belongs to
the sample excluding subjects that are potentially a↵ected by FPC according to the “filter”
statements (column 1) or EUA price estimates (column 3). ‘Recoded sample’ is 0 if the
observation belongs to the original sample and 1 if the observation belongs to the sample
with recoded choices according to the FPC “filter” statements. ‘EUA estimate below ’ is
an indicator variable and 1 if the observation is potentially a↵ected by FPC according to
subject’s EUA price estimate. *** Significant at or below 1% ** Significant at or
below 5% * Significant at or below 10%
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Table 6: Subjects’ EUA price estimates
Survey question Freq. Rel. freq. Cum.
“What is your estimate Below 2 100 4.25 4.25
of the current market price 2 to below 10 110 4.67 8.92
(in EUR) for 1 ton of CO2 10 to below 20 328 13.93 22.85
in the EU emissions trading 20 to below 30 240 10.19 33.04
system?” 30 to below 50 213 9.04 42.08
50 286 12.14 54.22
Above 50 to below 100 496 21.06 63.14
100 355 15.07 78.21
Above 100 to below 1,000 215 9.13 87.35
1,000 to below 10,000 210 8.92 96.26
10,000 and more 88 3.74 100.00
Notes: Continuous variable (open-ended question).
to detect FPC. This part specifically targets FPC from the potential availability of
a perfect substitute and is based on subjects’ estimates of the going EUA spot price
elicited in the ex-post questionnaire.36 Table 6 gives a detailed summary of this variable.
About 74% of subjects gave an estimate within the range of the randomly assigned
experimental prices (e 2 to e 100) while the median subject gave an estimate of e 50,
close to the experimental mean and median. Thus, most subjects do not seem to be well
informed about the field price (about e 15 at the time of the experiment). Comparing
assigned experimental cash prizes and estimated field prices, we identify 996 subjects
who estimated an EUA price below the cash prize amount they were assigned to. 1,359
subjects gave an EUA price estimate greater or equal to the cash prize. If subjects
implicitly or explicitly took their perception of a field price into account when pondering
their contribution decision, and not vice versa, then the choice of subjects who anticipate
an EUA price below the experimental price may be a↵ected by FPC.37
As before, we compare the unconditional price coe cient of the full sample with
36Evidence for endogenous information acquisition during the experiment, e.g. by searching the In-
ternet for EUA spot prices, comes from a careful examination of the “time stamps” of each screen in
each individual experiment. The time stamp measures the exact time at which the subject moved on
to the next screen. As information collection requires time for targeted search, search activity should
be associated with time delay at screens that ask for relevant information relative to other screens.
We impose ambitious assumptions on how quickly a subject can collect the information: For example,
subjects would need to find EUA prices and information on annual per capita emissions on the Internet
in under 2 minutes. We find no more than 1.4% of subjects with time delays that would be consistent
with information collection. In addition, these candidates do not exhibit above average accuracy on the
factual questions in the experiment. On this basis, we conclude that endogenous information acquisition
does not play a role in explaining the results and confirm results by Berrens et al. (2004) and Fong and
Oberholzer-Gee (2011). Importantly, this result also means that a potential field price censoring is not
a product of endogenous information acquisition by subjects during the experiment, but can at most be
generated by di↵erences in information prior to the experiment.
37To a rational agent, the choice would also depend on perceived transaction costs.
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that of a reduced sample. This time, the reduced sample excludes subjects potentially
a↵ected by FPC due to their EUA price estimate given afterwards. Column (3) in
Table 5 reports on the results. Again, the price coe cient of the reduced sample is
not significantly di↵erent from that of the full sample. The corresponding elasticity of
probability for the reduced sample is  0.29 (standard error 0.095).
For the final column (4) of Table 5, we split the original full sample into two subsam-
ples, one consisting of subjects whose EUA price estimate exceeds the cash prize and
the other of those whose estimates are below the cash prize. Column (4) reports on the
results of a direct comparison of contribution choices between the two subsamples with
respect to price. The results show that, first, controlling for cash prize, subjects who
estimate an EUA price below their cash prize are significantly less likely to contribute
than those who estimate a spot price above their cash prize. Second, the contribution
choice of the former group is not significantly correlated with price: the interaction term
is significantly positive and, regarding magnitude, o↵sets the significantly negative main
e↵ect.38 The observed e↵ects in this split-sample case are as one would expect them to
arise from FPC. The test using a split-sample approach is weak, however, as the result
can equally well be generated by reasons other than FPC: First, given the distributions
of the cash prize and the price estimate variables, there are only few observations for
low prices where the estimate undercuts the experimental price. This inflates the vari-
ance at low prices for this group and may prevent detection of a significant price e↵ect.
Second, the price estimate reported by the subject may itself not be independent of the
choice that the subject has taken. These competing hypotheses cannot be tested against
each other, given the data. However, even if there is a FPC bias, it is both small and
reinforcing the price e↵ect.
In the third and final part of the detection strategy for FPC, we qualitatively analyzed
the answers to the open-ended question on subjects’ existing e↵orts to mitigate climate
change. Most comments related to behavioral changes or investments into energy saving
measures. None of the subjects mentioned any type of carbon o↵set or certificate. We
take this as further evidence that close substitutes and their field prices did not play a
38Performing a separate regression for the reduced sample gives an insignificant e↵ect of the price.
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role in determining subjects’ contribution choices.
4 Conclusion
The relationship between the price of giving a the public good and its private provision
is a natural subject of interest to economists. Empirical opportunities in the form of
exogenous variations in marginal tax rates (for tax deductible contributions), laboratory
experiments, and field experiments have provided the basis for important insights into
how variations in rebate rates and match ratios a↵ect the probability that individuals will
choose to contribute and how much they contribute if they do. Among the many results
of this indirect approach to price variation, one finding is that the decision whether
to contribute appears to be largely immune to variations in match or rebate rates.
While variations in rebate rates and match ratios can be converted into theoretically
equivalent price variations, recent experimental evidence has thrown into doubt whether
this theoretical equivalence also implies behavioral equivalence. Using price elasticities
derived on the basis of their theoretically equivalent match rate or rebate rate elasticities
may therefore be problematic.
This paper presents field experimental evidence from an alternative approach to ex-
amining the relationship between the price of giving and public goods provision, namely
through direct price variation: We compare across thousands of subjects how the de-
cision whether to contribute varies with the amount of money that subjects have to
give up in order to provide one unit of the public good. The theoretical prediction
of a clear negative relationship between price and public goods provision is borne out
by our experimental data. There is a negative and robust direct price e↵ect on the
probability whether to contribute. We estimate its mean elasticity across the treatment
range as  0.31. The direct price e↵ect is robust with respect to a range of controls
and with respect to the potential problem of field price censoring. This provides strong
evidence that in the present case, making contributing cheaper through, for example,
public subsidies has only a modest impact on the probability to contribute.
Among subjects’ socioeconomic attributes that we use as controls, education stands
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out as a key determinant of the decision whether to contribute. Keeping in mind the
possible limitations of self-reported income data and the lack of an established education-
social preference channel in the literature, the role of education could be due to both
cognitive and income or wealth e↵ects. For gender and age, on the other hand, the liter-
ature provides reasons for expecting a significant role, but both e↵ects fail to materialize
in the experiment.
Given the di↵erence between the evidence on the contribution decision by direct and
indirect price variation, an obvious next research step is to directly compare match rates,
rebate rates, and direct price changes in the context of public goods, preferably in a field
setting. This would be important both in order to confirm independently the nature of
the direct price e↵ect and to quantify the di↵erences between these approaches in terms
of direction and magnitude.
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Appendix
A Formal proof of the direct price e↵ect at the extensive
margin of contributions
We introduce a unit price for the public good into a variant of Andreoni’s (1989, 1990) classical impurely
altruistic model in order to guide the intuition for the e↵ects of a direct price change and of non-price
factors at the extensive margin. Assume n individuals who derive utility from the amount of private
nume´raire x, the level of a public good G, and their own contributions to the public good of size gi
(“warm glow”). Let preferences also depend on a vector of individual-specific characteristics, ✓i. Thus,
we write the utility function as
Ui = U (xi,  iG, gi;✓i)
where  i 2 [0, 1] denotes heterogeneous perceptions about the value of the public good (Karlan and List
2006). Another interpretation of  i is incomplete information about the benefits produced by the public
good. In our case,  i represents any heterogeneous beliefs about the size of climatic changes and thus
the benefits generated by the total provision of emissions reductions.
Let the public good be measured in units which individuals can “purchase” and provide at price p.
Total provision is the sum of individual provisions, G =
Pn
i=1 gi. Also define G i =
P
j 6=i gi. Individuals
are endowed with wealth wi and thus maximize utility subject to their budget constraint,
max
xi,gi
U (xi,  iG, gi;✓i)
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s.t. xi + pgi = wi (1)
G = G i + gi (2)
gi   0 . (3)
Substituting for gi, the problem reduces to
max
xi,G
U (xi,  iG,G G i;✓i)
s.t. xi + pG = wi + pG i
G   G i .
We assume U to be strictly quasi-concave and increasing in the first three arguments. Thus, if we
ignore the inequality constraint for a moment, this resembles an ordinary consumer choice problem. The
demand function for G solving the problem can thus be written as
f (p, wi + pG i, G i,  i;✓i) .
The third argument in f is the warm glow argument. Taking into account the inequality constraint (3),
demand for the public good is
G = max {f(p, wi + pG i, G i,  i;✓i), G i} .
In order to derive first-order e↵ects at the extensive margin, we take the inverse of f with respect
to the second argument, wi + pG i and add pgi to both sides. Solving for gi gives
gi =
1
p
⇥
wi   f 1 (p,G,G i,  i;✓i)
⇤
+G .
Given (3), the condition to provide a strictly positive amount of public good is
wi > f
 1(p,G,G i,  i;✓i)  pG .
Let w⇤i denote the threshold level of wealth at which individual i switches from non-contribution to
contribution. Here, (3) holds with equality and thus, G = G i. It follows that
w⇤i = f
 1(p,G i,  i;✓i)  pG i (4)
Note that the third argument of f 1 drops out since at gi = 0 the individual does not derive any utility
from warm glow. Also note that w⇤i is not identical for all individuals because of  i and ✓i.
We are now interested in how the set of contributors changes if certain parameters change. From
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(4) it follows that
@w⇤i
@p
= f 1p  G i > 0
if we assume normality for both goods.39 Thus, an increase in price ceteris paribus increases the threshold
level of wealth for individual i, which makes it less likely that individual i will contribute. Similarly,
normality of both goods implies that40
@w⇤i
@ i
= f 1  < 0 .
Intuitively, if individual i’s perceived benefits from the public good provision increase then it is more
likely that i will provide a strictly positive amount of the public good. With regard to individual
characteristics, we have already demonstrated that w⇤i depends on ✓i.
B Instructions (translation of experimental screens into
English)
B.1 Welcome screen
Dear participants,
we would like to invite you to participate in two lotteries and to answer some questions
about CO2-emissions and climate change.
Your participation will take approximately ten minutes. In the lotteries, you have the
chance to win points worth up to a three-digit amount in euros.
As usual, all your information will be treated confidentially.
B.2 Citizenship screen
Of which countries do you hold citizenship?
In case you hold multiple citizenships, please tick all [of the following citizenships] which
apply!
[...]
B.3 Information Screen
In the following two lotteries, you may choose between two di↵erent prizes. These are:
A cash prize in points
or
39Note that normality implies that any increase in wealth will always go in consumption of both goods.
40Note that an increase of  i in f
 1 ceteris paribus implies lower demand for x, hence f 1  < 0.
41
Paper 1 · The Price of Contributing
the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 1 ton
How will the reduction of the CO2 emissions take place? We will make use of a reliable
opportunity provided by the EU emissions trading system: We will purchase and delete an
EU emissions allowance for you. Within the EU, emissions allowances are needed by power
plants and other large installations in order to be allowed to emit CO2. Since there is only
a fixed overall amount of allowances in place, deleted allowances are no longer available to
facilitate emissions.
Emissions in Germany and other EU countries decrease from one deleted allowance by
exactly one ton.
Because of the way in which CO2 mixes in the air, it does not matter for the e↵ect
on the climate where on the globe CO2 emissions are reduced. What counts is only total
emissions worldwide. In the lotteries, 100 winners will be randomly selected out of about
5,000 participants. The following two lotteries may di↵er in the prizes o↵ered as well as in
the payo↵ procedures.
B.4 Decision Screen
In this lottery, you have the choice between the two prizes listed below.
• If you choose the cash amount and win, then the corresponding amount of points will be auto-
matically credited to your points account within the next few days. All winners will receive a
short notification email for that.
• The deletion of emissions allowances will, in this lottery, take place as a collective order for all
winners: For every winner who has chosen the emissions reduction, one additional allowance will
be deleted. Winners will receive a short notification email containing a hyperlink through which
they can reliably verify the deletion on Heidelberg University webpages.
Please choose now, which prize you want if you are drawn as winner:
( ) The reduction of CO2 emissions by 1 ton through the deletion of one EU emissions allowance
( ) 46 euro in bonus points41 in bonus points
B.5 FPC filter question
Please give some particulars about the reasons why you personally chose the euro
amount. In order to do so, please tick all statements that apply to you. Please answer
spontaneously.
( ) Given the two prizes, I don’t not want to forgo the chance of winning 46 euros.
41Example amount. The order in which the two prizes appeared was randomized.
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( ) I assume that there is another way for me to abate 1 ton of CO2 emissions for less than 46 euros.
( ) I decided in favor of the euro amount for other/further reasons, namely:
B.6 Transition to lottery 2 and second lottery
On the next page, there will be the description of our second lottery.
[...]
B.7 Introduction follow-up questions
Thank you for your evaluations. On the following pages, we would like to ask you some
concluding questions.
B.8 Follow-up questions (screen 1)
What is your estimate of the current market price for one ton of CO2 in the EU emissions
trading system?
euros
How sure are you about your estimate?
( ) I know the price
( ) Very sure
( ) Somewhat sure
( ) Somewhat unsure
( ) Very unsure
( ) I don’t know
B.9 Follow-up questions (screen 2)
In this lottery, EU emission allowances are bought and deleted by the organizer. Do
you think that there exists a possibility for you personally to buy and delete EU emissions
allowances?
( ) Yes
( ) Somewhat yes
( ) Somewhat no
( ) No
( ) I don’t know
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Do you think that you will personally benefit from positive e↵ects of reduced CO2
emissions (for example from the mitigation of climate change)?
( ) [Same answer options as above]
Do you think that future generations in Germany (for example your children and grand-
children) will benefit if climate change mitigating CO2 emissions reductions are undertaken
in the present time?
( ) [Same answer options as above]
Do you think that your personal behavior or lifestyle has contributed or is contributing
to climate change?
( ) [Same answer options as above]
B.10 Follow-up questions (screen 3)
What is your estimate of the yearly CO2 emissions caused by your lifestyle?
tons
How sure are you about your estimate?
( ) I’ve had the emissions calculated
( ) Very sure
( ) Somewhat sure
( ) Somewhat unsure
( ) Very unsure
( ) I don’t know
B.11 Follow-up questions (screen 4)
Do you consciously act in a climate-protecting way? If yes, please list some forms of
behavior, decisions and measures through which you have consciously contributed or are
contributing to the reduction of CO2 or other greenhouse gases (in keywords).
B.12 Enquiry of socio-demographic information (if not or only par-
tially on record)
Please state your gender.
( ) Male
( ) Female
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In what year were you born?
How many children under 18 live in your household?
B.13 Enquiry of socio-demographic information if not on record
What is your highest educational degree?
( ) Still in school
( ) Special-needs school
( ) Elementary secondary school (Hauptschule, 9th grade)
( ) Polytechnic school of the GDR (10th grade)
( ) Highschool (Realschule, 10th grade)
( ) Advanced technical college entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife)
( ) A-levels (Abitur, 12th or 13th grade)
( ) Advanced technical college - Fachhochschule (Diplom (FH ), Bachelor, Master)
( ) University degree (Diplom, Magister, Bachelor, Master)
( ) Ph.D.
( ) Dropout
( ) No specification
What is the overall net income of the household that you live in?
( ) under EUR 500
( ) from EUR 500 up to EUR 1000
( ) from EUR 1000 up to EUR 1500
( ) from EUR 1500 up to EUR 2000
( ) from EUR 2000 up to EUR 2500
( ) from EUR 2500 up to EUR 3000
( ) from EUR 3000 up to EUR 3500
( ) from EUR 3500 up to EUR 4000
( ) from EUR 4000 up to EUR 4500
( ) from EUR 4500 up to EUR 5000
( ) from EUR 5000 up to EUR 10000
( ) EUR 10000 and more
( ) no specification
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B.14 Closing screen
Dear participant,
Thank you very much for your participation in this survey. If you are one of the winners,
we will contact you by e-mail shortly.
46
Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and Its
Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence⇤†
Johannes Diederich Timo Goeschl
Abstract
The determinants of individual, voluntary climate action (VCA) in combating
climate change and its potential scale are frequently debated in public but largely
underresearched. We provide estimates of the willingness to individually reduce EU
greenhouse gas emissions by one ton, using the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme. Estimates are derived from an online field experiment with a large, highly
heterogenous, and Internet-representative sample of voting-aged Germans. Jointly
estimating willingness to pay (WTP), non-indi↵erence to VCA, and prior knowledge,
we uncover important determinants of preferences for VCA, such as education, the
information structure among the population, and exogenous environmental condi-
tions.
Keywords: climate change, EU ETS, field experiment, online experiment, pub-
lic goods, voluntary contributions, voluntary climate action, willingness to pay
JEL-Classifications: C93, Q51, Q54
“Each and every one of us can make changes in the way we live our lives
and become part of the solution [to climate change].” – Al Gore
1 Introduction
Voluntary climate action (VCA) o↵ers members of the general population the opportu-
nity to individually provide additional reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
above and beyond those implemented by their governments. Within the climate policy
⇤The authors thank conference participants at the CESifo Summer Institute (Venice 2010), at the
annual meeting of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (Rome 2011),
at the annual meeting of the Verein fu¨r Socialpolitik (Frankfurt 2011), at the Climate Economics and
Law Conference (Bern 2011) and at the Summer Meeting of the Association of Environmental and
Resource Economists (Asheville, NC 2012), seminar participants at Heidelberg, and the handling editor
at Environmental Resource Economics and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. We also thank
Ruth Fieber, Christina Grimm, and Thomas Scheuerle for student assistance and Dr. Svenja Espenhorst
and Dennis Mignon at First Climate for support in acquiring EU ETS allowances. Financial support by
the German Science Foundation (DFG) under grant GO1604/1 is gratefully acknowledged.
†This paper has been published in Environmental and Resource Economics (2013), DOI
10.1007/s10640-013-9686-3. The final publication is available at link.springer.com
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debate, a rhetoric has evolved among commentators, climate researchers, and govern-
ment bodies that attributes a high potential to such voluntary action (e.g. Gore and
Guggenheim 2006, Pachauri 2007, European Commission 2011). VCA, it is sometimes
argued, might alleviate the need for coercive measures of emissions reductions by gov-
ernments. The demand for VCA and the factors that determine it are therefore key
empirical questions.
A limited number of studies have investigated the demand for VCA, typically with
a focus on estimating central measures of willingness to pay (WTP). These studies es-
timate mean WTP to be e25 (Brouwer et al. 2008), £24 (MacKerron et al. 2009), or
e12 (Lo¨schel et al. 2013) per ton of abated carbon (CO2) emissions. Such numbers
point to the possibility that, given the opportunity, voluntary behavior might give rise
to substantial GHG emissions reductions. Additional evidence regarding the presence
and determinants of VCA would help to substantiate this possibility, and various op-
portunities for conceptual and methodological improvements present themselves. One
opportunity lies in mitigating the potential hypothetical bias of the numbers reported.
With the exception of Lo¨schel et al. (2013), existing estimates are derived using stated
preferences methods and thus may overstate WTP (e.g. Cummings et al. 1995, Carlsson
and Martinsson 2001) or bias covariate e↵ects. Secondy, all existing studies are con-
strained by comparably small samples (N < 350) consisting of a specific subgroup of
the general population: Frequent fliers passing through a specific airport (Brouwer et al.
2008), young adults with higher education (MacKerron et al. 2009), or residents of a
specific city (Lo¨schel et al. 2013). Thirdly, participants faced bid prices for emissions
reductions that mostly fall in the neighborhood of current o↵set or permit prices. Es-
timates of true marginal abatement costs, however, are up to one order of magnitude
higher (e.g. Tol 2010). The fourth opportunity lies in that the existing studies have not
focused on covariates or accounted for the likely presence of indi↵erent respondents in a
way suitable for estimating covariate e↵ects.
The present paper embarks on providing the first study of preferences for VCA
and a rich set of covariates based on both non-hypothetical choices and a comparably
large sample from the general population. Specifically, we report on the WTP for the
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voluntary abatement of one ton of CO2 emissions through the retirement of an emissions
allowance (EUA) under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).1
The basic design of the “framed” field experiment (Harrison and List 2004) is a closed-
ended single-bounded valuation question implemented under a random incentive system
(Grether and Plott 1979, Starmer and Sugden 1991, Lee 2008): Experimental subjects
indicate their preference between, on the one hand, a randomly drawn cash award and,
on the other, the EUA retirement. The cash prize presented to the subject is the outcome
of an equiprobable draw from prizes between e2 and e100 in steps of e2, the upper
bound reflecting an economically meaningful maximum abatement cost for one ton of
CO2 emissions (Tol 1999, 2009, 2010). We use between-subjects randomization (Tversky
and Kahneman 1981, Baltussen et al. 2010, Abdellaoui et al. 2011) with odds of 1 in 50
that a subject’s choice of either cash or emissions reductions is realized. The choice is
taken by an Internet-representative sample of 2,440 Germans of voting age drawn from
a population of approximately 65,000 panel members of an Internet polling firm.
Any field study aimed at investigating the public’s demand for VCA must take into
account that VCA corresponds to a unilateral, private provision of a global public good,
GHG emissions reductions (Nordhaus 1993). Therefore, individual behavior will likely
be a↵ected by typical behavioral patterns of voluntary giving. First and foremost, some
people will not be willing to pay anything for voluntary emissions reductions, not because
they do not value climate change mitigation but because their behavior is determined
by strategic “free riding” or the perceived marginality of their individual contribution,
for example. Other people will be willing to pay more due to the altruistic component
of a contribution. This contribution character of the valued good has not always been
su ciently accounted for by the existing VCA literature. Indeed, our data suggests a
significant number of subjects with zero WTP as well as a robust share of contributors
even at highest prices. Since our focus is on covariate e↵ects, we explicitly model in-
1EUAs are the vehicle of choice for facilitating credible GHG emissions reductions in an experiment
as a binding cap of the EU ETS avoids problems of additionality that are often encountered for project-
based o↵sets (e.g. Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) under the Clean Development Mechanism of
the Kyoto Protocol). Retirement (or o cially, “deletion”) of EUAs is an option available to all trading
account holders in the EU ETS. As a result, a retired EUA reduces the total amount of GHG emissions
in the European Union by one ton of CO2. The EUAs used in the experiment are Phase II emission
allowances with a market price of around e15 apiece at the time of the experiment.
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di↵erence (or nonparticipation) in the econometric analysis using a mixture model (e.g.
McFadden 1994, Hanemann and Kristro¨m 1995, Haab 1995, Kristro¨m 1997) to prevent
parameter estimates to be biased if participation and WTP are determined by the same
set of covariates (Haab 1999, Werner 1999). Both indi↵erence to the o↵ered environ-
mental change and WTP can also be determined by a subject’s endogenous information
status about or experience with the good. Empirical work suggests that the knowledge
among the general population about the causes and functional relationships of climate
change (Ungar 2000, Lorenzoni and Pidgeon 2006, Lorenzoni et al. 2007, Sterman and
Sweeney 2007) and the logic underpinning climate policy (Sinn 2008) varies consider-
ably. Follow-up survey results in our experiment support this picture. We exploit this
heterogeneity and jointly model WTP, participation, and endogenous information in the
econometric analysis of covariate e↵ects.2
Our key results can be summarized as follows. First, we identify a variety of sig-
nificant drivers and correlates of VCA in our experiment, which points to important
heterogeneities regarding VCA among the population. For example, measures of ed-
ucational status turn out to be a key predictor of VCA: Years of schooling correlate
with WTP both directly and indirectly through the information submodel. Similarly,
WTP positively correlates with stated perceptions of both selfish and altruistic benefits
from today’s emissions reductions as well as perceptions of a lifestyle-related respon-
sibility for climate change. Policy-makers interested in harnessing VCA may find it
useful to be aware of these heterogeneities. A second key result is that the empirical
reality of VCA is likely to be subtle: Estimated coe cients and WTP are sensitive to
accounting for nonparticipation and endogenous information in the econometric model,
necessitating the use of joint modeling. Such modeling reveals, for example, that both
subjects’ knowledge about climate change and their likelihood of being indi↵erent with
respect to VCA di↵ers by age and gender: The typical young male is more likely to
be informed about climate change and also more likely to indicate indi↵erence towards
VCA. Third, WTP appears to be influenced by unexpected exogenous drivers: We find
evidence that ambient temperatures around the time of the experiment positively a↵ect
2Thanks to an anonymous referee and the editor for insightful comments about the presence of
nonparticipation and endogenous experience.
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WTP. Fourth, the empirical distribution of WTP uncovered in our experiment suggests
that future research will have to widen the bid range even beyond seemingly reasonable
upper bounds in order to cover the tails of WTP. Our experiment extends the upper
bound of experimental prices well beyond those in the existing literature and yet, like
some of the previous studies, finds significant demand at the maximum bid price. This
renders central measures of the estimated WTP distribution sensitive to the assumed
utility model and error distribution. While mitigated somewhat by the joint mixture
model or the use of nonparametric estimators, ours and similar existing WTP estimates
should be interpreted cautiously. The most conservative lower-bound estimate in our
data would be e6.30 for mean and e0.30 for median WTP for one ton of voluntary CO2
emissions reductions.
The paper proceeds as follows: We describe the experimental design, protocol, and
data in the following section. We then outline the econometric analysis in section 3 and
present and discuss the results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design and data
The basic design choices of the experiment are intended to address a number of issues
that arise in the context of assessing WTP in the field. First, the design combines
the advantages of a standard dichotomous choice format (e.g. Lusk and Hudson 2004,
Shogren 2006)—such as short administration time, limited cognitive load, and a familiar
decision situation—with incentivized choices in order to alleviate the potential hypo-
thetical bias of stated preferences methods (e.g. Cummings et al. 1995, Harrison 2006,
Harrison and Rutstro¨m 2008). Secondly, the field experimental design combined with
the comparably large sample, that is representative with respect to sex, age, and region
of residence for the Internet-using population of Germany, enhances external validity.
Thirdly, the design excludes to the greatest extent possible confounding public or private
good attributes associated with the experimental good by employing, on the one hand,
a website-based certification procedure of the EUA retirements, and by reminding, on
the other hand, the subjects of the spatial indi↵erence of local reductions for a global
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e↵ect on the climate. If subjects received EUA retirement certificates in hardcopy, for
example, it would plausibly increase WTP not because of the GHG emissions reduction,
but because of the curiosity dimension of the good or because of private co-benefits
derived from an increased visibility of the decision to others. Fourthly, with a focus
on endogenous, “homegrown” values (Cummings et al. 1995), we do not provide any
exogenous information regarding the issue of climate change or the employed metric for
emissions reductions.3 This allows us to investigate endogenous knowledge as a driver
of WTP in the joint estimation (Cameron and Englin 1997) and parallels the problem
policy makers would face when promoting VCA, at least in the short run. While this is
not a necessary design choice,4 providing “unbiased full information” (Arrow et al. 1993,
Munro and Hanley 1999) would be di cult given the complexity of the issue on the one
hand and the requirement of a particularly low cognitive load in an experiment that runs
online and with members of the general population on the other. The “snap shot” char-
acter of the design extends to the point that our experiment, like others, elicits demand
given the current market equilibria for (im)perfect substitutes for the experimental good
and given existing national or international climate policies.5 Thus, some of a subject’s
demand may already be met, and the results need to be interpreted in this light.
2.1 Procedures
The experiment was administered using the infrastructure of a large Internet polling
company. The recruitment of subjects followed the standard routine of our cooperation
partner in which panel members are invited via an email message to proceed to the
survey via a hypertext link. The introductory screen explained the thematic focus of the
survey, the expected duration of the survey (ten minutes), and the use of the random
3Note that the field nature of the experiment allows subjects to collect additional information while
the experiment is in progress (e.g. by consulting Internet resources on the side in a separate browser
window). In the data on subjects’ speed of progress in the experiment, however, we do not find much
evidence for simultaneous endogenous information acquisition—an observation that has also been made
in the literature (Berrens et al. 2004).
4Among the existing studies on VCA, the amount of information provided by the researchers di↵ers.
While Brouwer et al. (2008) appear to be silent about causes of climate change and used metrics,
MacKerron et al. (2009) provide a minor amount of information on metrics, and Lo¨schel et al. (2013)
provide information on both climate change and metrics (based on the IPCC report).
5Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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incentive system with a prize worth up to a three-digit Euro figure.6 Following the
invitation screen, there was a filter screen to focus on German subjects of voting age.7
Participants then saw 10 to 13 computer screens asking for 16 to 19 choices or answers,
depending on their decisions.8 Median completion time was approximately five minutes.9
Subjects’ valuation decision was collected using two screens, one that introduced the
good to be valued and set up the choice (subsequently called “information screen”) and
one that explained the payment procedures and collected the choice (subsequently called
“decision screen”). The information screen explained three features of the experiment:
(1) the trade-o↵ between a cash prize and the CO2 emissions reduction, including a suc-
cinct explanation of how the deletion of an EUA reliably reduces EU carbon emissions,
(2) the public good character of the emissions reduction and (3) the random incentive
system with odds of 100 in 5,000.10 The decision screen explained the consequences
if the subject was drawn as a winner, and elicited the subject’s choice. Subjects that
chose the cash amount received the award through their personal account at the polling
company11 while those who chose the emissions reductions could verify that the emis-
sions reduction had been carried out through authoritative certification presented on a
university website. The two prize alternatives were presented in random order, including
the randomly determined subject-specific cash amount, and subjects had to check the
preferred option.
The experiment concluded with a set of screens containing follow-up questions on
the knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs about climate change, EUAs, and the metrics used.
For subjects that had chosen the cash prize, a screen testing for field price censoring was
inserted. Finally, the survey collected socio-demographic variables.
6These design criteria would have been familiar to panel members from previous polls as they decided
on whether to proceed. The polling firm would regularly incentivize polls through either a piece-rate
reward of approximately e1 for 20min expected survey time or random (lottery) prizes, e.g. in the form
of a shopping vouchers.
7Subjects of other nationalities were redirected to other surveys running at the same time.
8Some screens and questions were due to a second valuation question posed after the independent
first one reported here. For a translation of the relevant experimental screens, see Diederich and Goeschl
(2011b). Screen shots are available from the authors upon request.
9Mean completion time was 1 hour 18 minutes. This is driven by a small fraction of surveys (about 4%)
in which subjects availed themselves of the opportunity to leave the survey and continue hours or days
later.
10The number of participants implied here is due to additional treatments running at the same time.
11A panel member can convert his or her account balance into cash as soon as a threshold of e50 is
reached.
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The Internet experiment ran in two sessions in May and July 2010. Session 1 lasted
from May 25th to June 2nd and generated 1,640 complete12 observations from 1,817
invitations. Session 2 lasted from July 19th to 27th and generated 800 complete ob-
servations out of 888 invitations. In the pooled sample, answers to the open-ended
questions revealed 85 subjects who either objected to the EU ETS as a proper method
to reduce emissions or said they distrusted the experiment itself. Following the usual
procedure in the literature, these observations were excluded from the subsequent anal-
ysis.13 The experiment was preceded by a set of pre-tests and a pilot experiment with
200 economics students in order to test the online implementation and refine the set of
texts and questions.
2.2 Data
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of experimental variables and matched environmen-
tal controls. Table 2 compares the sample means of key socio-demographic characteristics
with census data. While showing considerable variation, all compared demographics of
the Internet-representative sample turn out to be statistically di↵erent from those of the
general German population. As one might expect, the average Internet user is more likely
to be male, younger, and educated, and lives with more children. Regarding household
income, both very low and very high income categories are slightly underrepresented:
While mean income in the census data is higher,14 the di↵erence reverses if one drops
incomes above e5,000.
Subjects’ stated views regarding climate change in Table 1 are in line with a char-
acterization that citizens are generally concerned about climate change and have some
understanding about the physical inertia of the climate problem, but also di↵er in their
knowledge about the metrics involved. A majority accepts that their lifestyle is con-
tributing to climate change and understands that current emissions reductions do not
benefit themselves but instead constitute an intertemporal benefit transfer to future gen-
12We count an observation as complete if the subject saw the final dismissing screen. All screens
required an answer for each question by entering text or choosing at least one of the options (including
“I don’t know” options) before being able to proceed to the next screen.
13Results presented are not sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of these observations.
14Income categories above e5,000 were checked by 6% in our sample, while census data indicate a
share of around 19%.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of experimental variables and matched controls
Variable Description Mean S.d. Min. Max.
A. Socio-demographic characteristics
Female 1 if female 0.469 0.499 0 1
Age Years 45.42 14.68 18 89
Children in HH Number of household members be-
low age 18
0.466 0.846 0 6
Education Years based on highest educational
degree
12.27 3.213 9 22
Income Monthly household net incomea
(Euros)
2,556 1,706 450 8,000
> 1 citizenships 1 if has citizenship besides German 0.017 0.129 0 1
B. Climate change attitudes and beliefs
Personal benefits Degree of agreement to personal
benefits from e↵ects of carbon emis-
sions reductionsb
2.367 0.990 1 4
Future benefits Degree of agreement to benefits for
following generations from today’s
emissions reductionsb
2.902 0.967 1 4
Lifestyle impact Degree of agreement that personal
lifestyle has contributed to climate
changeb
2.761 0.951 1 4
Footprint estimate Estimate of yearly CO2 emissions
from lifestyle (metric tons)
3,021c 15,340 0 100,000
Footprint est. confidence Confidence in own footprint esti-
mate, 1 if at least “rather sure”
0.075 0.263 0 1
EUA price estimate Estimate of current EUA spot price
(Euros)
1,656d 10,306 0 100,000
Price est. confidence Confidence in own EUA price esti-
mate, 1 if at least “rather sure”
0.106 0.308 0 1
EUA availability Believes that EUAs would be per-
sonally available for purchase some-
where else (1 if at least “rather yes”)
0.197 0.398 0 1
C. Matched environmental controls
Media coverage Number of hits in a climate change
related keywords search in German
print and online mediae,f
136.9 28.13 69.5 160
Temperature Mean ambient air temperature in
subject’s region of residencef,g ( C)
15.1 4.186 8.05 25.8
Notes: a In our income approximation from subjects’ reported income categories, for the “less than
e 500” category, we assume e 450. For the two categories above e 5,000, we assume e 8,000 for com-
patibility with German census data. The remaining categories have a width of e 500 each. b Answer
categories: 1=“no”, 2=“rather no”, 3=“rather yes”, 4=“yes” c Median is 10 d Median is 50 e Key-
words used: ‘climate change’, ‘climate protection’, ‘global warming ’, ‘carbon dioxide’, ‘CO2’. Database:
LexisNexis f The variable is the moving 2-day average of the daily values of the day at which the
subject took the experiment and the day before g Source: German National Meteorological Service
(DWD)
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Table 2: Socio-demographics: sample vs. census
Variable Mean values T-test (two-sided)
Experimental German census
sample data
Female 0.469 0.521 p < 0.01
(0.499) (0.500)
Age 45.43 50.05 p < 0.01
(14.68) (18.31)
Children in HH 0.466 ⇡0.340 p < 0.01
(0.846) (⇡0.900)
Education 12.27 11.02 p < 0.01
(3.214) (3.01)
Income 2,556 4,057 p < 0.01
(1,705) (1,170)
Income  5, 000 2,205 2,150 p < 0.05
(1,030) (1,300)
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. Source: Federal Statistical O ce
(Destatis), Mikrozensus 2008, 2009, EVS 2008 and own computations
erations. The evidence on the understanding of the metrics is mixed: While the median
subject provides a surprisingly close estimate to the yearly per-capita carbon emissions
in Germany (about 10 tons), a number of subjects has di culties in giving a reasonable
estimate, and only 7.5% feel at least somewhat certain about their guess. A similar
pattern arises for estimates of spot prices of EU emissions allowances (about e 15 at the
time of the experiment).
Environmental controls were matched to subjects using data from a print and online
media database (LexisNexis) and from the National Meteorological Service (DWD). The
Germany-wide media coverage can be matched to subjects by experimental day while
the temperature data can be matched by both experimental day and region of residence
(Bundesland). Both variables reflect the 2-day moving average of daily values of the
day at which the subject decided to start the experimental survey and the day before.
In order to verify the robustness of the media coverage variable, we used two mutually
exclusive sets of keywords who turned out to be highly correlated (correlation coe cient
0.81).
Descriptive results regarding subjects’ valuation choices can be summarized as fol-
lows. In total, 382 (16.2%) of 2,354 subjects chose the emissions reduction through the
retirement of an EUA. 1,972 (83.8%) chose the cash amount. Despite a bid range that is
considerably larger than in previous studies, o↵ered prices do not cover the tails of the
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WTP distribution: At the lowest two bids (e2 and e4), still about two third of subjects
are not willing to take the reduction and thus, reveal an even lower WTP or complete
indi↵erence to the choice. At the highest bid of e100, still about one sixth of subjects
choose the reduction and thus reveal a WTP even larger. Note that in general, a low
price elasticity appears not unusual for voluntary contributions to public goods (Green
1992, Diederich and Goeschl 2011a).
3 Analysis
The econometric analysis jointly models (1) the WTP decision whether to contribute the
emissions reduction, (2) the participation decision whether the individual is indi↵erent to
the o↵ered choice, and (3) the endogenously determined knowledge regarding the valued
good. To model the WTP decision, we employ a version of the classic Bishop-Heberlein
model, which is a frequently used model for dichotomous choice data in contingent
valuation. Thus, subject i’s probability to choose the emissions reduction instead of the
money can be expressed as
Pr i (choice is emissions reduction) =
1 G" ( Z 0i↵+   ln ti) if ti < yi
0 if ti   yi
. (1)
where G" is the cdf of the error term of the utility di↵erence15, ti denotes the o↵ered cash
amount, yi is income, Zi is a vector of covariates, and (↵, ) is the parameter vector.
The Bishop-Heberlein model has two advantages in our case. First, it bounds WTP
from below at zero, a necessary assumption for a mixture model with a spike at zero,
without further need of truncation.16 Second, it assumes constant marginal utility of
15Shown is the formulation as a random utility model (RUM) censored from above by income (Hane-
mann and Kanninen 1999). The formulation as a expenditure di↵erence model (Cameron 1988) is
analogue (Haab 1999, Hanemann and Kanninen 1999).
16Our data provides little evidence on the presence of negative WTP. When asked about the reason
for choosing the cash prize, only two of 1,972 subjects expressed some disutility from the emissions
reduction, with harmful consequences for the economy as one of the main arguments. However, since
subjects were not forced to use this open-ended answer option, this number may understate the true
share. By contrast, 71% of subjects expect some benefits for future generations from the reduction, 45%
expect some personal benefits, and 72% give examples of personal climate-friendly behavior.
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income which appears reasonable for our data.17
In order to account for indi↵erence, choice probabilities in the experiment become
fPri (choice is emissions reduction) = (1   i) Pr i (choice is emissions reduction)fPri (choice is money) =  i + (1   i) Pr i (choice is money) (2)
where (1  i) denotes subject i’s probability of participation, i.e., of being not indi↵erent
but having a positive WTP (Haab 1999, Hanemann and Kanninen 1999). In order to
estimate (1    i), we follow two complementary approaches. One is to make (1    i) a
function of covariates,
(1   i) = Q0i✓ + ⇣i, (3)
and to identify participation for each subject through an indicator variable, POSWTP.
In order to classify subjects, we analyze answers to two open-ended survey questions.
One asked whether the subject intentionally behaves climate protecting and solicited
examples of individual behavior or measures aimed at mitigating climate change. The
other question asked for reasons for choosing the money instead of the emissions reduc-
tion. Coding of these answers was done conservatively such that unclear answers were
treated as participation, POSWTP=1. The other approach is to assume (1  i) = (1  )
as constant across individuals and exogenously given by the share of subjects who chose
the reduction in a separate treatment with 39 subjects which was identical to the one
described here except that subjects faced an alternative cash prize of e0.18 Since there
are several other plausible reasons for choosing cash besides indi↵erence in this case
(e.g. “protest voting” due to disappointment from being assigned a zero cash prize) we
interpret this share as a lower bound of (1   ).19
17Performing a linear grid search using a single-equation Box-Cox model, we find maxima of the
log-likelihood function around   = 1.
1821 of 39 subjects (46.15%) facing a zero cash prize chose the emissions reduction.
19Other approaches used in the literature are to estimate (1  ) endogenously if no information about
individual indi↵erence is available (An and Ayala 1996, Haab 1999) or to utilize a follow-up question
on indi↵erence without estimating it as a function of covariates (Kristro¨m 1997). The downside of both
approaches is that if the assumed distribution of WTP and the true distribution of (1    ) depend on
the same covariates, then treating (1  ) as constant or treating both equations as independent can bias
the estimates of covariate e↵ects on WTP (Werner 1999) and makes them more sensitive to the assumed
distribution for the error terms (Haab 1999). If we estimate (1    ) endogenously using (2), we obtain
participation probability estimates of around 70% for the lognormal, 60% for the log-logistic, and about
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For the information submodel, we follow Cameron and Englin (1997) in assuming
that the error terms of the WTP equation (1) and the information equation,
INFobj,subji = R
0
i  + ⌘i, (4)
are correlated. In addition, we assume information and participation to be correlated.
In the estimation results, we subsequently compare two possible proxies for information
in our data as alternative dependant variables. The first, INFobj, provides a measure
of the “objective” knowledge related to carbon emissions and is constructed from the
standardized deviation variables of subjects’ EUA price and carbon footprint estimates.
The second, INFsubj, represents “subjective” knowledge and is constructed from sub-
jects’ standardized self-assessed quality of both estimates. Both variables are distributed
approximately normally.
4 Results
4.1 Estimation results
If we assume "i, ⇣i, and ⌘i to be multivariate normally distributed with correlations ⇢
and ⌫, then the individual log-likelihood can be written as
logLi = ln
h
(1/⌘i) 
⇣
(INFobj,subji  R0i )/⌘i
⌘i
+POSWTPiIi ln [  (Pi)  (Wi)]
+POSWTPi(1  Ii) ln [  (Pi) (1    (Wi))] (5)
+(1  POSWTPi) ln [1    (Pi)]
50% for the Weibull version of (2).
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where
Pi =
Q0i✓   ⌫
⇣
(INFobj,subji  R0i )/⌘i
⌘
(1  ⌫2)0.5 ,
Wi =
(Z 0i↵    ln ti)  ⇢
⇣
(INFobj,subji  R0i )/⌘i
⌘
(1  ⇢2)0.5
and Ii is the subject’s discrete prize choice with Ii = 1 if the subject chooses the reduction
over the o↵ered cash amount ti. The log-likelihood function logL =
PN
i=1 logLi can then
be maximized with respect to the coe cient vectors (↵, ,  , ✓) and the parameter values
(⌘, ⌫, ⇢).
If (1    i) = (1    ), then individual log-likelihood of the resulting two-equations
model becomes
logLi = ln
h
(1/⌘i) 
⇣
(INFobj,subji  R0i )/⌘i
⌘i
+Ii ln [(1   )  (Wi)] (6)
+(1  Ii) ln [(1   ) (1    (Wi)) +  ]
and
PN
i=1 logLi is maximized with respect to the coe cient vectors (↵, ,  ) and param-
eter values (⌘, ⇢).
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Table 3 presents the estimation results. The first column corresponds to the standard
lognormal single-equation model (1). The second and third columns report results of
the joint three-equations model (5), and the last two columns report results of the joint
two-equations model (6) with exogenous participation probability. In all five columns,
the significance levels of the estimated parameters rarely change between models and
specifications. At the same time, there is reason to suspect the presence of a bias in
the single equation model, indicated by di↵erences in the magnitudes of the significant
coe cients estimates between the single and the joint models. In addition, the signif-
icance of the EUA price and footprint estimates in the single equation model justifies
employing a joint model that endogenizes prior information among subjects. Across the
joint models, the choice of the proxy for participation clearly matters as a comparison
of the coe cient estimates of the two and the three-equation model shows. This points
to a strong impact of the participation rate (1  ) on estimates. Finally, comparing the
two specifications for each of the joint models, coe cient estimates are largely invari-
ant with respect to the information proxy used: Subjective (left column) and objective
(right column) measures of subjects’ knowledge return broadly similar estimates, except
for the coe cient estimates in the information submodel itself.
The estimation results in Table 3 return signs for the significant variables that are
within expectations. Starting with the WTP submodel, the price variable has the de-
sired negative e↵ect and is highly significant, irrespective of the model. Among the
socio-demographic variables, education stands out as a highly significant correlate of
the choice of the emissions reduction. Among attitudinal variables, the expectation of
benefiting future generations shows a higher correlation with the propensity to choose
the EUA than the expectation of personal benefits or the acknowledgement of personal
negative contributions to climate change. Finally, the two matched environmental con-
trols deliver an unexpected e↵ect: While a larger number of recent news items related
to climate change has no direct e↵ect, higher mean temperatures in subjects’ regions
of residence around the time of the experiment are associated with a higher propensity
to opt for the GHG emissions reduction.20 Moving on to the participation submodel,
20The e↵ect is robust to including maximum instead of mean temperatures at the ten percent level of
significance.
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we observe important subtleties regarding the determinants of the prize choice: Female
subjects, older subjects, and, in part, subjects with more children in the household are
more likely to indicate non-indi↵erence to VCA. In addition, attitudinal variables reverse
their role in the participation submodel compared to the WTP submodel: Personal ben-
efits and acknowledged lifestyle impacts are much stronger correlated with participation
than are future benefits. Both recent media coverage as well as temperatures decrease
statements of participation in VCA. At around 84%, the predicted average probability
of participation in the three-equations-model is close to the observed share of subjects
who indicate non-indi↵erence to VCA. Finally, in the information submodel, female and
older subjects are both subjectively and objectively less informed. Subjects with more
children in the household feel better informed, but do not di↵er significantly in objective
terms. As expected, education is a significant driver of endogenous information status,
thus adding to the direct e↵ect of education on WTP through ⇢. Interestingly, higher
recent media coverage has a slightly negative e↵ect on the subjective assessment of in-
formation. The correlation of the endogenous information status, both subjective and
objective, and WTP is always highly significant. In contrast, endogenous information
status is not correlated with indi↵erence, as ⌫ is insignificant.
4.2 Willingness to Pay
The specific experimental design permits interpretation of the welfare measure elicited
as both WTP and willingness to accept (WTA) since either of the two implied reference
points can be defended.21 We subsequently follow the literature and report WTP.
21First, the experimental task may be interpreted as eliciting minimum WTA to forgo the emissions
reduction. To see this, denote the vector of public goods with and without the emissions reduction as
q1 and q0, respectively, and let the corresponding element of q be given in terms of abatement. Then,
the equivalent variation v(p, q1, y) = v(p, q0, y + E) defines WTA, where p is the vector of prices for
private goods. Second, however, the converse of perceiving the the experimental choice as a purchasing
decision appears equally if not more plausible. In this case, maximumWTP is given by the compensation
variation, v(p, q1, y0 C) = v(p, q0, y0), with income y0 = y+ t. Note that most of the reasons believed to
create the frequent disparity between WTP and WTA do not apply in our case (Hanemann 1999). First,
the notion of a “loss” a` la Tversky and Kahnemann and thus, loss aversion is ambiguous and depends on
the reference point used as described above. Second, we use a closed-ended and paid elicitation format,
which has been suggested to minimize the strategic incentives to understate WTP and overstate WTA
found for open-ended, unpaid elicitation formats and paid auctions. Third, when the change in q is
small, a WTP/WTA disparity due to low elasticities of substitution between public and private good
and income elasticities larger than unity should play a negligible role. One potential bias in this context
is the possible presence of a “windfall” (Keeler et al. 1985) or “house money” (Thaler and Johnson 1990)
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Table 4 reports WTP computations and illustrates the impact of covariates on mean
and median WTP estimates. Beginning with the covariates, the main results of the first
five columns can be summarized as follows. First, the joint models, which allow for
indi↵erent subjects, feature considerably higher mean and median WTP estimates than
the single-equation model.22 The strong impact of accounting for indi↵erence is also
emphasized by substantial di↵erences in estimates between the three-equations model
and the two-equations model with exogenous participation rate. In contrast to the
observed sensitivity to the participation rate, WTP estimates of the joint models are
highly robust to employing either the subjective or the objective proxy for knowledge.
Second, calibrating the vector of covariates using values from the census (Table 2) gives
mean and median WTP estimates of about 77% of the values for the experimental
sample. Thus, we would expect estimates for a truly representative sample to result
in numbers that are about one quarter below ours. Third, changes in climate change
attitudes and education a↵ect WTP considerably. For example, the calibration to reflect
a well-informed “realist”, who acknowledges future benefits and personal lifestyle impacts
but not personal benefits from today’s reductions, more than doubles median WTP
compared to the sample mean.
Turning to the absolute level of WTP, the di↵erences between mean and median
estimates are considerable in all versions of the models. This points to the fact that
despite censoring by income and even though the joint models allow for indi↵erence,
the e↵ect of the “fat tails” (Boyle et al. 1988) on both sides of the empirical WTP dis-
tribution persists. Thus, mean estimates are sensitive to the assumed model of utility,
the imposed distribution of the error terms, and the bounds implied by non-negativity
and income restrictions. The challenges of distributional and model assumptions also
a↵ect the median estimates since the empirical median falls below the lowest bid price
(Hanemann and Kanninen 1999).23 The estimated levels, particularly of mean WTP,
e↵ect common to all experiments in which subjects always gain irrespective of their choice. Evidence on
the presence, direction, and scale of a potential bias in public good situations is inconclusive, however
(Harrison 2007).
22Running separate regressions including either the participation or the information submodel shows
that the changes in WTP estimates are almost entirely due to allowing for indi↵erence.
23For example, mean (median) WTP estimates in the first column at the sample mean are e127.40
(e0.22) if errors are assumed log-logistic and e139.36 (e0.22) if errors are distributed Weibull.
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therefore need to be interpreted with caution. Observing that (1) the exogenous par-
ticipation probability of 46% in the two-equation model can be interpreted as a lower
bound of participation in the sample and (2) the conservative coding of POSWTP for
the three-equation model can be interpreted as an upper bound, the two models may be
plausibly viewed as estimating an upper and lower bound for median WTP in our data.
Regarding mean WTP, the last column of Table 4 reports estimates from the Turnbull
Distribution-Free Estimator (Turnbull 1976, Carson et al. 1994) which has been sug-
gested as a conservative approach for mean WTP in the presence of “fat tails” (Haab
and McConnell 1997, 2002). Similar to our parametric model, the Turnbull allows for
nonparticipation but indi↵erent subjects do not need to be uniquely identified.24 In its
most conservative lower bound version, the Turnbull exlusively relies on the assumption
of non-negativity and the information that the WTP of a subject who chooses the re-
duction is not less than the alternative cash prize. Taken together, we would suggest
a mean WTP of e6.31 and a median WTP between e0.30 and e12 as the most con-
servative and best available estimates for central measures of WTP in our sample. The
Turnbull estimator has limited power to quantify covariate e↵ects, however, as it does so
by simply confining the estimator to subsamples that exhibit the desired configuration.
If we compute the Turnbull for our subsamples of “enthusiasts” and “realists” (defined
by including the “rather yes” and “rather no” categories to increase subsample size),
lower bound estimates increase to about e22 and e17, respectively.
4.3 Discussion
In this section, we compare our findings to the existing literature and discuss two poten-
tial limitations of the preference elicitation. To begin with the former, Table 5 provides a
comparison of covariate results with the VCA literature. In addition, results can be com-
pared to some extent with two related strands: (1) papers on preferences for mandatory,
collective climate policies (CCP) and (2) papers on voluntary contributions to public
goods in general. Table 5 includes a selection of the former category25 while the latter
24The assumption here is that subjects with v(p, q0, y0i; zi) = v(p, q
1, y0i; zi) choose cash at all prices
ti > 0.
25The selection of papers is based on comparability of the valued scenario and availability of covariates.
See Johnson and Nemet (2010) for a more comprehensive survey of the growing literature on WTP for
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has been discussed to some extent elsewhere (Diederich and Goeschl 2011a). The present
study benefits from a larger set of covariates than most other studies on VCA or CCP.
Among the socio-demographic variables, education stands out as the most frequent and
unanimously positive driver. In contrast to our findings, income is positively correlated
in most studies where available. A possible explanation for the ambigious results for gen-
der and age may be countervailing e↵ects in both variables that are specific to climate
change. For example, the delayed arrival of benefits from emissions reductions may mili-
tate against older subjects contributing who in general have been found to give more (List
2004). The second panel in Table 3 reports on stated climate change attitudes. Mak-
ing the variables comparable across the literature involves some imprecise adjustments,
such as pooling the expectations of personal and future generation benefits. The almost
equivocal finding is that of a positive correlation between WTP and benefit expectations
as well as the acknowledgement of personal responsibility for climate change. The latter
may not only arise from concerns of justice (Konow 2003) or o↵set motives (Kotchen
2009) but could also be driven by an “outrage” premium for human-made environmental
damages (Bulte et al. 2005). A novel element in the present study is the matching of
exogenous data of environmental conditions at the time and location of the valuation
choice. While this allows to establish causality, it limits comparability to previous find-
ings which are based on respondents’ statements. If the e↵ect uncovered in our results is
not a general e↵ect in public good provision but rather context-specific, a possible expla-
nation may be a heuristic shortcut: subjects might associate lower GHG emissions with
lower temperatures, making emissions reductions—without further reasoning—appear
instantaneously more desirable. Without further evidence, however, such reasoning is
entirely speculative.
The large range of estimates for central measures of WTP in our data and their
sensitivity puts existing estimates of the VCA literature with comparable survey designs
into perspective and warrants cautious interpretation of the available welfare measures
for VCA. In comparison, we would expect our estimates in Table 4 to be lower than
those of the two contingent valuation studies on VCA as they are based on stated pref-
CCP.
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erences and respondents which—in light of the covariate results—will probably display
an above-average WTP. Regarding results based on the Turnbull lower bound estimator,
our data indeed suggests a lower mean WTP than found by Brouwer et al. (2008) at
e25/tCO2 by employing the Turnbull. Our parametric mean WTP estimates, however,
considerably exceed the RUM based estimates around £24/tCO2 by MacKerron et al.
(2009). One plausible reason for this is that the “fat tail” in MacKerron’s et al. data
is at a lower maximum bid (£20) than ours (e100). Moreover, MacKerron et al. (2009)
employ an unresticted linear RUM which allows for negative WTP. Among the existing
estimates, our results most closely correspond to Lo¨schel et al. (2013) who nonparamet-
rically calculate a mean WTP at e12/tCO2 (median at e0) from observed demand in a
variant of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism.
The literature as well as our design suggest two qualifications for our results. First,
field price censoring (FPC) can arise in valuation experiments because prices for goods
within the experiment cannot easily be isolated from prices “in the field” (Harrison et al.
2004, Cherry et al. 2004). As a result, there are circumstances when the experimentally
observable WTP is censored at the level of the field price as subjects avail themselves of
arbitrage opportunities. Careful examination of the data leads us to conclude that FPC
is an unlikely source of bias in the present experiment (Diederich and Goeschl 2011a).
Additional evidence to the analysis provided in Diederich and Goeschl (2011a) comes
from answers to the post-experimental survey in which only 6.2 (13.5) percent of subjects
confidently (tentatively) believe that they personally have access to the EUA market.
Any remaining e↵ect of FPC on covariate estimates will be at least partly accounted
for by the information submodel while for WTP, estimates would be downward biased.
Second, the number of sceptics about the reduction technology that is identified in the
ex-post survey and excluded from the sample may be a lower bound as some subjects
may be reluctant to mention their dislike about the employed reduction technology or
other reservations in their answers.26 Since they probably show up as participants in
the data who place a positive value on climate change mitigation but choose cash due to
unidentified scepticism, WTP estimates would be biased downward. A potential e↵ect on
26Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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covariate estimates would again be partially accounted for by the information submodel.
5 Conclusions
Individual, unilateral action to reduce GHG emissions, it has been suggested, could play
an important part in the endeavor to tackle climate change. Empirical estimates of the
public’s willingness to engage in VCA are sparse, however, and its key drivers are not
well understood. In this paper, we provide non-hypothetical estimates of the preferences
for VCA by giving subjects the costly opportunity to reduce GHG emissions by one
ton through the retirement of an EU ETS emissions allowance. To do so, we run a
dichotomous choice online valuation experiment with a sample of voting-aged Germans.
In contrast to prior studies, our sample is large, highly heterogeneous and Internet-
representative, and subjects face a considerably larger range of bid prices. Furthermore,
we explicitly take into account the public nature of the good and the voluntary contri-
bution character of the valuation exercise and allow for zero WTP in our econometric
analysis through a mixture model. Consistent with the approach to elicit “homegrown
values” (Cummings et al. 1995), we focus on endogenous information status and model
it jointly with WTP and the proxy for participation in VCA activities.
In the joint estimation, the main correlates of WTP in our experiment are subjects’
education—both directly and indirectly through the endogenous information status—,
their perceived benefits from emissions reductions—with a greater weight of altruis-
tic compared to selfish benefits—, the acknowledgement of personal responsibility for
climate change, and matched outdoor temperatures around the time and place of the
experiment. Regarding subjects indication of not being generally indi↵erent towards
VCA, the likelihood of participation is higher for females and increases with age, with
stated benefit expectations and with perceived personal responsibility for climate change.
Regarding the proxies for information status about climate change, young males with
higher education are both subjectively and objectively better informed about climate
change related facts. In addition, the subjective measure of information correlates posi-
tively with the number of children in the household and negatively with recent coverage
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of climate change in German media. Finally, subjects’ endogenous information status
and WTP highly significantly correlate.
Central measures of the estimated WTP distribution vary considerably with the
identified drivers. When calibrated with German census means of covariates, we obtain
estimates of about 77% of the estimates for our sample. In turn, a calibration to “real-
istic” expectations of benefits and personal lifestyle impact considerably increases WTP
estimates compared to the sample mean. In absolute terms, both mean and median esti-
mates are sensitive to model assumptions despite a much larger bid range than previous
studies. If one wanted to arrive at a welfare measure based on the data we obtained, we
would suggest a mean WTP of e6.30 and a median WTP of e0.30 for an individual vol-
untary contribution of one ton of GHG emissions reductions as conservative lower-bound
estimates.
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Motivational Drivers of the Private Provision of Public
Goods: Evidence From a Large Framed Field Experiment
Johannes Diederich Timo Goeschl
Abstract
Disentangling the motivational drivers of individuals is frequently regarded a key
step in reconciling theory and empirical evidence on the voluntary provision of public
goods. We present results of a large online field experiments with 12,624 contribution
choices by members of the Internet-using German population. Subjects are assigned
to six treatments targeted at motivations such as altruism, “warm glow”, image
motivation, or equity concerns. While evidence on treatment e↵ects is mixed, the
data point to significant e↵ects of framing and the sequence of presenting options.
Exploiting variations within the highly heterogeneous sample, the results confirm
previous results from a subset of the data on sociodemographics and exogenous
environmental conditions as determinants of subjects’ choices and add additional
evidence that females and older subjects are more inclined to give to the public
good.
1 Introduction
The question of the underlying drivers of the private provision of public goods has
spawned a still ongoing discussion in the literature. Since both empirically and ex-
perimentally, consumers voluntarily contribute to public goods at higher levels than
the standard theory predicts, several extensions of and alternatives to the traditional
theoretical formulation of the problem have been discussed. Most extensions concern
additional sources of utility over and above the “purely altruistic” setup, in which, be-
sides consumption, the overall level of the public good is the only argument in the utility
function, no matter how it is provided (Samuelson 1954, Bergstrom et al. 1986).
Among the additional drivers discussed, “warm glow”, image motivation, and moral
norms have received a considerable amount of attention. Commonly, the “warm glow”
of giving is defined as any private utility gains from the act of giving itself regardless of
its impact on the aggregate level of the public good (Cornes and Sandler 1984, Andreoni
1989, 1990). Also, it is assumed to increase in the size of one’s contribution. Image
motivation, in turn, is characterized by (1) the visibility of the contribution or pro-social
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action and (2) by some (perceived) norm causing external (social) approval or sanctioning
(Akerlof 1980, Hollander 1990, Benabou and Tirole 2006, Ariely et al. 2009). We may
therefore also call image motivation a social norm. In contrast, a norm where sanctioning
takes place internally, i.e. within the subject, may be called a moral norm (Brekke et al.
2003, Konow 2003). One may view the particular moral norm considered in the present
paper as a norm of distributive fairness or a concern for equity.
This paper reports results from five additional treatment groups in the experiment
reported in our articles “To Give or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and the
Provision of Public Goods” and “Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and
Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence”.1 Treatments were designed to disen-
tangle, in a uniform, controlled procedure, the presence and strength of the four motiva-
tional drivers mentioned above in the propensity to contribute a 1 ton carbon emissions
reduction to the global pure public good of climate change mitigation. In total, the data
set contains 12,624 contribution choices made by 6,312 subjects.
Main results regarding a successful disentanglement of the targeted motivations
through the treatments are ambiguous. On the one hand, we find that when remov-
ing altruism from subjects’ set of motivations, contribution probabilities do not di↵er,
while when adding image motivation, there is weak evidence for an increase. Both find-
ings are plausible and in line with theory. On the other hand, several findings point to
di culties of the experimental design to successfully operate: First, there is evidence for
strong framing e↵ects as two theoretically equivalent treatments delivered significantly
di↵erent contribution probabilities from slight changes in the information given. Second,
results from an ex-post control questions suggest that the treatments removing altruism
from subjects’ set of motivations have not been well understood and thus may have
failed. Third, we find in a treatment combining the removal of altruism and the acti-
vation of image motivation that contribution probabilities increase relatively strongly
which is di cult to reconcile with the result of the two single treatments mentioned
above.
In addition to treatment e↵ects, the set of available covariates provides an opportu-
1Both papers are part of this dissertation. The latter is also available under Diederich and Goeschl
(2013).
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nity to check previous results on determinants of contributions based on a subsample
of the full sample. Results confirm previous findings on sociodemographics such as a
highly significant correlation with education. Due to the larger statistical power, results
add evidence for a positive correlation of age and being female with the probability to
contribute to previously insignificant estimates. Lastly, additional evidence for a positive
causal e↵ect of outdoor temperatures, matched to subjects’ choices by experimental day
and region of residence, on the probability to contribute can be provided.
2 Theoretical framework
The following presents a simple linear model to illustrate the treatment design. The
model is based on the standard impurely altruistic public good model (Andreoni 1989,
1990) and also draws from Benabou and Tirole (2006). Let utility be additively separable
and expressed as
Ui =v
x
i xi + v
G
i G+ v
g
i gi
+ ⌘
⇥
 Gi E i
 
vGi |gi,p
    gi E i (vgi |gi,p)⇤ (1)
where xi denotes i’s consumption of a monetary nume´raire, gi is i’s contribution to
the public good, and G = G i + gi with G i being contributions by others. The vector
vi =
 
vxi , v
G
i , v
g
i
 
denotes the individual’s valuations for money, the overall level of public
good, and own contributions, respectively. Thus, the second (third) term in (1) is the
altruistic (“warm glow”) component of utility. The last term represents image motivation
where ⌘ 2 [0, 1] is a parameter of the visibility of the act of contributing to others, and
the vector   i = ( Gi ,  
g
i ) denotes individual i’s concerns for being perceived by others
as altruistic and for being perceived as not interested into “warm glow” (the latter
corresponding to the “private reward” in Benabou and Tirole 2006). We assume that the
way expectations on vi are formed is common knowledge. Let the individual be endowed
with wealth wi and maximize utility with respect to a budget constraint wi = xi + pyi
where p denotes anM -dimensional vector of prices representingM available technologies
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which convert the nume´raire into a unit of public good. Lastly, gi =
PM
j=1 yij .
2
The first-order derivative of (1) with respect to contribution technology j is
@U
@yij
=  pjvxi + vGi + vgi
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vGi |
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j=1 yij ,p
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   gi
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35 . (2)
Obviously, the solution of the simple linear model will not be interior but fully depend on
the relative weight of the additive motivational components. In our experimental design,
we investigate whether a subject is willing to contribute one more unit to the public good.
That is, whether utility is increasing in yij at the current level of contributions.3
Note that the image term in (2) comprises of two e↵ects: the change in others’
posterior expectation of i’s altruism and the change in their posterior expectation of i’s
interest in personal reward from giving. Both e↵ects should be expected to be positive
from an increase of giving (Benabou and Tirole 2006). Hence the net e↵ect of increasing
visibility ⌘ is unclear ex ante.
Di↵erentiating between the four di↵erent components of utility is straightforward
formally. In order to isolate “warm glow” one needs to ensure anonymity, ⌘ = 0, and
exogenously keep G invariant to gi.4 In this case, net marginal utility, v
g
i   pjvxi , is
either increasing or decreasing in yi which determines i’s experimental choice. This will
2The model would owe realism a potential but, for our purposes here, unnecessary extension. One
property of the specific public good used in the experiment is that contributions will o↵set concur-
rent negative contributions since carbon emissions are a by-product of consumption in most economies
(Kotchen 2009). Drawing from Kotchen’s model, we could write net contributions as
gi =
MX
j=1
yij    xi,   2 [0, 1]
where we assume a linear externality of private consumption on the public good,  xi. Thus, i’s direct
contributions now (partly) o↵set or exceed the harm done through consumption. Note that G i may
now include some initial level of the public good provided by nature, and that the individual can boost G
also by reducing consumption. As an additional extension, one could assume   to be individual-specific
and to represent the individual’s perception of the impact of consumption. We follow up on this issue
through questions in the post-experimental survey.
3The possibility of field price censoring has been discussed at length in the article “To Give or Not
to Give: The Price of Contributing and the Provision of Public Goods” (this dissertation).
4Note that vgi will, as a residual category, capture every source of utility that only depends on the
size of personal giving. This is “warm glow” by definition but may also relate to other motivations that
one would rather categorize into more complex moral reasoning (Brekke et al. 2003).
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be the condition of our experimental “Warm glow” treatment. If we let G vary with gi,
this will correspond to the “Baseline” condition where both the “warm glow” and the
altruistic components are active. In the “Image” condition, ⌘ > 0. Comparison to the
Baseline will reveal whether the net e↵ect of the image term is positive or negative.
Note that the production technology is constant across treatment conditions so far.
Di↵erent technologies can have di↵erent (perceived) by-products of producing the unit of
public good, however. It is clear that di↵erences in attributes of the otherwise identical
good may a↵ect utility of contributors (Hanley et al. 1998). We make use of this by
o↵ering, in one treatment, another contribution technology which di↵ers from production
via EUAs particularly with respect to equity e↵ects due to the geographic region in which
the contribution would be produced (in a developing country instead of within the EU).
One attribute of the technology made explicit to subjects was that production in a
developing country would generate positive side benefits to the local population and
environment.5 In the model, we therefore assume for simplicity that the production
technologies of G di↵er only with respect to their impact on equity. Without explicit
functional specification, we may add a technology-dependent concern for equity, Q, to
utility. (1) becomes
Ui = Ui
 
vxi xi + v
G
i G+ v
g
i gi + ⌘R(  i, gi,p);Q(y)
 
(3)
where R(·) denotes the image term in (1). Thus, Q plays only a role for treatment e↵ects
when the technology changes.
3 Treatment Design
Inspired by the model above, the treatment design of the experiment (incompletely)
varies three factors: (1) whether the choice of the emissions reduction actually has an
impact on total emissions, (2) whether the choice is to some extent visible to others, and
(3) whether the choice has di↵erent distributional impacts (Table 1). This gave six treat-
5Following up on footnote 2, one explicit attribute of the baseline EUAs compared to the alternative
technology was that domestic production would contribute to emissions reductions in the region where
subjects’ personal negative contributions have occurred.
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Table 1: Partial three-factor design of treatments
Factor 1:
Impact on total contributions
Factor 2 (Factor 3): Has impact Has no impact
Private contribution Base/EUA WG
(domestic)
Visible contribution Image WGI
(domestic)
Private contribution CER –
(developing country)
Notes: Base: Baseline treatment. WG: Warm Glow
treatment. WGI: Warm-Glow-Image treatment.
Table 2: Two-stages counterfactual design of the experiment
Stage Experimental group Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Base WG Base Image Base WGI EUA CER
2 WG Base Image Base WGI Base CER EUA
# of subjects: 779 778 784 796 792 798 788 797 6,312
Notes: Base: Baseline treatment. WG: Warm Glow treatment. WGI: Warm-Glow-Image
treatment.
ments in total. Treatments were administered to subjects in a two-stages counterfactual
design in order to allow for both between-subjects and within-subjects comparison of
behavior (Table 2).6 One reason for adding a within-subject component in design was
to exploit any coherence of treatment e↵ects within subjects and to immunize treat-
ment e↵ects against any arbitrariness in valuation or constructed preferences that could
manifest in between-subjects comparison (Ariely et al. 2003, Hanley et al. 2009).
At the beginning of the experiment7 subjects were informed that they would par-
ticipate in two consecutive lotteries. Following the first prize choice and, if applicable,
the FPC “filter” screen, subjects made a second choice based on another version on
the decision screen that administered a treatment condition by containing a di↵erent
description of how the public good would be provided, as described below. In two treat-
ments (EUA and CER), also a second information screen was shown that di↵ered in
6Thus, the full sample of the Baseline treatment (excluding sceptics) analyzed in the two other papers
on this experiment consists of the pooled first-stage choices of experimental groups 1, 3, and 5.
7The reader is referred to the two articles “To Give or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and
the Provision of Public Goods” (this dissertation) and “Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action
and Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence” (this dissertation and Diederich and Goeschl 2013)
for a full account of the experimental procedure.
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wording. If subjects opted for the cash prize in their second choice, a second FPC “fil-
ter” screen identical to that used in the first choice appeared. The following describes
the particular design and wording on the decision screen and, partially, the information
screen for each treatment condition.8
Baseline treatment. The Baseline treatment most closely corresponded to the situ-
ation known from laboratory public good experiments, but in a framed field experiment
(Harrison and List 2004) with a real public good and non-student subjects. In particular,
subjects’ choices were completely private information and a↵ected total contributions.
Instructions on the decision screen described that winners would be notified via email
and that the deletion of the EUA, if they chose this prize, would be verifiable on a
Heidelberg University9 web page via a web link embedded in the notification email.
Warm Glow treatment. Di↵erentiating “warm glow” from altruism and other mo-
tives is not a straightforward task. Most of the experimental designs in the laboratory
exogenously vary the individual opportunity cost of contributions and the marginal value
of the public good to separate between altruism and “warm glow” (Andreoni 1993, Pal-
frey and Prisbrey 1997, Goeree et al. 2002, Eckel et al. 2005). However, the marginal
benefit of a real public good is fixed. We therefore used a variant of a design by Crum-
pler and Grossman (2008) which mimics a complete crowding out of contributions.10 In
their experiment, subjects were informed that the charity they select would receive $10
from the experimenter. Subjects were then endowed with $10 and asked to indicate how
much of their endowment they would like to pass to the charity. Instructions stated that
“The amount contributed by the proctor to your selected charity WILL be reduced by
however much you pass to your selected charity. Your selected charity will receive neither
more nor less than $10.” Having made sure that subjects understood the procedure, the
authors find a stable average contribution rate of around 20% among 150 subjects. We
8See the appendix for screenshots of these two experimental screen for each treatment (in German).
9This mentioning of our home institution was the only hint to the identity of the experimenters in the
experiment and intended to increase credibility of the deletion confirmations to subjects. Confirmation
certificates of the deletion were o cial transaction protocols by the German Emissions Trading Authority
(DEHSt).
10Hence, this design corresponds to holding G constant in the model.
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adapted this design by stating on the decision screen of the Warm Glow treatment:
“In this lottery, a certain number of emission allowances will definitely
be bought and deleted. The emission allowance o↵ered to you today is part
of these allowances. This means that regardless of your choice, the number
of allowances to be deleted will not change. However, you have the oppor-
tunity to personally contribute to this emission reduction. You can do so by
foregoing the cash prize and selecting the emission reduction instead.”
One limitation of the design by Crumpler and Grossman (2008) is that it may allow
for an experimenter demand e↵ect or a desire to give to the experimenter. The fact
that the experimenters’ identity was much less clear in our field setting mitigates this
problem: First, there was no personal interaction. Second, it was much less clear whose
financial burden would be reduced from contributing.
Image treatment. In order to boost visibility of a winners’ contribution compared
to the Baseline treatment, the decision screen described that the reduction-choosing
winner would be personally contacted by a sta↵ member via email to arrange the EUA
deletion and to ask for the consent to publish the winners’ name on a section of YouGov’s
website dedicated to this purpose. This procedure increased visibility of the subject’s
pro-social choice while cash choices remained private. The more personal interaction
for deletion contrasts the anonymous aggregate deletion procedure announced in the
Baseline treatment. In order to account for potentially higher demands for data privacy
in an environment such as the Internet, subjects were informed that their names would
be published only with first name, the first letter of the surname, and city.
When designing the Image treatment, we deliberately decided not to increase visibil-
ity by issuing personalized certificates (hard copy or electronic) that confirm the deletion
(e.g Lo¨schel et al. 2010). The reason is that such certification can generate additional
private utility even if not shown to others. Thus, this option seemed unlikely to increase
visibility without activating additional sources of utility. Instead, subjects in the Image
treatment were informed, just like in the Baseline treatment, that the deletion would
be verifiable on a Heidelberg University website. In implementing this, winners of the
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Image treatment were assigned a single EUA number in the notification email and could
verify that “their” EUA number fell within a range of EUA numbers for which a single
o cial deletion confirmation was provided on a Heidelberg University webpage.
Another feature in treatment design of the Image treatment comes out of the theo-
retical model. Since the size of the net image e↵ect in eq. (2) is likely to depend on p, we
“wash out” these second order e↵ects by concealing the price a winning contributor has
faced. Therefore, instructions noted that the alternative cash prize of a winner would
not be made public and that other participants may face di↵erent trade-o↵s.
Warm Glow Image treatment (WGI). This treatment exactly combined the in-
structions of the Warm Glow and the Image treatments. Thus, we added publicity to the
barebone “warm glow” motivation to contribute in the Warm Glow treatment. The text
of the decision screen made clear which informations would be published, thus subjects
could conclude that the information on whether their EUA was pre-bought or not would
not be disclosed.
EUA and CER treatments. These treatments were designed to facilitate a change
in abatement technologies. Thus, the CER treatment o↵ered a Certified Emissions Re-
duction (CER) based on the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Pro-
tocol instead of an EUA. The CER was of the “Gold Standard” quality.11 Instructions
explicitly mentioned the di↵erences between both technologies along two dimensions:
(1) region of abatement and (2) region of investment. We expected both to give rise to
specific equity concerns or moral considerations. While the former can trigger a polluter-
pays motivation in favor of domestic abatement through an EUA, the latter can trigger
distributional concerns due to the side-benefits of Gold Standard CERs which require
the carbon o↵set project to benefit the local community and local environment in a
developing country.12 Both motivations can be found in anecdotal evidence.13 For the
experimental implementation, presentation of the two technologies required not only
11http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org
12Thus, the di↵erence between both technologies may be interpreted as a normative conflict between
equality and equity (Konow 2003, Nikiforakis et al. 2012).
13For example, Carbon Retirement, a commercial UK based service for deleting EUAs, advertises with
the feature of domestic abatement for moral reasons.
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two di↵erent decision screens but also two di↵erent information screens. For the EUA
treatment, both screens closely corresponded to the Baseline treatment, with minor
di↵erences (see the results below).
4 Results
Before turning to treatment e↵ects, we compare (independent) behavior in the first
lottery of subjects in the pooled Baseline groups 1, 3, and 5 with that of subjects in
the EUA group 7. Since both treatments correspond to the same combination of factors
(Table 1), behavior should not di↵er. The result is, however, that contribution choices
of the EUA treatment significantly exceed those in the Baseline treatment (p = 0.01 for
a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test and student’s t test), by about 3.8%. Thus, minor
changes in framing of the screens had a remarkably significant impact: The information
and decision screens of both theoretically identical treatments di↵ered only slightly
at three places in the text. First, in presenting the two options in headlines on the
information screen, the option of “reduction of carbon (CO2) emissions by 1 ton” added
“within the European Union” in the EUA treatment. Second, within the text below, it
stated that this would reduce “domestic emissions in Germany and other EU countries, to
which your personal energy use contributes” instead of only saying that this would reduce
“emissions in Germany and other EU countries” as in the Baseline treatment. Third, the
decision screen in the baseline noted that the deletion of EU allowances would take place
through a “joint order” for all winners choosing this option. The first two di↵erences
were intended to help contrasting the EUA treatment from the CER treatment, the third
di↵erence was intended to help contrasting the Warm Glow and Image treatments from
the Baseline, which was not necessary in the EUA treatment. Since all three di↵erences
occurred simultaneously, we cannot further di↵erentiate between the possible causes of
this framing e↵ect. The following will therefore present results for the EUA and CER
treatments separately from those of the other treatments.
In the analysis, choices in the first lottery, which are completely independent from
each other, can be directly compared between-subjects. To exploit both choices each
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subject made, analysis through panel regressions will account for between- and within
subject e↵ects. Table 3 reports results of Probit regressions of the choice of the emissions
reduction comparing the Baseline treatment with the treatments Warm Glow, Image,
and WGI. Columns (1) to (3) are Probit regressions reporting between-subjects di↵er-
ences of choices in the first lottery. Columns (4) to (6) account for the panel structure of
the two-lottery counterfactual design and report results of random-e↵ects Probit regres-
sions. Columns (4) to (6) thus also take into account within-subject treatment e↵ects as
well as a “time” trend. Some specifications control for subjects’ characteristics and for
matched exogenous environmental conditions used in previous analyses. Table 4 restates
descriptions of these variables and provides summary statistics for the full experimental
sample.
Coe cient estimates of treatment e↵ects are positive throughout. However, estimates
are mostly insignificant with the exception of the WGI treatment (marginal e↵ect up to
3.5%) and, for one specification only, the Image treatment (marginal e↵ect 2.8%).
The insignificant di↵erence between Baseline and Warm Glow treatments would im-
ply that altruism was a negligible motivational component in subjects’ choices. However,
evidence for a lack of understanding of the treatment design of the two “warm glow”
treatments comes from a control question in which we asked subjects in treatment groups
1, 2, 5, and 6 for the number of lotteries (“both”, “one”, or “none of the lotteries”) in
which a winner’s prize choice would influence the actual amount of emissions reductions.
Overall, only 13.8% chose the correct answer (“one lottery”).
A positive e↵ect of visibility of the contribution, implied marginally by the results, is
in line with the theoretical expectations and indicates that subjects expectation of being
perceived as altruistic when observed in the act of contributing by others (the first term
in eq. (2)) seems to dominate.
In light of the results of the Warm Glow and Image treatments, the comparably large
positive e↵ect of the WGI treatment appears counterintuitive, however. This is even
more so as the “warm glow” component of the treatment has apparently not been well
understood as the control question mentioned above indicates. Again, framing e↵ects
could be the reason for this otherwise inconclusive e↵ect: In exactly combining the
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Table 3: Probit coe cient estimates comparing Baseline, Warm Glow, Image, and WGI
treatments. Dependent variable: choice of emission reduction.
Between-subjects Between- and within-subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment:
Warm Glow 0.065 0.055 0.057 0.027 0.106 0.125
(0.061) (0.069) (0.070) (0.088) (0.103) (0.106)
Image 0.069 0.112* 0.101 0.074 0.051 0.081
(0.060) (0.067) (0.068) (0.087) (0.102) (0.105)
WGI 0.132** 0.124* 0.118* 0.157* 0.118 0.146
(0.059) (0.067) (0.068) (0.085) (0.100) (0.103)
Lottery 2 – – – 0.578*** 0.445*** 0.451***
(0.055) (0.065) (0.067)
Cash prize – -0.004*** -0.004*** – -0.020*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Female – 0.084* 0.081 – 0.311** 0.298**
(0.050) (0.051) (0.127) (0.130)
Age – 0.003* 0.003* – 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Education – 0.051*** 0.052*** – 0.139*** 0.143***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.021)
Income – -0.011 -0.013 – -0.034 -0.038
(0.015) (0.015) (0.038) (0.039)
Ambient temperature – – 0.009 – – 0.034**
(0.006) (0.017)
Media coverage – – -0.001 – – 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Constant -0.985*** -1.595*** -1.661*** -4.190*** -5.179*** -5.974***
(0.031) (0.138) (0.236) (0.117) (0.367) (0.625)
N 4727 3866 3763 9454 7732 7526
Log-likelihood -2179.660 -1737.092 -1691.138 -3866.061 -3053.855 -2963.011
 2 5.389 75.290 81.157 114.634 290.534 283.337
D.f. 3 8 10 4 9 11
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.021 0.023
AIC 4367.319 3492.184 3404.276 7744.122 6129.711 5952.022
BIC 4393.164 3548.524 3472.838 7787.047 6206.195 6042.062
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) are Probit coe cient estimates of the choice of emission reduction in the
first lottery. Columns (4)-(6) are random-e↵ects Probit estimates of choices in the full panel,
reported as marginal e↵ects at the sample means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance levels (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%).
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Table 4: Summary statistics of subjects’ characteristics (N = 6, 312)
Variable Description Mean SD Min Max
Sociodemographic characteristics
Female 1 if female 0.475 0.499 0 1
Age Subject’s age (years) 45.73 14.57 18 91
Years of education Years based on subject’s stated highest
educational degree
12.26 3.222 9 22
Income Midpointa of subject’s reported monthly
household net income category (Euros)
2,508 1,681 450 8,000
Environmental controls
Ambient temperature Mean ambient outdoor temperature in
subject’s region of residenceb ( C)
15.08 4.089 8.05 25.8
Media attention Number of hits for a climate change re-
lated keyword searchc in German print
and online mediab
135.7 29.34 69.5 160
Notes: a In our income approximation, for the ‘less than e 500’ category, we assume e 450. For
the two categories above e 5,000, we assume e 8,000 for compatibility with German census data.
The remaining categories have widths of e 500. b The variable is the moving 2-day average of the
daily values of the day at which the subject took the experiment and the day before c Keywords
used: ‘climate change’, ‘climate protection’, ‘global warming ’, ‘carbon dioxide’, ‘CO2’. Database:
LexisNexis d Answer categories 1=disagree, 2=tend to disagree, 3=tend to agree, 4=agree e
Median is 10 f Median is 50
wording of the two other treatments, the WGI treatment contained the largest amount
of text of all treatments. Potentially, an apparently more detailed description, compared
to the Baseline, may have increased subjects’ trust in the procedure, or made the option
more interesting from an hedonic point of view.
In contrast to the weak evidence on treatments, the results show a highly significant
e↵ect of repetition. Estimated at the margin, subjects are up to 57.8% more likely to
choose the emissions reduction in the second lottery.
Estimates of other covariate e↵ects confirm previous analyses of the Baseline subsam-
ple but also add additional evidence based on the increased statistical power of the full
sample. Results for the e↵ects of price, education, and income corroborate the estimates
in our article “To Give or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and the Provision of
Public Goods” (this dissertation) in sign, size, and significance. In addition, the higher
statistical power of the full sample reveals some evidence for positive correlations of be-
ing female and older with the choice of the contribution (marginal e↵ect up to 31% for
being female and up to 0.1% per year for age). This finding is in accordance with some
previous works, while others have found insignificant e↵ects.14
14See the original article for references.
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In exploiting the statistical power of the full sample, there is also evidence in support
of the e↵ects of matched environmental controls analyzed in our article “Willingness to
Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence”
(this dissertation and Diederich and Goeschl 2013): Higher ambient outdoor temper-
atures in a subject’s region of residence around the time the subject took part in the
experiment caused a higher probability of choosing the emissions reduction. The e↵ect
is significant in the panel regression only, however (marginal e↵ect 3%).
Finally, Table 5 reports the same model specifications in comparing EUA and CER
treatments. Estimates of the treatment e↵ect are ambiguous with some weak within-
subject evidence for a preferring the CER through an o↵set project in a developing
country (marginal e↵ect 12%). Other estimates are qualitatively similar but statistically
weaker than in Table 3 due to smaller size of the subsample.
5 Conclusion
Following up on previous analyses, this paper presented additional results of treatments
targeted at contribution motives known from the literature such as “warm glow”, im-
age motivation, and equity concerns based on a framed field experiment on giving to
a real and global public good: climate change mitigation. Results regarding the disen-
tanglement of these motives are ambiguous: On the one hand we find an insignificant
presence of altruism compared to a “warm glow” of giving and a slightly positive image
motivation, which is in line with theoretical predictions.15 On the other hand, these
results do not align with our finding of a relatively strong positive e↵ect when simply
combining these two treatments, i.e., removing altruism and adding image motivation in
a combined treatment. Also, the two altruism-removing “warm glow” treatments were
apparently not well understood by subjects. Besides, there is evidence for framing ef-
fects such that slight changes in wording had significant impacts. Other than treatment
e↵ects, a strong result is that subjects are much more inclined to choose the emissions
reduction if presented with a second chance. Regarding covariate e↵ects, results of the
15While our own model does not predict signs, the model by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002), for example,
predicts a dominance of “warm glow” and zero impact of altruism in very large groups.
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Table 5: Probit coe cient estimates comparing EUA and CER treatment. Baseline:
EUA treatment. Dependent variable: choice of emission reduction.
Between-subjects Between- and within-subjects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CER treatment -0.022 -0.057 -0.050 0.124* 0.070 0.085
(0.072) (0.082) (0.083) (0.075) (0.085) (0.087)
Lottery 2 – – – 0.615*** 0.563*** 0.550***
(0.080) (0.091) (0.092)
Cash prize – -0.001 -0.001 – -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Female – 0.020 0.010 – 0.056 0.056
(0.087) (0.088) (0.166) (0.169)
Age – 0.008** 0.007** – 0.011* 0.010
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Education – 0.045*** 0.045*** – 0.092*** 0.090***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.026)
Income – 0.031 0.032 – 0.077 0.074
(0.025) (0.026) (0.050) (0.051)
Ambient temperature – – 0.002 – – -0.018
(0.011) (0.022)
Media coverage – – -0.000 – – -0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Constant -0.840*** -1.777*** -1.730*** -2.675*** -3.864*** -3.092***
(0.051) (0.245) (0.416) (0.190) (0.518) (0.821)
N 1585.000 1256.000 1230.000 3170.000 2512.000 2460.000
Log-likelihood -787.516 -605.400 -596.333 -1492.148 -1171.425 -1146.591
 2 0.091 25.989 24.333 62.349 90.271 84.913
D.f. 1.000 6.000 8.000 2.000 7.000 9.000
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.021 0.020
AIC 1579.031 1224.800 1210.666 2992.296 2360.851 2315.182
BIC 1589.768 1260.749 1256.699 3016.542 2413.310 2379.069
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) are Probit coe cient estimates of the choice of emission reduction in the
first lottery. Columns (4)-(6) are random-e↵ects Probit estimates of choices in the full panel,
reported as marginal e↵ects at the sample means. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Stars
indicate significance levels (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%).
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previous analyses are confirmed. In addition, the higher statistical power of the present
sample allows us to find evidence for a positive e↵ect of age and being female on the
likelihood of contribution the emissions reduction.
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Appendix
Information and decision screens
This section contains screenshots of the actual screens used in the experiment (in German). Translations
of the screens belonging to the Baseline treatment can be found in the appendix to the article “To Give
or Not to Give: The Price of Contributing and the Provision of Public Goods” (this dissertation).
Translations of the other treatments can be mostly found in the text above.
Figure 1: Information screen of the Baseline, Warm Glow, Image, and WGI treatments
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Figure 2: Decision screen, Baseline treatment
Figure 3: Decision screen, Warm Glow treatment
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Figure 4: Decision screen, Image treatment
Figure 5: Decision screen, WGI treatment
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Figure 6: Information screen of the EUA treatment
Figure 7: Decision screen, EUA treatment
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Figure 8: Information screen of the CER treatment
Figure 9: Decision screen, CER treatment
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The Pure Group Size E↵ect in Linear Public Good
Experiments with Large Groups⇤
Johannes Diederich Timo Goeschl Israel Waichman
Abstract
Many pure public goods are privately provided among large groups. Existing evi-
dence about the behavior of large groups in linear public good experiments is sparse
and debatable while theory provides ambiguous predictions and empirical results
are mixed. We compare individual contribution levels for experimental group sizes
of 10, 40, and 100 in a between-subjects design and find a positive “pure” e↵ect of
group size that is statistically more pronounced than previously established by Isaac,
Walker, and Williams (1994). Di↵erences in group sizes also manifest in subjects’
first-order beliefs, in crowding-out of contributions by others’ giving, and in subjects’
tendency to stick to their first-round decision. Our design of the long-term Internet
experiment provides an improved methodology to overcome typical administrative
and budgetary challenges in running large-group, multi-period experiments. Our
experiment also benefits from a diverse sample of the German population revealing
gender, education, and the urbanity of the place of residence as main correlates to
the private provision of the experimental public good.
1 Introduction
Many public goods are privately provided on a global scale with literally millions of
consumers and potential suppliers. Examples include web resources such as Wikipedia,
charities such as the Red Cross, and environmental public goods such as climate change
mitigation. Most experimental research on the private provision of public goods has
focused on comparably small groups, playing a public good game in a laboratory. Typ-
ically, these groups consist of two to ten subjects of a convenience sample of students.
The immediate question about the external validity of this approach is threefold: First,
to what extent do results obtained for students hold for humans in general? Second,
to what extent do results obtained in a small group setting hold for large groups? And
⇤We thank seminar participants in Heidelberg and Mannheim for helpful comments, and Brigitte
Galiger and Hans Baumann for student assistance. We also thank the people at Lightspeed Research for
cooperation. Funding by the German Science Foundation (DFG) under grant GO1604/1 is gratefully
acknowledged.
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third, to what extent do results obtained from laboratory public goods hold for (the
framing of) real-world public goods?
While a multitude of papers has been addressing the first and the third question, the
literature is surprisingly silent about the second one. Among the thousands of published
replications of the standard linear public good experiment (henceforth called linear PGE
or LPGE), we are aware of only one study that explicitly compares behavior of small
and large1 groups (Isaac, Walker, and Williams 1994, henceforth also IWW). The most
likely reasons for this lack of evidence are methodological. In general, researchers face
two challenges in running a PGE with large groups (Isaac et al. 1994, Ledyard 1995). One
is to facilitate simultaneous play when group sizes exceed typical lab sizes. The other one
is funding since for parameter values of typical small-group PGEs, maximum attainable
as well as expected average payo↵s rapidly increase with group size.2 IWW overcame
the first challenge by what they termed “multiple session” experiments in which each
round lasts several days so that subjects can sequentially access the lab and submit their
decision. IWW overcame the second challenge by paying, instead of money, extra-credit
points improving students’ grades which, on the downside, made final payment almost
dichotomous. The result IWW found in their experiments was that for certain values
of experimental parameters, larger groups provide more of the public good while for
other values, they could not identify a significant e↵ect of the groups size.3 Besides this
experimental finding, theoretical and empirical work on the e↵ect of numbers provide
ambiguous findings regarding contribution levels.
In this paper, we report on a LPGE played with groups of the unexceptional size of 10
as well as of the large sizes of 40 and 100 subjects. Our results clearly support the pres-
1In an experimental context, we use the term “large” as referring to group sizes exceeding N = 20,
which roughly corresponds to the capacity of a typical experimental laboratory. Notably, there have
been several contributions to the literature that compare di↵erent sizes of small groups with N < 20.
2For a standard LPGE, the increase is quadratic in N if we assume perfectly identical subjects.
3A tendency to find the result counterintuitive at first can result from a confusion of terminology.
A “pure” e↵ect of numbers (IWW) implies that the public good in question is also pure. To the
experimentalist, this requires the marginal returns from a contribution to the public good to be constant
across experimental group sizes. Another e↵ect of group size arises for non-excludable but rival goods,
i.e. common goods. For common goods, an increase in group size causes a decrease in the marginal
per-capita return (MPCR) of contributions since consumption of the good becomes more congested.
Sometimes, the intuition of a negative e↵ect of group size on contributions is based on this increase
in the marginality of one’s contribution (Olson 1965). However, this is not a “pure group size e↵ect”
as IWW call it. In the experimental literature, the significant e↵ect of MPCR on contributions is a
well-established result (Ledyard 1995).
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ence of a positive e↵ect of pure group size on individual contributions. At the same time,
we o↵er an improved methodology for running experiments that require simultaneous
interaction with large groups. In particular, we resolve several important shortcomings
in IWW’s design. First, administering the experiment online leads to an extremely low
rate of “defaulting” subjects, i.e. subjects who fail to participate in individual rounds
and thus, trigger an automatic individual decision. Second, using a regionally highly
dispersed sample largely excludes uncontrolled communication between subjects during
multi-day rounds. Third, paying monetary earnings to induce experimental preferences
ensures continuous incentives. Apart from these improvements, we are the first to ad-
minister a LPGE with large groups to a heterogeneous sample of subjects from the
general population, which also allows to exploit considerable variation in demographic
characteristics.
In addition to establishing a positive e↵ect of group size, we obtain results from
subjects’ stated first-order beliefs, from the analysis of individual behavior over time,
and from correlating demographic information. Regarding beliefs, we find evidence that
the observed positive group size e↵ect on contributions is also present in first-order beliefs
about others’ contributions. However, the predicted share of contributors among fellow
group members is inversely related to group size, an e↵ect which we do not observe
in actual behavior. In our regression results, observed previous-round contributions by
others crowd-in individual contributions for small groups. However, the crowding-in is
insignificant for groups with N = 40 and becomes a significant crowding-out for large
groups of N = 100 as well as for small groups of N = 10 with high endowments. Overall,
observed cooperative behavior is always higher than the believed behavior of others.
Regarding individual behavior over time, we find that the share of subjects who display
a “sticky” contribution pattern is larger in larger groups. Exploiting sociodemographic
data of our non-student subject sample, we find significantly higher contributions for
male subjects, for subjects holding a higher educational degree, and for subjects living
in a more rural residential environment. These e↵ects do not significantly di↵er with
group size.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a review of
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the relevant theoretical, empirical, and experimental literature. Section 3 describes the
experimental design and the collected data. Section 4 reports on the analysis and results.
Section 5 discusses the main finding with respect to explanatory hypotheses and future
research.
2 Literature
The literature on a “pure” e↵ect of group size on public good provision is very lim-
ited and provides ambiguous predictions and evidence. The widespread premise among
economists that contributions will decrease with group size traces back to Olson (1965)
who wrote “the larger a group is the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal
supply of any collective good”.4
2.1 Theoretical literature
Economic theory provides ambiguous predictions for the direction of an e↵ect of group
size when the public good is pure and linear. One needs to be careful, however, to
di↵erentiate between those types of models where predictions carry over to the envi-
ronment of a standard linear public good experiment and those types of models where
they do not. Consider the (neo-)classical “purely altruistic” model, in which individu-
als care, besides consumption, about the aggregate level of public good in the economy
only. For an experimental environment with a linear monetary public good (e.g. an
experimental “group account”), the unanimous prediction for this type of preferences
is to contribute zero if MPCR < 1. This prediction is independent of group size and
due to free riding behavior. The predictive power of the classical model is therefore
limited in a linear public good experiment with varying group size. If an interior solu-
tion was possible, however, like for many real-world public goods, the purely altruistic
model always predicts a negative e↵ect of group size on individual contributions, both
for identical individuals (Chamberlin 1974, McGuire 1974) and for individuals who di↵er
in wealth or preferences (Andreoni 1988), while total giving will rise. The intuition for
4As pointed out by many scholars (see, e.g., Esteban 2001) and noted in footnote 3, Olson’s proposition
implied a non-excludable but rival public good.
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this result fully parallels the intuition for the famous crowding-out result in the purely
altruistic model (Warr 1983, Bernheim 1986, Bergstrom et al. 1986) that has inspired so
much behavioral research: If one cares only about the level of public good provided in
the economy, adding more contributors will partially crowd out one’s own contribution.
Thus, more potential contributors increases free riding, which thus is the driving force
of the negative e↵ect of group size in the purely altruistic model.
The stark predictions of the purely altruistic model would be mitigated somewhat
if one adds “warm glow” (Andreoni 1989, 1990). Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) show that
under a reasonable set of assumptions, such “joy-of-giving motives” will crowd out altru-
ism as the motive for giving in an economy of infinite size. Hence, contributions would
be invariant to additional contributors in the limit. In a linear public good experiment,
joy-of-giving motives may be important to explain the typically observed above-Nash be-
havior. However, since the altruistic component of motivation predicts zero contributions
for all group sizes in a linear experimental environment with MPCR < 1, composition of
the altruistic and the “warm glow” component will not change in the number of recipi-
ents. Thus, also an “impure” (Andreoni 1989, 1990) public good model will not predict
a pure group size e↵ect for a linear PGE.
An important step towards modeling group size e↵ects is the model of “congested
altruism” by Andreoni (2007). In his model, individuals explicitly care about the benefits
to others generated by the contribution to the public good.5 However, utility is assumed
not to increase proportionally to the increase of total social benefits from larger numbers
but is discounted as the size of the economy grows. Thus, the individuals derive utility
from a combination of caring about total surplus and caring about average surplus
generated by the contribution. As a result, the overall predicted e↵ect of group size
is ambiguous: On the one hand, larger groups imply that the marginal contribution
will create more social benefits, providing an incentive to increase contributions. On
the other hand, larger groups imply that a smaller contribution is needed to achieve
5Note that there is potential for confusion due to the terminology used in the literature. Tradition-
ally, the models in which the individual only cares about aggregate provision have been called “purely
altruistic”, as explained above, although these types of preferences are perfectly consistent with a purely
selfish desire to consume the public good. In contrast, in Andreoni (2007)’s model, agents are explicitly
interested in the benefits to others. Intuitively, Andreoni calls this “altruism” although it is di↵erent
from the meaning of altruism in traditional models.
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the same average surplus, providing an incentive to decrease contributions. Calibrating
a utility function with experimental results, Andreoni postulates that the latter e↵ect
would dominate. In particular, average giving would decrease while total giving would
increase. Note that the decreasing e↵ect from group size is not due to increased strategic
free riding, as in the purely altruistic model, but results from a decrease in the value
of social benefits to the contributor. Thus, this type of preferences may very well carry
over to an experimental linear public good environment.
2.2 Experimental literature
Experimental evidence on the pure e↵ect of numbers in a linear public good environment
is extremely limited for large groups. This is especially surprising as the topic has been
of key interest to experimentalists—inspired by Olson’s conjecture—, especially in the
early days of public good experiments (Ledyard 1995). To the best of our knowledge,
only IWW and, recently, Weimann et al. (2012), which we both briefly discuss below,
have investigated the e↵ect of group size in linear public good experiments with groups
of N > 20. However, there are other papers reporting on large-group linear public good
experiments who do not compare group sizes. A meta analysis on linear public good
experiments (Zelmer 2003) lists McCorkle and Watts (1996), which is a simple one shot
experiment consisting of a single large group, and we are also aware of Marwell and Ames
(1981)6 and Rondeau et al. (2005).7 A larger set of papers tested for the e↵ect of group
size in linear public good experiments with “small” (N < 20) groups. The seminal paper
is Isaac and Walker (1988) who find no significant e↵ect of numbers comparing groups
of 4 and 10 subjects. In her meta-study, Zelmer (2003) finds a weakly positive e↵ect of
group size across small-group studies. Other experimental public good papers reporting
on large groups focused on the provision point mechanism not linear environments,
especially among the early literature (Chamberlin 1978, Marwell and Ames 1979, 1981,
Brewer and Kramer 1986).8 Sweeney (1973) tested Olson’s group size conjecture through
6Among other treatments, Marwell and Ames (1981) consider a linear environment with a verly low
MPCR of 0.0275.
7In Rondeau et al. (2005), subjects know that they are part of a large group but not the exact size
of 32.
8In many of the early one-shot experiments, deception was used to make subject believe that they
are part of a large group (Marwell and Ames 1979, 1981, Brewer and Kramer 1986).
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Table 1: Number of experimental groups in Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994)
Group size
N = 4 N = 10 N = 40 N = 100
MPCR = 0.30 17 16 6 3
MPCR = 0.75 10 10 6 3
MPCR = 0.03 – – 6 –
another design than actually varying group size and is thus not comparable.
2.2.1 Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994)
IWW ran a series of long-term, or as they called it, a “multiple session” experiments
with non-monetary incentives to systematically investigate the e↵ect of group size for
linear pure public goods in large groups. Table 1 lists the treatments they report. IWW
compared groups of 4, 10, 40, and 100 subjects, using MPCR values of 0.3 and 0.75 and,
partly, 0.03. Their design aimed at providing a feasible methodology to experimental
economists to cope with the challenges of running large-groups, multi-round experiments
that require simultaneous interaction. Each experimental round lasted for two or three
days. During this time the student subjects could use on-campus computer facilities at
their own convenience to enter their round decisions. This part of the design overcame
the “physical constraint” of limited lab space. Another innovation with respect to this
constraint was to complement the long-term experiments by “muti-site” experiments
in which they connected two experimental labs to run a few regular short term lab
experiments with groups of 40. To overcome the “financial constraint”, subjects’ earnings
were converted into extra credit points to improve their final grades by up to three points
on a 100-point scale. This procedure was thoroughly tested by comparing behavior
between long-term extra-credit experiments and standard short-term cash experiments,
mostly for group sizes of four and ten.
IWW’s findings have surprised many economists who would have expected a neg-
ative e↵ect of group size on contributions. IWW found significantly higher individual
contributions for the large groups of 40 and 100 compared to the two small groups of
four and ten. In particular, cooperation was sustained over time with only slight if any
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decline for the large groups while the small groups exhibited the usual declining pat-
tern over time. This finding held for the MPCR of 0.3. For the MPCR of 0.75, IWW
found no statistically significant di↵erence in average contributions across the four group
sizes. Instead, all four treatments showed only a slight if any decline compared to the
first-round level.
Despite their careful design, IWW’s method leaves room for several important im-
provements. First, chances are high that subjects’ decisions were not independent from
each other as they were all volunteers from undergrad microeconomic theory classes at
(mostly) the same university. This is especially problematic for the large group treat-
ments since in this case, chances are high that one’s peers are in the same group (and
subjects know that), and MPCR values of 0.3 or 0.75 require only three or two other
members of the group to cooperate in order to outperform the free rider’s earnings.
Thus, communication between rounds could be an important alternative explanation to
group size for increased cooperation in IWW’s results. Second, IWW report a significant
amount of “default decisions”. The design of a long-term experiment requires to specify
a default rule in case a subject does not participate in a particular round. This is espe-
cially important in a public goods experiment where groups size is to be kept constant.
The default rule IWW used was to allocate all endowment to a subject’s private account,
thus interpreting non-participation as a decision to free ride. It is obvious that this rule
conditions a subject’s costs of participating in a round on the decision whether to free
ride or not and thus, may strongly bias incentives in the case of a long-term experiment
where subjects repeatedly need to physically access some facility. In IWW’s data, de-
fault rates range around 25-45% for the large groups of 100 and between 15% and 60%
for the small groups of four. For the groups of 100, this means that about half of all free
riding decisions were done through defaulting. Note that average contribution levels did
mostly not significantly di↵er in the comparison to short-term, cash experiments, which
points against a bias for the small groups. Third, translating monetary earnings into
extra-credit points made payment almost dichotomous. According to IWW’s descrip-
tion, a unique letter grade (e.g. B+) typically comprised of 3-4 points of the 100-point
scale. Thus, at most one level change of the letter grade (e.g. from B+ to A-, or from
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B- to B) could be achieved from earnings in the experiment.
2.2.2 Weimann, Brosig-Koch, Hennig-Schmidt, Keser, and Stahr (2012)
In a recent working paper, Weimann et al. (2012) report on playing the linear public
good game with groups of 60 and 100 by connecting four experimental labs at German
universities through the Internet. Live video surveillance of all four labs increases credi-
bility of the procedure to subjects. While this “connected lab” approach improves upon
IWW, who only connected two labs and did not provide video surveillance, Weimann et
al. (2012) do not provide a solution to the financial constraint as they focus very low
MPCR values (0.02 and 0.04). The contribution behavior they find compares well to
IWW’s treatment with groups of 40 and MPCR = 0.03 and resembles the usual declining
pattern of standard small-group lab experiments. Comparing the groups of 60 and 100,
they find weak evidence for a positive e↵ect of group size.
2.3 Empirical literature
Empirical evidence on the e↵ect of group size for pure public goods is sparse and ambigu-
ous. Goetze et al. (1993) analyze data from 137 public broadcasting stations and use the
number of (potential) receivers of the program as the group size variable. Controlling
for income, they find smaller average contributions for larger audiences while total con-
tributions increase. Haan and Kooreman (2002) analyze data from 166 small companies
who were provided biweekly with a box of candy bars by a firm run by business students.
The candy bars were a public good insofar as in each firm, the box containing the candy
as well as the container collecting the payment were freely accessible and payment was
on a voluntary basis. Using the number of sales as proxy for the size of the company,
the authors find tentative evidence that average contributions to the provision of the
box increase with group size. The third empirical paper we are aware of is Zhang and
Zhu (2011) who exploit a natural experiment with the Chinese Wikipedia website: In
2005, access to the website was blocked in mainland China which reduced the size of
the group of potential beneficiaries and contributors significantly. The authors find that
this significantly reduced individual contributions. Note that all three real-world public
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goods analyzed in the empirical studies can be interpreted as both pure and linear public
goods.
3 Experimental design and procedures
3.1 Design
The experiment on which we report is a standard linear public good game using the
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM).9 Thus, individual payo↵s are calculated as
⇡i = y   gi + a
0@gi + NX
j 6=i
gj
1A (1)
where y denotes subjects’ identical endowment, gi denotes subject i’s contribution to the
public good, and a is the marginal per capita return (MPCR): the return to each member
of the group, including the donor, from a marginal contribution. Thus, if 1/N < a < 1
then the environment of the linear public good experiment mimics a social dilemma
in which free riding (gi = 0) is the dominant strategy to the rational player but full
contribution (gi = y) would be socially optimal.
In order to overcome the physical and financial constraints and to improve upon
IWW’s design after 20 years, we introduced three features in running a large-groups
public good experiment. One was to administer the experiment online. In particular,
we ran a long-term Internet experiment in which each experimental round lasted for
exactly three days. This has several advantages. First, handling large groups and
communicating with many subjects via the Internet can be easier than in-person. Second,
participation costs to subjects are extremely small, both in general and for each round as
subjects simply click a link in an email, log in, and enter their round decision instead of
physically come to a lab. We expected low participation costs to encourage low default
rates. Further support for going online comes from recent evidence that long-term online
experiments produce similar results to short-term lab experiments in social dilemma
situations (Normann et al. Forth.). The second novel feature was to recruit a more
9E.g. Isaac and Walker (1988), Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000).
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general sample of the German population than a convenience sample of students. Apart
from the fact that to our knowledge no paper has investigated the behavior of “normals”
(Wilson 2007) in large-group public good games, this has mainly three advantages: First,
the regional dispersion of subjects would make interaction extremely unlikely. Second,
it enhances external validity of the results. Third, higher diversity in sociodemographic
characteristics would allow to link some of the results to these idiosyncatics. Subjects
were recruited from the German panel of an international online polling company. This
guaranteed that subjects were either used to participate in online surveys or at least
able to do so. The third feature of the design was to return to monetary earnings for
the subjects. To do so, we made use of the polling firm’s infrastructure to pay their
survey participants: The pollster compensates panel members with “points” where one
point is worth e 0.01.10 Panel members can cash points by transferring their monetary
equivalent to a PayPal account where they can use it for purchases or wire the balance
to a regular bank account. Members can also use the points directly to acquire shopping
vouchers (e.g. for amazon.de or Karstadt, one of Germany’s major department store
chains) or donate to a charity (e.g. UNICEF). There is a threshold for panel members to
be able to use the points which is an account balance of 550 points. Using the pollster’s
infrastructure has a major advantage that needs to be emphasized: The usual payment
for participating in online surveys varies considerably, depending on the polling company
and the length of the survey.11 From that, we expected the induced preferences to be
sustainable over a wider range of prospective earnings (very low money for the small
groups but relatively large money for the large groups) than it would be possible in a
lab experiment with students. In particular, we endowed subjects with the equivalent
of e 0.40 each round with one randomly determined round being payo↵-relevant. This
endowment allowed to remain within a reasonable research budget despite the large
groups. Similar to IWW’s tests of extra-credit rewards, we test whether the induced
incentives work by comparing, for the group size of ten, behavior with a treatment
10Members earn points through all kinds of activities with the pollsters’s panel, predominantly an-
swering surveys. Survey topics of these types of pollsters are very broad and range from politics and
consumer preferences to lifestyle issues.
11The pollster at hand advised us with earnings of e 5-10 per subject for the proposed experiment.
Other players in the market provide much lower rates, e.g. e 1 for 20min.
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Table 2: Experimental treatments (between-subjects design)
Treatment
10L 40L 100L 10H
Group size N = 10 N = 40 N = 100 N = 10
Endowment 40 points 40 points 40 points 1,000 points
Number of groups 16 5 5 5
Notes: 1 point = e 0.01. MPCR is 0.3 in all treatments.
where endowment is substantially higher (e 10).
Parameter values in the experiment largely follow IWW. First, we chose a MPCR of
0.3, which is the value at which IWW identified a group size e↵ect. Second, we chose
group sizes of 10, 40, and 100 subjects but left out IWWs’ smallest group of 4 since very
small groups have been extensively studied in the literature already. Third, we adopted
IWWs’ default rule of allocating all endowment to the private account if a subject did
not participate in a given round. Fourth, all subjects were assigned to one group size
only and participated in the experiment once (between-subjects treatment design). We
deviated from IWWs’ parameters in that we chose five instead of three groups for the
largest group size of 100 to increase statistical power. Furthermore, we decided to confine
the online experiment to seven instead of ten rounds since we anticipated that an e↵ect
of group size could be established within the first seven rounds already, and we were
not sure about the persistence of online panel members used to one-time surveys in a
long-term interaction. Table 2 summarizes the treatments and number of independent
observations in the experiment.
3.2 Procedures
The experiment took place in two sessions in July 2012 and in September 2012. The
July session consisted of six groups of Treatment 10L and all five groups of Treatment
10H (see Table 2). The September session consisted of 10 groups of Treatment 10L and
the treatments 40L and 100L.
In order to recruit subjects, our cooperation partner screened a random selection of
panel members by asking for their consent to participate in what was presented to them
as an “interactive survey” in which final payment would depend on own answers as well as
the answers of other participants and which would run in seven rounds, each round lasting
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2-3 days. With the agreement, subjects were required to provide a valid email address,
phone number, and ZIP code (“PLZ” in German). Also, the screener survey asked for
basic sociodemographic characteristics. About two weeks after screening, consenting
panel members received an email inviting them to the first round of the “interactive
survey” and providing them with personal login data and the link to the experimental
website, www.interaktive-umfrage.de (translates “www.interactive-survey.de”).
The experimental website consisted of only three pages12, thus minimizing cognitive
load and time demands. The first page was shown after log in and only in the first
round of the game. This screen asked subjects to download and read the experimental
instructions and emphasized that only by reading the instructions, subjects would un-
derstand how to influence their earnings. The screen provided a link to download the
instructions in PDF format, consisting of two pages of written text (in German) using
12pt script size. Every subsequent screen in the experiment showed a link to review the
instructions in the upper right corner. On the second screen, subjects saw the history of
previous rounds in the upper part of the screen, were provided with a button to access
the payo↵ calculator in the middle part of the screen, and were asked to enter their
decision for the current round in the lower part of the screen. In addition, the screen
reminded subjects of the size of the group they were part of. After entering a decision,
the website presented the third screen, which asked subjects for their estimates of (1)
how many of the other members of their group would contribute at least one point to
the group account and (2) how many points on average these contributing members
would allocate. These questions were not paid.13 Having answered these two questions,
subjects saw a dismissing screen. Subjects would also see the dismissing screen if they
would log in a second time after having entered their answers but before the end of the
round.
Experimental instructions14 described the recurring question in each round of how
to divide the endowment between two “alternatives”: a “private account” and a “group
12Screenshots (in German) can be found in the appendix.
13There is evidence that unincentivized prediction questions do not bias behavior in a linear public
good experiment (Ga¨chter and Renner 2010). In addition, since the time between decisions would usually
consist of three days, we were not too worried that the questions would influence decisions as answers
to the prediction questions were not part of the history shown to subjects.
14Original instructions (in German) can be found in the appendix.
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account”. We decided to follow the literature which uses this framing since, on the one
hand, this framing seems su ciently general while, on the other hand, it retains some
control about what a sample drawn from the general population will associate with
the experimental task. The latter might not hold anymore with an even more abstract
framing. Instructions verbally explained the payo↵ from the group account through
both the per-capita e↵ect from giving (i.e., via the MPCR) and by illustrating the per-
capita e↵ect with a multiplication of the group account balance by a certain factor and
an equal split of the result.15 In addition, instructions gave the formula to calculate
personal earnings, expressed in simple words. Instructions were pre-tested using a small
convenience sample of members of the general population.
The payo↵ calculator familiarized subjects with the decision space of the linear public
good game. We felt this option to be preferable over control questions in order to keep
the amount of text as small as possible in an online survey with members of the general
population. Also, control questions may have the disadvantage of providing subjects
with reference allocations. Instead of reading text, subjects could playfully enter possible
allocations of themselves and the average co-member of their group and learn about the
earnings.
The experimental protocol was designed to keep default rates as low as possible. Dur-
ing the morning of the first day of each round, subjects received an email that announced
the new round and contained the personal login data and the link to the website. In the
first round, this email announced the start of the experiment as described previously.
Subjects who would not enter an allocation during the first (second) day received an au-
tomatic reminder email at 2:00 a.m. on the second (third) day sent by the experimental
website. In addition, and to avoid misallocations of automatic reminder emails to spam
folders, student assistants sent out personalized emails to non-participating subjects on
the second day at around 5:00 p.m. At about the same time on the third day, student
assistants began to call subjects who had still not participated by phone and politely
reminded them of the approaching end of the round. If necessary, they were prepared
to elicit an allocation on the phone, which in fact almost never happened. If a subject
15This corresponds to the notation of MPCR as k/N . The factor is k = {3; 12; 30} for N =
{10; 40; 100}, respectively (Isaac et al. 1994).
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did not participate until 11:55 p.m. of the third day, the website assigned the default
decision and started the next round.
In round one, the procedure on the third day was slightly di↵erent. Instead of
phoning, student assistants sent out another personalized reminder email during the
late afternoon. During the evening, invited panel members who had not completed the
first round were then discarded and experimental groups were re-matched.16
After completion of all seven rounds, the random number fixing the payo↵-relevant
round was determined by the online polling company who had not seen the data at this
point. After calculating and transmitting earnings, points were credited to the members’
accounts.
3.3 Sample characteristics
Our cooperation partner provided us with 163 (1,239) screened panel members for the
July (September) session, of which some su↵ered from obviously invalid email addresses
or phone numbers. Subsequently, 150 (1,162) members were invited to the experiment.
42 (308) invited members in July (September) did not complete round one. In order
to fit group sizes and treatments, two of the no-shows were assigned to groups despite
their absence while the remaining were removed. In addition, 54 subjects in September
were dismissed despite their completion of round one in order to fit group sizes and
treatments. Dismissed subjects were paid a flat fee of 500 points. This left us with a
total of 110 (800) experimental subjects assigned to treatments and groups as shown in
Table 2. The average earning from the public good game was 772 points with a range of
[34 points; 2,483 points] in July and 487 points with a range of [27 points; 1,825 points]
in September. In addition, subjects received a fixed participation fee of 200 points.
Table 3 summarizes sociodemographic characteristics which show considerable het-
erogeneity. About half of the sample is female. Among the age categories, people above
age 65 are somewhat underrepresented. With respect to education, more than half of
the sample consists of workers or employees who completed a vocational training or pro-
fessional school. About 30% of the sample have some form of higher education (college,
16Our partner oversampled panel members during screening, assuming a response rate of about 75%
to the first-round invitations to the experiment.
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Table 3: Demographic characteristics
Variable Categories Freq. Percent
Female 453 49.78
Age 18-24 89 9.78
25-34 146 16.04
35-44 240 26.37
45-54 221 24.29
55-64 192 21.10
65 and older 22 2.42
Education Vocational training (Lehre/Berufsfachschule) 402 44.18
Professional school / tertiary college (Fachschule) 61 6.70
Master of crafts (Meister) / technician 51 5.60
College degree (Fachhochschule) 112 12.31
University degree 146 16.04
Other degree or training 26 2.86
No degree or training 38 4.18
Student at college or university 51 5.60
Apprentice or trainee 10 1.10
Student in school 3 0.33
Ph.D. 10 1.10
Region I North Germany 281 30.88
Central Germany 397 43.63
South Germany 232 25.49
Region II West Germany 668 73.41
East Germany (former GDR) 178 19.56
Berlin 64 7.03
Big city 1 if lives in city with population > 500, 000 177 19.45
0 else 733 80.55
Small 1 if ZIP code is unique to town 448 64.18
town / 0 if town has multiple ZIP codes 250 35.82
rural Missing 212 -
university, Ph.D.). About 7% are students in various levels of their education. Subjects’
regions of residence are highly dispersed across Germany (Figure 1). We exploit the
regional data about federal states (Bundeslaender) and ZIP codes along several dimen-
sions. The variable “region I” proxies for latitude. “Region II” corresponds to former
East and West Germany. Since the state of Berlin was itself divided, we treat it sepa-
rately. “Big city” is an indicator variable for all subjects whose ZIP code is part of 14
German cities with a population larger than 500,000.17 In contrast, “small town” is an
indicator variable for all subjects who live in a community that consists of only one ZIP
code.
Table 4 gives a more detailed impression of the regional dispersion by summarizing
17The variable largely excludes subjects who live in suburban areas of these cities, however.
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Figure 1: Distribution of subjects across German federal states (Bundeslaender)
Table 4: Distribution of subjects across ZIP codes
# of subjects ZIP codes
per ZIP code Frequency Percent
1 705 87.91
2 89 11.10
3 6 0.75
4 1 0.12
5 1 0.12
Total 802 100.00
the distribution of subjects across ZIP codes. In total, our subjects live in 802 di↵erent
ZIP codes. In only eight of them, three or more subjects reside within the same code.
Thus, personal interaction of subjects is extremely unlikely.
4 Results
4.1 Data quality
Figure 2 gives an overview about the data by depicting mean contributions of each
independent observation, i.e. each experimental group. In treatments 10L and 10H, we
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observe the the typical declining pattern over time for some groups while for other groups,
contributions stay about the same. One group in Treatment 10L exhibits exceptionally
high contribution rates. In Treatment 40L, most groups exhibit a slightly declining path,
while in Treatment 100L, contributions almost appear reversed U-shaped. Naturally, the
variance of group means is much lower for large groups.
Figure 3 illustrates that our design succeeded in keeping default rates at low levels.
The graph shows for each round and treatment the percentage of subjects who did not
enter a round decision. Default rates manifest at 4.5% on average, slightly rise over time,
and never exceed 10%. This is much lower than what IWW obtained. We conclude that
a significant bias caused by the default rule is very unlikely in our data.
Result 1 Default rates are very low, with 4.5% of subjects defaulting on average in each
round.
Figure 4 compares mean contributions for the two treatments with identical group
size of 10 but endowments di↵ering by the factor 25. Contribution schedules of both
treatments are strikingly similar. Testing for di↵erences does not establish significance
for any round, using the two-sided Fligner-Policello robust rank order test (Fligner and
Policello 1981, Feltovich 2005).18 If we removed the outlier group of Treatment 10L, the
10L line would shift downwards and would almost coincide with the 10H line. These
observations lead us to conclude that for our subject sample, the stakes employed in the
10L, 40L, and 100L treatments su ce in order to induce experimental preferences.
Result 2 Mean contributions in the treatments with lower and higher endowment do
not significantly di↵er.
Compared to the literature, the typical declining pattern of contributions in groups
of size N = 10 appears slightly less pronounced than usual. One reason can be that
we only observe seven rounds. In experiments with ten rounds, it has been found that
much of the decline takes place after round seven (e.g., Isaac and Walker 1988, Fehr and
Ga¨chter 2000, List 2004) which is usually attributed to the “end game e↵ect”. Another
18This result also holds for the standard Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test or the t-test. The robust rank
order test is the more appropriate test for non-normal populations in our case since it does not assume
equal variances.
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Figure 2: Mean contributions (in percent of endowment) of experimental groups by
rounds and treatments
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Figure 3: Default rates by rounds and treatments
Figure 4: Mean contributions (in percent of endowment) of low and high stake groups
with group size N = 10. Error bars denote standard errors.
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reason might be our subject sample. Intuitively, non-students may be less able to cope
with the abstract environment of an experimental game and therefore may adapt slower
on average. It has been shown for one-shot public good games (Ga¨chter et al. 2004) as
well as for repeated public good games (Belot et al. 2010) that non-students contribute
more than student subjects. However, we are not aware of existing results regarding
di↵erences in the speed of convergence to the Nash equilibrium. We return to this point
in Section 4.3 on individual behavior. Regarding a potential bias introduced by slower
adaptation of subjects or higher noise in behavior, the (between-subjects) treatment
e↵ects for group size should be una↵ected or, if anything, biased downwards.
4.2 Group size e↵ect
Figure 5 compares mean contributions in the three group size treatments. Clearly,
contribution levels are strictly ordered for group size. Regarding dynamics, the groups
of size N = 10 show an overall downward trend while groups of size N = 40 stay rather
constant at first and begin to slightly decline after round four. In contrast, the group
size of N = 100 shows a slight upward trend before declining after round five. Table 5
reports test results from a roundwise comparison of group means between treatments.
The group size e↵ect is significant in all rounds between sizes N = 10 and N = 100.
Comparing group sizes N = 10 and N = 40 as well as N = 40 and N = 100, the e↵ect
is significant in most rounds, especially in rounds four to six.
Result 3 There is strong evidence for a positive e↵ect of group size on contributions to
a pure public good in a standard linear PGE, using a MPCR of 0.3.
4.3 Individual behavior
One meaningful way of summarizing individual behavior in large-group experiments is
to compare histograms of the contributions across rounds (IWW). Figure 6 compares
behavior in the first and in the final round, di↵erentiated by group sizes. From the
graph, we can observe several stylized facts. In round one, equal split of the endowment
is the clear mode of the distribution for all treatments, with almost 40% choosing this
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Figure 5: Mean contributions (in percent of endowment) for group sizes N = 10, N = 40,
and N = 100. Error bars denote standard errors.
Table 5: Significance of group size e↵ect
Round Mean contribution Two-sided Fligner-Policello
in % of endowment robust rank order test
10L 40L 100L 100L vs. 10L 40L vs. 10L 100L vs.40L
1 43.73 48.09 48.58 U`=-1.792 * U`=-1.772 * U`=0.275
(2.56) (0.92) (1.81)
2 45.70 47.90 50.22 U`=-2.046 ** U`=-1.615 * U`=-1.136
(2.80) (1.15) (1.13)
3 44.80 47.35 51.45 U`=-3.040 ** U`=-1.396 U`=-1.448 *
(2.88) (2.21) (1.39)
4 38.73 47.83 52.22 U`=-2.673 ** U`=-2.638 ** U`=-1.531 *
(3.56) (2.07) (0.67)
5 37.00 44.25 52.12 U`=-4.472 *** U`=-2.469 ** U`=-5.493 **
(3.82) (1.83) (0.97)
6 34.09 42.88 49.43 U`=-4.121 *** U`=-2.202 ** U`=-1.531 *
(3.74) (2.21) (0.88)
7 35.59 40.58 44.11 U`=-2.647 ** U`=-1.310 U`=-1.322
(3.53) (2.45) (1.18)
Notes: Mean contribution is the average of group means. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at group means. The Fligner-Policello nonparametrically tests the equality
of the distributions of group means. Stars indicate significance levels (* 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%).
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Figure 6: Individual behavior: Distribution of contributions (in percent of endowment)
in rounds one and seven, by treatments
allocation. Zero contribution is chosen by almost 15% of subjects while full cooperation
is chosen by up to about 10% of subjects. The remaining subjects show a preference for
dividing endowment along intervals of 5 or 10 points (12.5% or 25% of endowment). In
round seven, the fraction of equal split allocations has dropped considerably to about
20% but remains modal. The share of full free riders has slightly increased while the
share of full cooperators has slightly decreased. Overall, many more combinations in
between the 5-point and 10-point intervals are chosen, with some accumulation close to
full cooperation and free riding. If we test for di↵erences, the distributions of individual
allocations in rounds one and seven di↵er significantly at the 10% level for all treatments.
Between treatments, test results are largely in line with Table 5.
Another way to identify individual patterns within the data is to investigate the
subject-specific variation in contributions. Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the distribu-
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tion of the 15% quantile19 of subjects who largely stick to a certain allocation over all
seven rounds. We observe that the overall share of “sticky” subjects is larger for group
sizes N = 40 and N = 100 at around 16% compared to 11% for group size N = 10.
This can be due to the feedback (the results from previous rounds shown to subjects)
being less volatile in larger groups. Conditional on the “sticky” subsample, about 13% of
decisions in all three treatments are free riding, about 32% are choosing the equal split of
endowment, and about 25% are full cooperation. If we compare this to the distribution
of decisions in the full sample (panel B of Table 6), the most striking di↵erence is a
considerably higher frequency of full cooperation among “sticky” subjects. The same
e↵ect can be found to some extent for equal split but not for free riding.
Result 4 Subjects tendency to stick to their initial allocation over all seven rounds is
higher for larger groups.
Result 5 The share of full cooperation among “sticky” subjects is more than three times
the overall share of full cooperation. Thus, cooperators are more likely to be “sticky” than
other types of players. This result holds across group sizes.
At the other end of the distribution of standard deviations, we observe a number of
subjects with very high variation in contributions. Categorizing the individual contri-
bution patterns of the top 7.5% quantile of standard deviation, we identify roughly 40%
of them with a decreasing pattern over time but only one individual with an increasing
pattern. 45% show a pattern that can be interpreted as “pulsing” behavior (IWW).
About 12% display patterns of some other sort.
4.4 First-order beliefs
We analyze subjects’ beliefs about others’ behavior along two dimensions. First, we
compare beliefs between treatments. Second, we compare beliefs with observed behavior.
In Figure 7, the three figures on the right-hand side (RHS) of each panel depict
subjects’ answers to the two belief elicitation questions: in Panel (a), it gives subjects’
19The 15% quantile of subjects with the lowest variation in contributions seemed a plausible choice as
it consists of 9.9% with zero variation and about 5.1% with SD< 5.15% of endowment.
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Table 6: Distribution of individual decisions conditional on low variation in contributions
and in the full sample
Contribution to Percent of decisions
group account 10L 40L 100L Pooled
A. Decisions by subjects with low variation (n=952)a
Free riding (0%) 11.9 8.3 14.3 12.6
Equal split (50%) 31.8 29.0 33.1 32.4
Full cooperation (100%) 33.3 25.8 24.8 26.6
Other allocations 23.0 36.9 27.8 28.4
Total conditional 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total unconditional 11.25 15.50 15.80 14.94
B. Full set of decisions (n=6,370)
Free riding (0%) 13.0 11.6 11.8 12.0
Equal split (50%) 25.9 28.3 23.3 24.9
Full cooperation (100%) 6.8 8.5 9.5 8.8
Other allocations 54.3 51.6 55.4 54.3
Total all decisions 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: a The 15% quantile of subjects with the lowest varia-
tion in contributions consists of 9.9% with zero s.d. and about
5.1% with SD< 5.15% of endowment.
beliefs about the number of contributors in their group (question 1), in Panel (b), it
shows the predicted average contributions of those who would contribute, and in Panel
(c), it depicts predicted unconditional average contributions, obtained from multiplying
the answers to questions 1 and 2. The predicted share of contributors is in fact decreasing
with group size. The di↵erences between Treatment 10L and the large group treatments
are statistically significant in all but one round using the Fligner-Policello robust rank
order test. This includes the first round. Thus, expectations already reflect di↵erences
in group sizes before subjects get any feedback from previous rounds. In contrast, we do
not find significant di↵erences in the share of free riders for actual behavior (LHS of Panel
(a)). The RHS of Panel (b) shows that beliefs about conditional average contributions
are increasing with group size. Di↵erences between the large group treatments and the
10L treatment are highly significant for all rounds. The LHS of Panel (b) shows that we
also observe the group size e↵ect in the conditional sample. Regarding computed beliefs
about unconditional average contributions, results are less pronounced. Comparing each
of the large group treatments with the 10L treatment yields a significant e↵ect only after
round three.
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(a) Percentage of contributors in group (question 1)
(b) Percent of endowment allocated to group account, conditional on being a contrib-
utor (question 2)
(c) Percent of endowment allocated to group account, unconditional (question 1 x
question 2)
(d) Legend
Figure 7: Observed behavior (left) vs. first-order beliefs (right)
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Result 6 There is evidence of group size e↵ects in subjects’ first-order beliefs. In partic-
ular, the predicted contributions of contributors increase with group size, which we also
find in observed behavior. In contrast, the predicted share of contributors is inversely
correlated with group size while there is no significant e↵ect in actual behavior.
The presence of the group size e↵ects in first-order beliefs suggests that the observed
e↵ect is not merely some artifact of behavior since it appears robust to a mental process
of forming expectations about others’ behavior. The fact that we follow a between-
subjects design reinforces this conclusion. Thus, people do not only give more in large
groups in a linear public good experiment, they also state that they expect others to do
so. Consequently, the group size e↵ect may be consistent with conditional cooperative
or reciprocal behavior. They also expect relatively fewer people to contribute in larger
groups which we do not observe, however.
Two potential limitations apply to these observations. First, an endogeneity problem
would arise if subjects did not process the belief elicitation questions correctly but used
their own decision as a shortcut to give an answer. Evidence from the following result
below points somewhat against this behavior. Second, due to our design we cannot
control for the possibility that the conditional nature of the second question has not
been fully understood by all subjects. In this case, answers by these subjects represent
unconditional contributions so that the presence of an overall positive group size e↵ect
in the RHS of panel (c) in Figure 7 would be actually underestimated.
Comparing predicted and observed behavior in each panel of Figure 7, we find that
actual behavior almost unanimously exceeds predictions in all rounds and for each treat-
ment.20 We also investigate the possibility that the conditionality of the second question
has not been understood by subjects. In this case, one needs to interpret the answers
to the second question as predictions of the unconditional group average and compare
the RHS of Panel (b) with the LHS of Panel (c). This can be seen in Figure 8. Ob-
served mean contributions still marginally exceed beliefs in all rounds, and di↵erences
20Observed values are significantly higher than predicted values at mostly 5%, sometimes 1%, and
sometimes 10% significance using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. An exception is Treat-
ment 10L in Panel (a) in which the predicted share is not significantly di↵erent from the observed one
in rounds 1, 4, 6, and 7.
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Figure 8: Observed average contributions vs. predicted conditional contributions, by
treatment
are significant for most rounds.21
Result 7 Subjects regularly underestimate the probability and extent of contributions by
other group members for both small and large groups.
This result reminds of the common observation that people think of their own behav-
ior as above-average. In the literature on public good games, both deviations of beliefs
compared to observed behavior have been found. For example, Tho¨ni et al. (2012) find
lower beliefs for a non-student sample and Ga¨chter and Renner (2010) for a student
sample. Others have found the opposite e↵ect (Tho¨ni et al. 2012, p.639).
21Significance levels are mostly 5% and sometimes at 1% or 10%. For rounds three to seven in
Treatment 40L, round seven in Treatment 100L, and round five in Treatment 10H equality cannot be
rejected.
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4.5 Regression analysis
Regressions of individual contribution behavior provide further support for the pure
group size e↵ect as well as insights about the e↵ect of covariates. For the basic model
we use
gi =  0 +  1Ti +  2G i,r 1 +  3Bi +  4G i,r 1Ti +  5BiTi +  6Zi +  8Ri (2)
where gi denotes subject i’s contribution to the group account in a given round, and Ti
denotes i’s experimental treatment (10L, 40L, 100L, or 10H). The lagged variable G i,r 1
is part the history shown to subjects and denotes total contributions by other group
members in the previous round. Bi is the vector of answers to the two belief elicitation
questions. As before, to facilitate comparability across treatments, we measure G i,r 1
in percent of total group endowment, the first element of Bi in percent of group size,
and the second element of Bi in percent of individual endowment. Finally, Zi is a vector
of sociodemographic characteristics, and Ri denotes round dummies.22
Table 7 reports coe cient estimates of OLS regressions for five di↵erent specifica-
tions. Specification (1) only includes the treatment dummies, besides dummy controls
for rounds. Specification (2) consists of specification (1) plus the full set of sociodemo-
graphic characteristics. Specification (2) thus contains all available variables that are
fully exogenous to the contribution choice. Specification (3) consists of specification (1)
plus the experimental variables. Specification (4) reports the full set of variables. In
addition, specification (5) contains interaction terms of the experimental variables with
treatments.23
22Random e↵ects GLS panel regressions with rounds as the time variable yield very similar results to
the ones reported below. Apparently, controlling for rounds through dummies is more standard in the
literature, however.
23We also tested interaction of the treatments with the demographic variables and round dummies.
These results do not deliver additional meaningful significant results and are therefore not included in
Table 7.
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Table 7: OLS regressions. Dependent variable: Percentage of endow-
ment contributed to group account
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Experimental variables
Treatment:
40L 5.6009* 7.3198* 2.9023 2.6086 15.3161
(3.234) (3.939) (2.324) (2.347) (15.364)
100L 9.7812*** 10.1732*** 6.0805** 5.2327** 31.6540***
(2.951) (3.601) (2.677) (2.543) (10.392)
10H -3.9755 -5.2241 0.9328 1.4229 14.3801*
(4.748) (4.385) (2.126) (2.324) (8.163)
Others’ contributions (lagged) – – 0.1779 0.1788 0.3224***
(0.129) (0.112) (0.092)
Belief % contributors – – 0.2134*** 0.1844*** 0.1787***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.056)
Belief % contributions – – 0.4726*** 0.4963*** 0.4913***
(0.053) (0.045) (0.092)
Others’ contrib. (lagged) ⇥ . . .
40L – – – – -0.3394
(0.342)
100L – – – – -0.5307***
(0.167)
10H – – – – -0.5483***
(0.131)
Belief % contributors ⇥ . . .
40L – – – – 0.0090
(0.057)
100L – – – – 0.0005
(0.069)
10H – – – – 0.0705
(0.120)
Belief % contributions ⇥ . . .
40L – – – – 0.0405
(0.099)
100L – – – – -0.0184
(0.112)
10H – – – – 0.0928
(0.146)
B. Demographic variables
Female – -4.3781*** – -3.7521* -3.8123*
(1.343) (2.070) (2.061)
Age:
25-34 – 7.7380** – 4.7482* 4.8432**
(3.487) (2.406) (2.247)
35-44 – 3.3364 – 3.2801 3.3741
(3.851) (3.830) (3.744)
45-54 – 4.4989 – 3.5503 3.5967
(4.126) (3.280) (3.135)
55-64 – 4.0601 – 3.1711 3.1310
(4.515) (3.378) (3.258)
65 and older – 12.2621 – 7.4505 7.4544
(8.841) (6.127) (5.940)
Education:
Professional school – 3.7312 – 2.4003 2.2137
(3.716) (4.373) (4.299)
Master of crafts – 3.1782 – -0.3666 -0.3489
(4.205) (3.557) (3.470)
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – Continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
College degree – 4.7907* – 0.9490 0.9303
(2.752) (2.133) (2.132)
University degree – 6.7378** – 2.0347 1.7786
(2.674) (2.861) (2.868)
Other degree or training – -7.0496** – -7.5202** -7.6114**
(3.441) (2.898) (2.842)
No degree or training – 2.7568 – 4.4807 4.4834
(3.272) (2.799) (2.714)
Student at college / univ. – 3.4143 – 0.9818 0.9155
(5.422) (5.639) (5.524)
Apprentice / trainee – 2.2138 – 4.8963 5.0601
(6.574) (5.068) (4.959)
Student in school – 12.3849** – 15.7820** 15.7142**
(5.371) (6.921) (6.739)
Ph.D. – 23.2421*** – 16.8054*** 16.4940***
(5.139) (5.104) (4.858)
Region I:
Central Germany – 0.7721 – 1.0214 0.8861
(1.456) (1.589) (1.617)
South Germany – 0.3665 – 0.9461 0.7865
(1.560) (1.453) (1.541)
Region II:
East Germany – -0.0605 – -0.3903 -0.3687
(1.916) (1.491) (1.498)
Berlin – 0.1245 – 1.6105 1.4767
(2.816) (2.852) (2.879)
Big city (>500,000) – 1.1233 – 3.9818 3.6411
(3.188) (2.853) (2.945)
Small town / rural – 4.2146* – 4.5555* 4.3211*
(2.253) (2.387) (2.392)
Constant 42.2247*** 32.9797*** 3.8445 -2.1270 -7.6067
(2.898) (5.381) (4.736) (6.183) (5.797)
N 6370 4886 5099 3907 3907
R2 0.028 0.057 0.251 0.274 0.278
# of clusters 31 31 31 31 31
Notes: Reported are coe cients. Standard errors are clustered at the group level and shown in
parentheses. Stars indicate significance levels (* 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%). The baseline is Treatment 10L,
age 18-24, vocational training, North and West Germany, and round 2 (to allow for lagged variables).
All model specifications also include controls for round indicating a highly significant negative time
trend.
Clearly, the positive e↵ect of group size on contributions manifests in each model
specification. For N = 40 however, the e↵ect is significant in specifications (1) and (2)
only, when experimental variables are excluded. Di↵erences in stake sizes, represented
by the coe cient on the 10H treatment, are not significant, although specification (5)
starts to pick up some e↵ect that could be due to the selection of round two as the
baseline (cp. Figure 4). Overall, these results provide additional support for our findings
in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
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When included, experimental variables correlate with the contribution choices in
mostly expected ways but also uncover unexpected results. First, the e↵ect of the sum
of contributions by other members of the group, as implicitly contained in the history
of total contributions shown to subjects, is insignificant in specifications (3) and (4).
However, di↵erentiating for treatments in specification (5) reveals a significant positive
e↵ect in the 10L treatment and a negative e↵ect in the 100L and 10H treatments. Thus,
we observe a crowding-in of exogenous provision for small groups but a crowding-out for
large groups and small groups with large stakes. Second, as one would expect, the two
types of elicited beliefs strongly and positively correlate with the contribution. Thus, the
evidence for average behavior to be consistent with conditional cooperation (Fischbacher
et al. 2001) is mixed.24
Result 8 Stated first-order beliefs about others are positively correlated with individual
contributions. However, observed actual contributions by others crowd-out contributions
in large groups whereas they crowd-in contributions in small groups.
Result 9 Evidence from regressions for an e↵ect of stakes is mixed: While there is
essentially no e↵ect on contribution levels, di↵erences can be found for crowding behavior,
with crowding in for small-stake groups and crowding out for large-stake groups.
Several sociodemographic characteristics correlate with contribution choices. First,
females give less than males in our sample. This finding compares to varying findings in
the literature where, e.g., Tho¨ni et al. (2012) also find a negative e↵ect among Danish
subjects from the general population. In contrast, field studies using real-world public
goods found positive correlations (e.g. List 2004). Second, the e↵ect of age is largely
insignificant: only the category consisting of subjects around the age of 30 contributes
24A possible regressor that may provide further insights but is omitted in our model is a lagged
variable for subjects’ own contributions in previous rounds. Including contributions of the previous round
in columns (3) and (4) results in a highly significant coe cient while the R2 increases to about 0.45.
Significance levels of the other experimental variables do not change. However, coe cient estimates of all
variables, including of demographic variables, decrease considerably since the variable necessarily controls
for e↵ects that have already been endogenously present in the round before. Thus, the interpretation
of coe cients of those variables that are fixed across rounds (treatments and demographics) now gets a
marginal component: a significantly positive coe cient can be interpreted as the e↵ect being increasing
compared to the previous round and vice versa. If one wanted to include lagged own contributions,
ideally one would jointly estimate first round contributions without lagged variables and the remaining
round including lagged variables.
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significantly more than the baseline which consists of subjects around 20. Both findings
are somewhat in contrast to previous studies which typically find, if any, a positive e↵ect
of age on altruism and cooperation (e.g., Carpenter et al. 2008, List 2004, Tho¨ni et al.
2012). Third, level and type of education seems to be correlated with contributions:
Subjects with certain higher educational degrees give more, so do students in school but
not trainees or university students. Note that we cannot exclude the e↵ect to partially
reflect an e↵ect of unobserved income. We have, however, previously found evidence for
a positive e↵ect of education in giving to a public good in Diederich and Goeschl (2011)
and Diederich and Goeschl (2013) and in the literature, weakly, in List (2004). Fourth,
subjects living in small towns or rural areas contribute significantly more while other
regional variables are insignificant. Not part of the model of Table 7 are interaction
e↵ects of demographic variables with group size treatments. When included, we do not
find further meaningful significant e↵ects.
Result 10 Individual contributions to the group account are higher for subjects who are
male, of age around 30, have higher educational degrees, and reside in small towns or
rural areas. Interaction terms do not suggest significant di↵erences of these e↵ects for
di↵erent group sizes.
5 Discussion and concluding remarks
Our results provide strong support for the presence of a positive e↵ect of “pure” group
size on contributions in linear public goods experiments when the marginal return from
contributing is 0.3. We add to the existing literature in several respects. First, we pro-
vide an additional piece of evidence given ambiguous theoretical predictions, ambiguous
empirical findings, and only one previous experimental study on large (N > 20) groups.
Second, we improve on several methodological drawbacks of the existing experimental
evidence. In particular, the long-term online experiment reported here benefits from
extremely low default rates, an independent sample of subjects, and monetary earnings
(instead of grade improvements). To the researcher, our design provides an improved
framework for running simultaneous large-group experiments that helps in overcoming
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the “physical constraint” of standard lab sizes as well as “financial constraints” (IWW).
Third, we are the first to test for the e↵ect of group size using a sample from the general
population, which allows to correlate a rich set of covariates with observed behavior.
By virtue of the experimental design, we can exclude many possible explanations for
the positive e↵ect of group size but not all. The standard linear public good game we
use holds constant the incentives for strategic free riding, which is the driver of a group
size e↵ect in the classical “purely altruistic” model, across group sizes. Consequently,
the observed group size e↵ect must be due to a non-standard preference component.25
Among those, the design of the basic linear public good game precludes many possible
drivers known from the literature such as image motivation, punishment, or communica-
tion. Likewise, a potential “warm glow” component of utility, i.e. utility that is derived
from the mere act of giving, will be invariant to changes in the group size by definition.
Based on the available set of hypotheses known to us from the literature, we are thus left
with three possible explanations for which we can unfortunately not di↵erentiate further
given our design.
First, our findings are consistent with the presence of other regarding preferences,
particularly with Andreoni (2007)’s theory of “congested altruism”. If this is the case
then our results suggest that the group size-dependent discounting is low such that care
about aggregate surplus dominates care about average surplus in preferences. Thus,
contrary to Andreoni’s findings, an increase in numbers has an overall positive e↵ect in
our data. In a sense, subjects would perceive an increase in group size as an improved
opportunity of a “welfare-generating machine”. Note that this explanation would also be
consistent with the presence of a group size e↵ect in first-order beliefs and with signaling
behavior through “pulsing” contributions.
Second, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the public good envi-
ronment, though linear by design, is not represented linearly in subjects’ preferences.
Instead, an argument of this type assumes that subjects care about some minimum level
of earnings (e.g. of the size of initial endowment) more than about earnings above this
level. Thus, loss aversion is at the heart of this hypothesis. An variant of the argument
25Thanks to Christoph Vanberg for pointing this out.
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can be found in IWW who define a measure of how much the N 1 other group members
need to contribute on average in order to restore the earnings of subject i, who makes a
marginal contribution, to the level of free riding (i.e. the endowment). Obviously, this
measure is decreasing in group size. Thus, chances of “hedging” the initial endowment
are higher for larger groups. Another variant of this argument would state that in larger
groups, it is more likely for a loss-averse subject to encounter the required number26
of like-minded subjects who will also contribute and thus permit earnings above the
endowment for everyone. Note that implicit in all versions of this argument is that it as-
sumes the presence of something like a perceived provision point in subjects’ preferences.
Now, it is well known from threshold public good games that cooperation is more likely
to succeed in environments with provision points and the public good is more likely to
be provided compared to linear environments. Thus, an implicit or perceived provision
point may cause a positive e↵ect of group size since average contributions necessary to
achieve the perceived threshold always decrease in group size. Again, this explanation
would be consistent with the presence of a group size e↵ect in first-order beliefs and with
signaling behavior through “pulsing” contributions.
Third, it is also possible that the positive group size e↵ect is due to intuitive, non-
strategic behavior: It is not necessary for subjects who only fully understand the rules
of the game to also grasp the strategic environment or to be motivated by others’ well-
being in order to be influenced by salient di↵erences between group sizes. For example,
a simple computation of maximum possible earnings from cooperation will produce a
much larger number for N = 100 compared to N = 10 while both minimum earnings
and the free rider’s earnings are constant across group sizes.27 Thus, a myopic cost
benefit analysis may lead to higher contributions in large groups (IWW). We can also
interpret such behavior in the context of dual process theories, originally developed in
social psychology (Sloman 1996, Kahneman 2003). According to these theories decisions
are made either through a fast system based on intuition (also called system 1) or a
slow system based on reasoning (also called system 2). The hypothesis is then that
26Obviously, for a MPCR of 0.3 the required number is four.
27Minimum attainable payo↵ is when mi = z and mj = 0 8j 6= i, maximum attainable payo↵ is when
mi = 0 and mj = z 8j 6= i. Minimum payo↵ is always 12 points, the free rider’s payo↵ is always 40
points, and maximum payo↵s are 148 points (10L), 508 points (40L), and 1,228 points (100L).
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subjects use, for whatever reason, intuition rather than reasoning when confronted with
the decision environment of our experiment. Note that “pulsing” behavior which we
partly observe in our data would not be consistent with this explanation if it is meant
to signal cooperation. In contrast, the result of a group size e↵ect in first-order beliefs
is consistent with this explanation since subjects using intuition may simply extrapolate
their own behavior to others. Future research is necessary to test these hypotheses and
to further investigate the drivers of the positive e↵ect of group size confirmed in our
results.
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Appendix
A Experimental website
Screen 1 (Welcome), shown in round 1 only
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Screen 2 (Decision), shown here for round 2
Screen 3 (Belief elicitation)
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Payo↵ calculator
B Experimental instructions
Presented here is the original wording of the instructions for the 10L treatment. Instructions for the
other treatments di↵ered in the group size stated in the text.
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The E↵ect of Ambient Noise on Cooperation in Public
Good Games⇤
Johannes Diederich
Abstract
Environmental stressors such as noise, pollution, extreme temperatures, or crowd-
ing can pose relevant externalities in the economy if certain conditions are met. This
paper presents experimental evidence that exposure to acute ambient noise decreases
cooperative behavior in a standard linear public good game.
1 Introduction
Traditionally, economics has been abstracting economic behavior from the influence of
environmental stressors1 on humans, much as it used to do for the influence of moods
and emotions (Kirchsteiger et al. 2006). In particular, researchers have assumed either
that individual preferences are invariant to any impact of environmental stress or that
the potential e↵ect on preferences is stochastic and negligible. Environmental stressors
may become relevant to economics, however, if three conditions are fulfilled: (1) The
e↵ect of environmental stressors on economic behavior is significant, (2) the ambient
levels of environmental stressors are subject to (permanent) change (Rabin 1998),2 and
(3) adaptation of humans to altered levels is imperfect or costly.
As a first step to this agenda, this paper addresses condition (1) and tests for an
aftere↵ect of acute noise exposure on cooperative behavior in a standard linear public
good experiment. One reason for investigating noise among the available set of envi-
ronmental stressors is that it has been suggested to be the most important stressor for
conditions of environmental overload (Moser 1988). To my knowledge, neither noise
⇤Thanks to Magdalena Buckert and various colleagues for helpful discussions. Funding by the German
Science Foundation under grant GO1604/1 is gratefully acknowledged.
1Noise, air pollution, extreme temperatures, and crowding have been typically subsumed under envi-
ronmental stressors (Evans 1984).
2For example, the populations of industrialized countries have been subject to considerable variations
in ambient levels of noise, pollution, and crowding for the past two centuries, especially in urban areas.
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nor other environmental stressors have been subject to systematic research in economic
experiments so far. While I am therefore not aware of previous results regarding an ef-
fect of ambient noise on cooperative behavior in social dilemmas, such as the voluntary
provision of public goods, the psychological literature reports that acute exposure to
noise reduces helping behavior, both in laboratory (Glass and Singer 1972, Sherrod and
Downs 1974) and in field experiments (Page 1977, Moser 1988). Helping behavior and
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas are related in that altruism has been suggested
to be a major motivational driver for behavior in both situations (e.g. Andreoni 2006).
Thus, assuming that exposure to noise a↵ects the altruistic component of motivation, the
immediate hypothesis for the question of an e↵ect of noise in a public good experiment
is that observed cooperation will decline.
The literature also provides evidence for the opposite hypothesis, however, if one
takes into account possible physiological pathways mediating the potential e↵ect of noise
on cooperation. Traditionally, the e↵ects of environmental stressors have been linked to
physiological stress. Thus, one immediately plausible mechanism would be that noise
produces physiological stress, and that physiological stress a↵ects cooperative behavior
or altruism. Regarding the first part of this pathway, the early literature on environ-
mental stressors, which focused on behavioral measures of physiological stress, found
that noise decreases frustration tolerance and attention (Glass and Singer 1972, Sherrod
and Downs 1974, Page 1977). Evidence on a link of noise and physiological measures of
stress, which are typically elevations in the cardiovascular and neuroendocrine systems,
is more rare. A meta study by Dickerson and Kemeny (2004) on the e↵ect of various
psychological stressors on the stress hormone cortisol does not find a significant e↵ect
for noise. However, as the authors note, the sample size is small in the case of noise
(n=6). A result where physiological stress from noise could be identified is the “e↵ort-
by-stress tradeo↵” (Tafalla and Evans 1997, Evans and Cohen 2004): Noise increases
norepinephrine and cortisol levels in a laboratory setting if accompanied with high e↵ort
to complete a simultaneous task. At the same time, performance in the task is una↵ected
by noise. If completing the task is associated with low e↵ort, however, no physiologi-
cal indication of stress under noise can be observed, while performance is significantly
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worse. Thus, physiological stress seems to be traded-o↵ for e↵ort and produced only if
needed to compensate for the increased psychological demands from noise in order to
maintain performance. Evidence for the e↵ort-by-stress tradeo↵ was also found in field
studies on job demand and occupational noise (Evans and Cohen 2004). A second result
where noise was found to cause physiological stress was in the case of chronic exposure:
In studies with children, chronic exposure to aircraft or tra c noise increased cortisol
and epinephrine as well as blood pressure levels, adversely a↵ected psychophysiological,
cognitive, motivational, and a↵ective indices of stress, and led to decreased persistence
in problem solving tasks (Evans et al. 1995, Bullinger et al. 1999, Evans and Cohen
2004).3
Regarding the second part of the hypothesized link between noise, physiological
stress, and cooperation/altruism, evidence is even more sparse. In an early study, Do-
vidio and Morris (1975) show that a high-stress condition leads to increased helping
behavior towards others who share the same stressful situation. They observed less
helping behavior, however, if the potential recipient was in a dissimilar and less stressful
situation.4 To my knowledge, there is only one paper investigating behavior in standard
economic games: von Dawans et al. (2012) show that physiological stress, induced by
a standardized laboratory stressor, is associated with increased pro-social and altruistic
behavior in versions of the trust game and the dictator game. Taking together this
evidence with that on the link between noise and physiological stress described above,
there is reason to expect a positive e↵ect of noise exposure on public good contributions
if one assumes that physiological stress mediates the e↵ect.
In the experiment reported in this paper, treated subjects were exposed to a con-
glomerate of typical urban sounds directly before playing a standard linear public good
game in groups of four players. The data suggest a negative e↵ect of acute noise expo-
sure on public good contributions, compared to an unexposed control group of subjects,
and would thus support the first of the two aforementioned hypotheses. The e↵ect is
statistically significant for certain subgroups among the student subjects, specifically,
3Some of these papers experimentally exploited airport openings that corresponded to natural exper-
iments.
4These results found for male subjects were confirmed for female participants by Hayden et al. (1984)
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Bachelor and Master students, but not for students pursuing other degrees. The e↵ect
is not significantly di↵erent between men and women. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper to further disentangle the motivational drivers or physiological mediators of
the noise e↵ect, the present study collects some survey-based controls for chronic, acute
pre-experimental, and acute intra-experimental stress as well as for subjects’ history of
chronic and acute pre-experimental noise exposure in order to account for adaptation or
multiple-stressor e↵ects. Most of these variables, in particular chronic stress and noise
history, do not significantly interact with the observed e↵ect of noise. Likewise, there is
no significant evidence for an e↵ort-by-stress trade-o↵ based on these survey measures.
Evidence on an e↵ect from the presence of multiple stressors is mixed, and the possibility
of endogeneity inherent to ex post survey measures cannot be excluded.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. Section
3 presents the results, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Method
Participants Participants were 63 female and 49 male students at Heidelberg Univer-
sity, recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 64 subjects were randomly assigned to the
noise treatment, 48 subjects to the control treatment. The share of females is somewhat
higher in the control treatment (64.6% vs. 50%), which turns out not to be significantly
di↵erent using two-sided tests. Half of the subjects majors in an academic subject of
the social sciences (economics, political science, sociology) while the other half majors
in subjects belonging to the humanities, sciences, or another area. Subjects of the social
sciences turn out to be unequally distributed across treatments, with a share of 62.5% in
the noise treatment but only 33.3% in the control group (Table 1). Likewise, di↵erences
exist with respect to the degree pursued. The unequal distributions are likely to be due
to the sample size, as the procedure of matching treatment condition and experimental
sessions was not systematic. The di↵erences can be a problem for simple tests of the
treatment e↵ect if economics students display systematically di↵erent behavior, or if
academic maturity matters, and thus calls for an additional regression analysis. Mean
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Table 1: Share of students in the social sciences and pursued degrees, by treatments
Major belongs to Degree pursued
social sciences Bachelor Master Staatsexamena Other, or no answer
Noise 62.5% 70.3% 6.3% 18.8% 4.7%
Control 33.3% 43.8% 22.9% 29.2% 4.2%
Notes: a The Staatsexamen is a degree in Germany issued by the government, not the university.
For examples, teachers, lawyers, and medical doctors graduate via Staatsexamen.
earnings were e 8.40 per subject (SD e 1.01), including a fixed show-up fee of e 3.
Noise treatment In the first part of the experiment, subjects who received the noise
treatment were exposed to 25min of noise at about 65dB(A) on average with bursts at
about 75dB(A) on average.5 The noise was administered through speakers6 (Glass and
Singer 1972, Sherrod and Downs 1974, Tafalla and Evans 1997) placed such that noise
levels were fairly equal across cubicles in the lab. Loudness was measured several times
during exposure.7 The noise was a mixture of typical urban sounds at varying levels
(such as road tra c, aircraft sound, a drilling jackhammer8, a ringing cellphone, and
passing people engaged in a indiscernible chat) which was interrupted by random bursts
of electronic static.9 During exposure, subjects had to perform a paid proofreading task
on four magazine or newspaper articles on various unrelated topics. Payment in this
part was conditioned on performance in the task. The control group performed the
same task for the same time without being exposed to noise. The typical noise level in
the laboratory in sessions in the control treatment was about 45dB(A).
Administering the noise during an unrelated e↵ortful task prior to the public good
game is guided by two findings of the literature. First, there is stronger evidence of
behavioral aftere↵ects than of simultaneous e↵ects for noise and other environmental
stressors. In Glass and Singer (1972) and Sherrod and Downs (1974), for example,
5Following the guidelines of the German Association of Otolaryngologists, the noise would not exceed
85dB(A).
6Bose Companion 2.
7Trotec BS15.
8Referential note: “Builders drilling sound” recorded by Koops.
9Cohen (1980) reviews several papers using di↵erent types of noise. Results suggest that besides the
uncontrollability of the noise, the unpredictability matters for an e↵ect of intermittent noise samples
while variations in the intensity of the noise matters for an e↵ect of continuous noise samples. The noise
administered in the present experiment combines both types using unpredictable, interrupting bursts
and variations in intensity of the continuous parts.
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subjects were confronted with an opportunity to display helping behavior after being
exposed to noise during which they were working on some other task. While performance
in the task did not significantly di↵er between the treatment and the control group,
di↵erences manifested in the behavior afterwards. This suggests that subjects may adapt
during exposure.10 Glass and Singer (1972) and many replications in the literature (see
Evans and Cohen 2004) found similar behavioral aftere↵ects for other environmental
stressors and for di↵erent tasks following exposure, for instance, persistence in a puzzle
task or performance in a proofreading task. However, the dominance of aftere↵ects does
not preclude to also find simultaneous e↵ects: For the relevant case of helping behavior,
for example, Page (1977) identifies di↵erences during acute exposure. The second reason
for having subjects solve a cognitively demanding task during noise exposure is to allow
an e↵ort-by-stress tradeo↵ to manifest, if present. One way to interpret aftere↵ects is
in the context of behavior that occurs after a daily routine in an exposed environment,
e.g., changes in home life from a noisy working environment (Evans and Cohen 2004).
Public good game The public good game was played directly after the proofreading
task, in groups of four subjects and for ten periods. The game was of the standard
linear type using the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). The choice was framed
as distributing the endowment of 20 “points” of each round (worth e 0.30) between a
“private account” and a “group account”, the latter yielding a marginal per capita return
(MPCR) of 0.4. Matching was constant across rounds (partner treatment) and earnings
of each round added to the final payo↵. Instructions included a table illustrating a
subject’s round earnings for various combinations of own and others’ contributions to
the group account.11
Questionnaire The experiment concluded with a questionnaire collecting measures
of subjective e↵ort in the proofreading task, perceived stress, history of noise exposure,
and some demographics. The question in which subjects have to rank their e↵ort put in
10This is in line with others’ findings regarding the e↵ect of simultaneous noise on cognitive performance
(e.g. Hancock and Pierce 1985, Hygge and Knez 2001).
11See the appendix for the exact wording of the instructions (in German, translation to English
available upon request from the author).
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the proofreading task serves as a control for the presence of physiological stress during
noise exposure (Tafalla and Evans 1997). To control for background levels of chronic
and pre-experimental stress, the questionnaire used the 4-item version of the Perceived
Stress Scale (PSS) by Cohen et al. (1983) as well as a simple question asking for perceived
stress on the same day prior to the experiment, respectively. Questions regarding noise
asked how bothered the subject felt by the experimental noise (Sherrod and Downs
1974) as well as a subjective ranking of the noise exposure on the same day prior to the
experiment, during the past year, and during childhood. Although subjective in nature,
collecting some long-term history of noise exposure can serve as a control for “adaptation
level shifts” through which noise might be perceived less annoying if a subject has a
history of chronic exposure (Berglund et al. 1975, Evans and Cohen 2004). Likewise,
the questions about perceived stress and noise exposure right before the experiment can
serve as controls for the presence of multiple stressors which could increase the e↵ect of
noise due to “diminished coping with multiple stressors” (Evans and Cohen 2004).
Protocol The experiment consisted of seven experimental sessions, conducted in Spring
2013 in the experimental laboratory of the Department of Economics at Heidelberg Uni-
versity, Germany. Each session was scheduled for 1 hour and 15 minutes including seating
and payment, which turned out to be about the time each session took. After seating,
subjects read the instructions (in hardcopy) for both parts of the experiment in private.
The experimenter afterwards paraphrased the important parts of the instructions in a
standardized way, with an emphasis on the understanding of the public good game,
including the payo↵ table. Subjects had the opportunity to ask questions in private.
When all questions were answered, the texts for the proofreading task were distributed
in hard copy and the experiment started. All other elements of the experiment were
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects were
not informed about their earnings in the proofreading task before finishing the end of
the experiment. After finishing the questionnaire, subjects were paid and dismissed.
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3 Results
3.1 Nonparametric treatment e↵ects
Before investigating an aftere↵ect in the public good game, it is meaningful to evaluate
the reception of the noise treatment during exposure. In the proofreading task, subjects’
earnings (which are perfectly collinear to their performance) turn out to be significantly
lower under noise exposure (p < 0.10 in a two-sided Fligner-Policello Robust Rank Order
Test, Fligner and Policello 1981). However, part of the di↵erence can be attributed to a
few subjects12 who missed to enter and confirm the number of mistakes they had counted
into their computer terminals before time ran out, thus earning zero money in the task.13
Interestingly, these instances only occurred in the noise treatment, despite identical oral
warnings prior to beginning the task as well as 60-100 seconds before time was up. If
these subjects are excluded, the di↵erence in performance between the treatment group
and the control group is insignificant (p = 0.57). As mentioned before, both results,
una↵ected performance and decreased performance under noise, have been found for
comparable tasks in the literature. At the same time, subjects report to experience
the administered noise as bothersome and disruptive. In the ex post questionnaire, a
majority of treated subjects (61%) chooses one of the upper three categories on a scale of
six answer possibilities to describe their feelings about the noise during the proofreading
task. The six answer categories were presented as ranging from “not bothersome at
all” to “extremely bothersome”. Both results together would suggest the presence of an
e↵ort-by-stress trade-o↵ among those subjects who are una↵ected in performance (i.e. do
not miss the timeout) and rate the noise as bothersome, thus the literature would suggest
elevated levels of physiological stress among these subjects to prevent performance losses
under noise.
Result 1 Subjects performance in the proofreading task is not significantly di↵erent
under noise exposure. However, some treated subjects miss to pay su cient attention
to the time constraint under noise. The majority of treated subjects rates the noise as
bothersome.
128 out of 112.
13The upper right corner of the computer screen displayed a count down for the 25 minutes (in seconds).
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Figure 1: Mean contributions (in experimental points) of subjects in the control group
and the treatment group. Error bars denote standard errors which are clustered at
experimental groups (N = 28).
Turning to the aftere↵ect of noise in the public good game, Figure 1 depicts mean
contributions for the control group and the treatment group. Clearly, average contribu-
tions of those exposed to noise prior to the game seem to be consistently below those
of unexposed subjects. The e↵ect is almost never significant, however, using two-sided
tests, as Table 2 shows. Plausibly, the number of independent observations (28 experi-
mental groups) is too small to identify a roundwise e↵ect. Pooling group means of all
periods would lead to highly significant two-sided test results (p < 0.002).
Result 2 There is tentative nonparametric evidence that public good contribution levels
in the noise treatment are consistently below those in the control treatment.
3.2 Regression results
In order to exploit the controls obtained by the questionnaire, and in order to control
for the unequal distributions between the treatment and the control group found for
some demographics, this section presents regression results. Table 3 reports summary
statistics for variables elicited in the questionnaire. The first three variables will be
assumed to proxy for physiological stress, either acute (if subjects rate their day before
153
Paper 5 · Ambient Noise and Cooperation
Table 2: Significance of the treatment e↵ect
Period
1 2 3 4 5
Mean Noise 9.94 10.26 8.28 7.50 6.55
contri- (1.00) (1.28) (1.27) (1.34) (1.32)
bution Control 11.67 11.83 11.06 9.08 9.33
(points) (1.08) (1.38) (1.51) (1.73) (1.56)
Two-sided (one-
sided) Fligner- U`=1.364 U`=0.875 U`=1.448 U`=0.657 U`=1.519
Policello test (*) (*) (*)
Period
6 7 8 9 10
Mean Noise 5.89 5.65 5.48 5.48 3.44
contri- (1.20) (1.41) (1.51) (1.16) (1.03)
bution Control 9.44 7.98 6.67 6.21 4.52
(points) (1.67) (1.73) (1.86) (1.83) (1.32)
Two-sided (one-
sided) Fligner- U`=2.006** U`=1.229 U`=0.708 U`=0.812 U`=0.774
Policello test (***)
Notes: Mean contribution is the average of the means of the experimental public
good groups. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the group level.
For periods 2-10, the Fligner-Policello tests the equality of the distributions of
the group means. For period 1, the Fligner-Policello tests the equality of the
distributions of the individual contributions. Stars indicate significance levels (*
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%).
the experiment as stressful or if they rate their e↵ort in the proofreading task as high
inducing an e↵ort-by-stress tradeo↵) or chronic (as measured by the 4-item PSS). The
next three variables represent subjects’ self-rated history of noise exposure on the ex-
perimental day prior to the experiment, over the past year, and during childhood at the
place they lived most of the time. All but the PSS scale are dummy variables which are
constructed from subjects’ answers on a 6-item rating scale. The second set of variables
are demographic characteristics.
Testing for systematic di↵erences in the distributions of the answer ratings between
the treatment group and the control group yields some evidence for endogeneity of
the questionnaire responses. While for most variables, significant di↵erences cannot be
established (using a two-sided Fligner-Policello test), for the two questions on noise ex-
posure during the past year and during childhood, subjects in the noise treatment report
significantly lower exposures compared to the control group. The potential presence of
a bias from endogeneity needs to be taken into account when interpreting regression
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Table 3: Summary statistics of questionnaire variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Pre-experimental stress .5714 .4971 0 1
E↵ort in part I .6696 .4725 0 1
Chronic stress (4-item PSS) 6.009 3.036 0 15
Pre-experimental noise exposure .6429 .4813 0 1
Chronic noise exposure (past year) .4911 .5022 0 1
Noise exposure in childhood .5446 .5002 0 1
Female .5625 .4983 0 1
Age 22.13 2.625 18 33
Major belongs to the social sciences .5 .5022 0 1
Pursues Bachelor’s degree .5893 .4942 0 1
Pursues Master’s degree .1339 .3421 0 1
Pursues Staatsexamen .2321 .4241 0 1
Pursues other degree / no answer .0446 .2074 0 1
results.
The econometric specification used in the regressions is
Ci,t =  0 +  1Pi,t +  2Ti,t +  3Si,t +  1(Ti,t ⇥ Si,t)
+ 4Hi,t +  1(Ti,t ⇥Hi,t) +  5Di,t +  1(Ti,t ⇥Di,t)
+ 6
P
 i,t 1C i,t 1 +  7Ci,t 1
where Ci,t denotes subject i’s contributions in period t, Pi,t denotes a vector of dummy
variables for the experimental periods, Ti,t is the dummy indicating the treatment, Si,t
and Hi,t are the vectors of stress-related and noise-related controls as described above,
Di,t is the vector of demographic controls, and the last two terms represent others’ and
i’s own contributions to the group account in the previous period.
Table 4 reports coe cient estimates from OLS regressions.14,15 The first specifica-
tion only includes the treatment variable, besides the period dummies. Columns (2) to
(4) each include, in addition, one of the vectors containing variables related to either
stress, noise history, or demographics as well as their interactions with the treatment
variable.16 Column (5) presents the full model. Column (6) corresponds to column (5),
14Running random e↵ects GLS panel regressions with period as the time variable yields very similar
results with the same significance levels for all variables.
15Note that due to the small sample size, Table 4 also marks significance levels of below 20% (with
one star in parentheses) for illustrative purposes, in order to point out variables that might plausibly
qualify for significance in a larger sample.
16Among the demographic controls, I leave out age due to its small variation in the student sample. If
there are e↵ects, I expect them to be better reflected by the pursued academic degrees which plausibly
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but, in addition, includes the experimental feedback variables for the previous period.
Coe cient estimates for the period dummies and the constant, which are not reported
in Table 4 but included in each specification, confirm a highly significant negative time
trend, as suggested by Figure 1.
Column (1) confirms the insignificant negative treatment e↵ect suggested by the
nonparametric tests in Section 3.1. Controlling for self-reported variables related to
stress in column (2), the results show significantly higher contributions among those
subjects who both report a stressful day and were exposed to the noise. The limited
statistical power of the sample prevents to clearly disentangle whether the interaction
e↵ect is due to a negative main e↵ect of noise among the self-reported unstressed that is
absent among the stressed, or whether the e↵ect is due to a negative main e↵ect of stress
among the control group that is absent among the treated. Taking together the evidence
from all specifications in Table 4 and from additional regressions, there is evidence for
both. In an attempt to explain this finding, it appears that both a negative e↵ect of
noise as well as of stress is intuitive, but the significant absence of the negative e↵ect if
both conditions meet appears counterintuitive. In particular, the negative e↵ect of pre-
experimental stress would be consistent with “diminished coping from multiple stressors”
(Evans and Cohen 2004) but this is inconsistent with un-diminished or even better coping
under pre-experimental stress and noise. A potential explanation for this finding could
be endogeneity of the questionnaire answers, however: If subjects felt tempted to ex post
report a stressful day as an excuse for having given less, then the positive interaction
e↵ect would imply that in the noise treatment, subjects are simply less tempted to use
this excuse and, at the same time, give less because of the noise exposure. Turning to the
e↵ort in the proofreading task, there is no evidence that treated subjects reporting higher
e↵orts behave di↵erent, potentially from an e↵ort-by-stress tradeo↵, as indicated by the
insignificant interaction e↵ect.17 However, all subjects across treatments who report
higher e↵ort also tend to give more to the public good. This could be a manifestation
proxy for maturity among students.
17In a future analysis of the data, a better way to test for a potential e↵ect of an e↵ort-by-stress
tradeo↵ given the available variables would be to test of di↵erent behavior of subjects who (1) were in
the treatment group, (2) reported over-average levels of e↵ort, (3) reported the noise as bothersome, and
(4) did not miss the timeout.
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Table 4: OLS coe cient estimates of contributions to the group account
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Noise -2.070 -3.784 -0.638 -5.199* -5.919* -2.316*
(1.789) (2.997) (2.417) (2.736) (3.304) (1.308)
Pre-exper. stress – -1.846(*) – – -1.932(*) -1.529***
(1.238) (1.429) (0.551)
. . . * Noise – 3.489* – – 2.917(*) 2.106***
(1.771) (2.150) (0.704)
E↵ort in part I – 2.719* – – 2.833(*) 0.728(*)
(1.467) (1.957) (0.486)
. . . * Noise – -1.969 – – -1.608 -0.250
(1.991) (2.623) (0.786)
Chronic stress (PSS) – -0.076 – – -0.088 0.000
(0.218) (0.283) (0.110)
. . . * Noise – 0.158 – – 0.200 0.077
(0.326) (0.367) (0.140)
Pre-exp. noise expos. – – -1.527 – -0.206 0.116
(1.560) (2.279) (0.891)
. . . * Noise – – 1.765 – 0.961 -0.212
(1.802) (2.497) (1.079)
Chronic noise expos. – – 3.397 – 3.236(*) 0.161
(2.617) (2.432) (0.554)
. . . * Noise – – -2.519 – -0.773 0.783
(2.783) (2.762) (0.705)
Noisy childhood – – 0.272 – 0.677 0.496
(1.361) (1.710) (0.610)
. . . * Noise – – -1.410 – -1.455 -0.602
(1.782) (2.073) (0.761)
Female – – – -0.906 -1.164 0.435
(1.157) (1.456) (0.759)
. . . * Noise – – – 0.449 -0.758 -0.368
(1.543) (2.179) (0.891)
Major of the Soc. Sciences – – – -2.494(*) -3.501* -1.341(*)
(1.858) (1.844) (0.817)
. . . * Noise – – – 2.184 3.519(*) 1.437(*)
(2.545) (2.431) (1.040)
Master student – – – -1.697 -2.918** -0.961
(1.822) (1.383) (0.916)
Staatsex. stud. – – – -3.384(*) -3.526(*) -1.094
(2.510) (2.372) (0.858)
Other stud./n.a. – – – -0.906 -2.186 -0.850
(1.743) (1.774) (1.313)
Master * Noise – – – -1.453 0.106 -0.004
(2.193) (2.216) (1.019)
St.-ex. * Noise – – – 6.916** 7.538** 1.520
(3.112) (2.920) (1.167)
Other/n.a. * Noise – – – 6.368** 9.664*** 3.324**
(2.405) (2.888) (1.577)
Others’ contributions – – – – – 0.138***
(0.018)
Own contribution – – – – – 0.465***
(0.047)
N 1120 1120 1120 1120 1120 1008
# of clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28
R2 0.113 0.140 0.134 0.171 0.227 0.597
Notes: (*) significant at the 20 % level, * at 10 %, ** at 5 %, *** at 1 %. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level and shown in parentheses. All regressions include dummy controls for
experimental periods and a constant. In columns (4)-(6), Bachelor students are the baseline.
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of an experimenter demand e↵ect. The measure of chronic stress, the PSS, does never
significantly correlate with either contributions or noise. Altogether, the evidence on an
e↵ect of stress in the experiment is mixed and supports careful interpretation of simple
ex post survey measures.
Result 3 Survey measures of chronic stress insignificantly correlate with the both con-
tributions to the public good as well as the e↵ect of noise. Survey measures of acute
pre-experimental or intra-experimental stress provide mixed evidence, and contamina-
tion of questionnaire answers by endogeneity, e.g. from ex-post rationalization or an
experimenter demand e↵ect, cannot be excluded.
Column (3) reveals no significant main or interaction e↵ects of the various types of
self-reported noise exposure in the past. This points against a measurable presence of
“adaptation level shifts” (Evans and Cohen 2004).
Result 4 Regression results do not reveal any e↵ects of the various types of self-reported
past noise exposure on contributions or on the e↵ect of noise on contributions.
Employing demographic controls in column (4) delivers a significantly negative e↵ect of
the noise treatment for the baseline of Bachelor students. The e↵ect persists for Master
students, who do not significantly di↵er from the baseline, but is o↵set by a positive
interaction e↵ect of about the same magnitude for Staatsexamen students and for the
residual category of other degrees and non-responding students. In addition, Staatsex-
amen students show tentative evidence for a negative main e↵ect on contributions. As
one would expect, there is (tentative) evidence that students with a major in the social
sciences (mostly economics) give less. Male and female subjects do not significantly dif-
fer in giving behavior or reception of the treatment in the present sample, as one might
have expected from findings by Epstein and Karlin (1975) for the e↵ect of crowding.
Result 5 Controlling for demographics, noise exposure significantly reduces contribu-
tions among subjects pursuing a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree, but not for other subjects
in the sample. No such di↵erences can be established between male and female subjects.
All e↵ects described above generally persist if we test the full model in column (5), with
slight changes in the significance levels of some variables. Also, the full model adds
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(weak) evidence that the significantly negative e↵ect of noise is less received by students
of the social sciences, and that Master students give less in general. The latter e↵ect
can plausibly related to experience or age. The final column (6) conditions contribution
choices on what happened in the previous period. Both experimental feedback variables
are highly significant in explaining behavior in the current period. Including them a↵ects
significance levels of some variables, partly heavily, but does not alter coe cient signs.18
4 Conclusions
Despite a considerable body of literature in other disciplines, for example, environmental
psychology, the e↵ects of environmental stressors have not yet been in the focus of
economists. And rightly so, if environmental stressors are, on aggregate, irrelevant to
economic behavior and decision making. Environmental stressors pose an externality and
source of market failure, however, if their e↵ect is significant, if changes in their levels are
permanent and man-made, and if adaptation is imperfect or costly. This paper provides
evidence for the first of these three conditions. My results suggest a significant adverse
e↵ect of the exposure to acute ambient noise on the extent of voluntary giving to a linear
laboratory public good.
Among the limited related literature, this result confirms findings of a negative e↵ect
of noise on helping behavior (Glass and Singer 1972, Sherrod and Downs 1974, Page 1977,
Moser 1988). The finding supports altruism as the a↵ected motivational transmitter, as
altruism is regarded a common motivation for both helping behavior and public good
contributions (Andreoni 2006). In contrast, the result appears not in line with the
hypothesis that physiological stress is the dominant physiological pathway of the noise
e↵ect, since the (sparse) literature suggests a positive e↵ect of physiological stress on
pro-social behavior (Dovidio and Morris 1975, von Dawans et al. 2012). However, it is
beyond the scope of this paper to clearly identify the mediator causing the observed
e↵ect, and alternative hypotheses do exist. For example, risk preferences or cognitive
processing capacities could equally plausible be the a↵ected motivational drivers of public
18Again, random e↵ects GLS panel regressions with period as the time variable yield very similar
results.
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good giving if subjects perceive the group account as the more risky or more cognitively
demanding option.19 The same argument may hold for the e↵ect on helping behavior
reported in the literature. Likewise, alternative hypotheses besides physiological stress
exist for the physiological transmission of the e↵ect. For example, Page (1977) mentions
stimulus overload, distraction, or escape and avoidance behavior as possible explanations
for the negative e↵ect on helping behavior. These could also be plausibly related to
selfish behavior in cases of social dilemmas. Disentangling these various explanations for
physiological or motivational causes of the e↵ect is left for future research.
The e↵ect of noise found in the present data is an e↵ect of acute, short-term noise
exposure. The extent to which the result may generalize to an environment of chronic
noise exposure, such as urban areas or the vicinity to an airport, depends on adaptation,
as mentioned before. Research on chronic e↵ects naturally poses more di culties as
the researcher mostly relies on either empirical data or natural experiments. Regarding
adaptation costs, the literature provides some evidence on the costs of adaptation to
permanently increased noise levels. For example, chronic noise was found to adversely
a↵ect auditory discrimination in children and thus, reading acquisition, presumably due
to a habituation of adaptation strategies to cope with chronic exposure (Cohen et al.
1973, Evans et al. 1995, Evans and Cohen 2004). If adaptation to chronically increased
levels incurs significant costs, man-made changes in ambient levels of environmental
stressors such as noise would be sources of relevant externalities in the economy, however.
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Appendix
Experimental instructions
[Original wording. Translation to English available upon request from the author.]
Willkommen zu diesem Experiment! Bitte lesen Sie diese Anleitung sorgfa¨ltig durch. Nur so
wissen Sie, wie Sie Ihren Verdienst durch Ihre Entscheidungen und Antworten beeinflussen.
Wenn Sie den Instruktionen folgen, ko¨nnen Sie insgesamt einen angemessenen Geldbetrag verdienen.
Dieses Experiment besteht aus zwei Teilen und einem abschließenden Fragebogen. Alle Teil-
nehmer nehmen am gleichen Experiment teil und lesen die gleiche Anleitung wie Sie.
Ab jetzt und bis zum Ende des Experiments ist es Ihnen untersagt, mit anderen Teilnehmern
zu kommunizieren. Wenn Sie wa¨hrend des Experiments eine Frage haben, heben Sie einfach die
Hand.
Alle Ihre Angaben werden vertraulich behandelt und sind anonym. Das einzige Mal, wo Ihr
Namen und Ihre Adresse beno¨tigt wird, ist auf der Empfangsbesta¨tigung / Quittung der Auszahlung,
die Sie bitte jetzt ausfu¨llen. Tragen Sie dort auch die Computernummer Ihres Sitzplatzes ein, damit
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Ihnen Ihr Verdienst nach dem Experiment zugeordnet werden kann. Das Feld fu¨r den Betrag bitte
freilassen.
Um die wissenschaftliche Verwertbarkeit dieses Experiments zu fo¨rdern, tre↵en Sie alle Ihre
Entscheidungen am besten frei von Mutmaßungen u¨ber den wissenschaftlichen Gegenstand dieses Ex-
periments. Vielen Dank.
Auszahlungen
Wa¨hrend des Experiments spielen Sie um Punkte. Nach dem Experiment werden die Punkte, die
Sie verdient haben, in Euro umgerechnet. Dabei entspricht 1 Punkt = 1,5 Eurocent (0,015 Euro).
Zusa¨tzlich zum variablen Verdienst erhalten Sie eine feste Teilnahmevergu¨tung von 3,00 Euro.
Experiment Teil 1
Wa¨hrend des ersten Teils des Experiments lesen Sie mehrere Texte auf Papier. Jeder Text entha¨lt
Rechtschreib- und Grammatikfehler. Finden und za¨hlen Sie die Fehler, und tragen Sie die An-
zahl in das entsprechende Feld auf dem Computerbildschirm ein. Fu¨r jeden richtig erkannten
Fehler erhalten Sie 5 Punkte. u¨bersteigt die Anzahl der Fehler, die Sie eintragen, die wahre Anzahl
der Fehler im Text, werden Ihnen fu¨r jeden falsch erkannten Fehler wieder 5 Punkte abgezogen. Ihr
Verdienst kann jedoch nicht negativ werden, sondern betra¨gt immer mindestens 0 Punkte.
Beispiel 1: Ein Text entha¨lt 8 Fehler. Sie tragen 5 Fehler ein. Sie erhalten 25 Punkte.
Beispiel 2: Ein Text entha¨lt 8 Fehler. Sie tragen 10 Fehler ein. Sie erhalten 30 Punkte.
Beispiel 3: Ein Text entha¨lt 8 Fehler. Sie tragen 30 Fehler ein. Sie erhalten 0 Punkte.
[Only the treatment group saw the following paragraph:] Wa¨hrend dieses Teils des Experiments
wird der Raum mit Gera¨uschen beschallt. Der Pegel der Gera¨usche ist dabei stets gesundheitlich
unbedenklich und entspricht Pegeln, denen Sie auch im Alltag begegnen.
Experiment Teil 2
Der zweite Teil des Experiments besteht aus 10 Runden. Zu Beginn des zweiten Teils werden
Sie u¨ber Computer per Zufallsauswahl mit drei anderen Teilnehmern/-innen im Raum zu einer
Gruppe zusammengeschaltet. Keiner der Gruppenmitglieder kennt die Identita¨t der anderen
Gruppenmitglieder; sie wird auch nach dem Experiment nicht o↵engelegt. Ihr Verdienst in diesem Teil
wird sowohl durch Ihre eigenen Entscheidungen als auch durch die Entscheidungen der anderen
Teilnehmer in Ihrer Gruppe beeinflusst.
In jeder Runde sind Sie und die anderen Mitglieder Ihrer Gruppe mit der gleichen Entscheidungssi-
tuation konfrontiert: Jede(r) bekommt 20 Punkte zur Verfu¨gung gestellt und entscheidet, wie sie
oder er diese auf zwei Alternativen verteilen mo¨chte. Die beiden Alternativen sind ein privates
Punktekonto und ein gemeinsames Konto Ihrer Gruppe.
• Privates Konto: Jeder Punkt, den Sie Ihrem privaten Konto zuteilen, erho¨ht (ausschließlich)
Ihren eigenen Punkteverdienst, und zwar um 1 Punkt.
• Gruppenkonto: Jeder Punkt, den Sie dem Gruppenkonto zuordnen, erho¨ht den Punkteverdienst
bei allen Mitgliedern der Gruppe, inklusive Ihnen, und zwar um 0,4 Punkte. Gleiches gilt,
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wenn ein anderes Mitglied Ihrer Gruppe Punkte dem Gruppenkonto zuteilt: Jeder Punkt erho¨ht
den Verdienst bei allen in der Gruppe um 0,4 Punkte.
Ihr perso¨nlicher Verdienst pro Runde la¨sst sich nach diesen Regeln wie folgt zusammenfassen:
Ihr Verdienst pro Runde = Ihre Zuteilung zum privaten Konto + 0,4 x Summe der Beitra¨ge aller
Gruppenmitglieder zum Gruppenkonto
Bitte beachten Sie, dass Ihnen der Einfachheit halber auf dem Computerbildschirm nur ein Feld
zum Eintragen von Punkten gezeigt wird. Dort tragen Sie ein, wie viele der 20 Punkte Sie dem Grup-
penkonto zuweisen mo¨chten. Alle u¨brigen Punkte, die Sie nicht dem Gruppenkonto zuteilen, werden
dann automatisch dem privaten Konto zugeteilt.
Beispiel: Angenommen, Sie behalten 10 Punkte fu¨r das private Konto und tragen 10 Punkte in
das Feld fu¨r das Gruppenkonto ein. Ferner sei angenommen, die anderen Gruppenmitglieder tragen
ebenfalls zum Gruppenkonto bei. Nehmen wir an, insgesamt kommen auf dem Gruppenkonto 40 Punkte
zusammen. Diese 40 Punkte bewirken eine Auszahlung von 0,4 x 40 = 16 Punkte fu¨r jeden in der
Gruppe. Ihr eigener Verdienst betra¨gt also die 16 Punkte vom Gruppenkonto und die 10 Punkte auf
Ihrem privaten Konto = 26 Punkte.
Die Tabelle auf Seite 3 gibt eine u¨bersicht u¨ber Ihren Verdienst fu¨r einige beispielhafte Kombi-
nationen wieder. Sie lesen die Tabelle wie folgt: Zeilen stehen fu¨r Beispiele, wie viele Punkte Sie
dem Gruppenkonto zuteilen (also zwischen 0 und 20). Spalten stehen fu¨r Beispiele, wie viele Punkte
die anderen drei Gruppenmitglieder insgesamt auf das Gruppenkonto einzahlen (also zwischen 0
und 60). Jede Zelle gibt Ihren perso¨nlichen Rundenverdienst wieder, der sich wie oben beschrieben
berechnet. Bitte vergewissern Sie sich jetzt, dass Sie die Tabelle vollsta¨ndig verstehen. Zo¨gern Sie nicht,
die Hand zu heben, wenn Sie eine Frage haben.
Vor jeder neuen Runde werden Ihnen Informationen u¨ber die vergangene Runde angezeigt,
und zwar u¨ber:
• Ihren eigenen Beitrag zum Gruppenkonto, den Sie in das Feld auf dem Bildschirm eingegeben
haben,
• die Summe der Punkte aller vier Gruppenmitglieder auf dem Gruppenkonto,
• Ihren Verdienst in der vergangenen Runde, der sich aus diesen Entscheidungen ergibt.
Fragebogen
Das Experiment endet mit einem Fragebogen, wa¨hrenddessen Ihre Auszahlung vorbereitet wird. Die
Antworten auf Fragen im Fragebogen geben Sie am besten spontan, ohne lange und wiederholt daru¨ber
nachzudenken.
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Danke fu¨r Ihre Teilnahme!
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Conclusion
As each article of this dissertation has already drawn conclusions with respect to its
particular research question(s) and results, the purpose of this section is to make some
concluding remarks regarding the common theme of this dissertation. Shared by all five
analyses of the three experiments reported in this dissertation is their relation to the
question of the determinants of private provision of public goods (PPPG). For the sake
of summarizing, the determinants investigated in the five articles can be grouped into
four categories: (A) sociodemographic characteristics, mostly elicited from experimental
subjects by a questionnaire, (B) exogenous environmental conditions, either matched
to subjects by experimental time and location in the field or administered as a treat-
ment, (C) changes in the exogenous parameters or “rules” of the public good “game”,
all of them administered as between-subjects (BS) treatment conditions, and (D) de-
terminants related to subjects’ (endogenous) information status or expectations, again
elicited through questionnaires. Table 1 summarizes the main results regarding these
groups of determinants from the five articles. The table reports both the direction and
significance levels of the e↵ects but does not distinguish whether the e↵ect on PPPG
was at the extensive or intensive margin or both, and whether the public good in the
experiment was real (experiment 1) or an experimental “group account” (experiments 2
and 3).
Our results on the e↵ect of various observable determinants on contributions can help
to target the “right” motives when extending the existing research in the area of why
people voluntarily contribute. In the literature on PPPG, this question has been focal,
and a lot of research has been undertaken in this area (see, e.g., Kolm and Ythier 2006).
Nevertheless the discipline has not yet arrived at a unifying behavioral theory reconciling
the neoclassical prediction and the empirical reality. Experimentally disentangling causal
motivations that mediate observable changes in giving behavior induced by changes in
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Table 1: Determinants of PPPG collected and analyzed in this dissertation
Determinant E↵ect on PPPGa Experiment Remark
A. Sociodemographic characteristicsb
Female ++ / – – – 1,2
Age + /   1,2
Education +++ 1,2
Income   1
Children in HH   1
Rural residential environmentc + 2
Eastern Germany – – / ? 1,2 Significant only if
younger (age < 27)
subjects are excluded
B. Exogenous environmental conditions
Ambient outdoor temperature ++ 1
Media coverage of real public good   1
Acute ambient noise – 3 BS treatment e↵ect
C. Exogenous “rules of the game”
Price of providing a unit of PG – – – 1 BS treatment e↵ect
Visible, observed contribution + 1 BS treatment e↵ect
Group size +++ 2 BS treatment e↵ect,
pure public good,
MPCR=0.3
D. Information / expectations
Endogenous knowledge about real PG +++ 1
Past/present negative contributionsb – – – 1
Egoistic benefit expectationsb +++ 1
Altruistic benefit expectationsb +++ 1 Estimates larger in
size than for egoistic
benefitsa
Notes: Experiment 1 is the framed field experiment of Papers 1 to 3, experiment 2 is the artefactual field
experiment of Paper 4, and experiment 3 is the lab experiment of Paper 5. +++ / – – – Significance
up to 1% level. ++ / – – Significance up to 5% level. + / – Significance up to 10% level.   Not
significant. a Results jointly report the e↵ect on giving at the extensive and intensive margin as well as
to real (experiment 1) and “laboratory” (experiments 2 and 3) public goods. b Self-reported variable(s).
c Variable constructed from self-reported ZIP (PLZ) codes.
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other observable factors can be complex (Imai et al. 2011). Ideally, a successful research
for mediators would identify a couple of main causal drivers of providing public goods
within humans which in fact are the ones mediating the observed e↵ects of all the
identified determinants. Questions for mediators in the context of the determinants
identified in our results would be, for example: What causes the observed di↵erences
between males and females in giving? Are “biological” di↵erences in altruism over time
responsible for an age e↵ect, or are di↵erences in the socialization of di↵erent age cohorts
driving the e↵ect, pointing to social or moral norms driving the e↵ect? Do people who
are more inclined to contribute move to rural areas, or does a rural environment nurture
cooperation? If the latter dominates, is this based on social norms, potentially based
on the dependency on reciprocity in rural areas, or is this a physiological e↵ect on some
intrinsic motivation, e.g. from a quieter environment?
To the policy maker (or fundraiser), who is less likely to be interested in causal
mechanisms, our results suggest that targeting certain subgroups within the population
is likely to have significant e↵ects on the extent of voluntary giving to public goods. The
educated Western German of the countryside may be such a stereotype, for example.
However, some of our results caution against over-extrapolating the observed e↵ects as
some determinants are not consistent in their e↵ect across experiments. This observation
is most pronounced in the case of the di↵erence between males and females. An obvious
explanation is that the e↵ect is contingent on the specific context or type of public
good: While the public good in experiment 1 was real (climate change mitigation), the
public good in experiments 2 and 3 was experimental “group accounts”. This raises
the question to which extent people perceive social dilemmas as social dilemmas, i.e. to
which extent they consider the decision on whether or how much to contribute to some
particular public good as a strategic environment of a multi-person prisoners’ dilemma.
Further research in this area is clearly warranted as it speaks to the external validity of
many experimental results from public good games.
The same question extends to our results that changes in environmental conditions
and the “rules of the game” may a↵ect contributions. While there is evidence that some
of these determinants matter and some not, the question arises which of these e↵ects
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depend on the specific context (e.g. the observed temperature e↵ect) and which do not.
Lastly, some of the most pronounced e↵ects are correlations of contribution choices
with variables related to subjects information status and their expectations and beliefs
about the public good. Apart from pointing to possible mediators such as altruism
or moral norms, this finding strengthens the role informational campaigns can play in
determining contributions. However, all the pronounced e↵ects of informational vari-
ables are based on endogenous information status. In contrast, media coverage as an
exogenous informational variable does not a↵ect contributing in the particular case of
climate change mitigation. This points to important subtleties in the e↵ects of providing,
receiving, and acquiring information regarding public goods.
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